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Abstract
Based on 50 interviews with  activists  and hackers  this  work analyzes  the question  of  political 
rationality of mobile media within a systematic framework of studies of governmentality. It shows 
how through a global and massive use of mobile phones the western concept of the individual is  
enforced,  while  at  the  same time  by means  of  surveillance  and other  interventions  these  new 
freedoms  of  individual  mobile  communication  get  restricted  and  limited  again.  Following  the 
presentation  of  this  dialectical  relation  of  freedom and  surveillance,  a  third  part  discusses  the 
possibilities  and chances  of  autonomous  approaches  for  mobile  communication,  which  operate 
beyond sovereign or commercial regulation. Under discussion are open source wireless solutions, 
such as mesh networks. Two case studies underline the arguments: SMS as a means of support and 
development of protests within the Pakistan Lawyer's Movement against dictator Musharraf, and on 
the other side the surveillance of Berlin based activists by German authorities over years. Further 
Keywords  are:  Governmentality,  Surveillance,  Open  Source  Software,  Privacy,  Power,  Protest, 
Activism, Mobile Media, Surveillance Media.
Aufbauend  auf  50  Interviews  mit  Aktivisten  und Hackern  untersucht  die  Arbeit  die  Frage  der 
politischen Rationalität mobiler Medien im systematischen Rahmen einer gouvernementalen Studie. 
Die Arbeit zeigt, dass die globale massive Verwendung von Mobiltelefonen einerseits zur Stärkung 
des  westlich  geprägten  Individuums führt,  andererseits  mittels  Überwachung und verschiedener 
staatlicher Eingriffe die neu entstandenen Freiheiten der individuellen Mobilkommunikation auf der 
Ebene souveräner Machtausübung wieder eingefangen werden. Dieser Dialektik von Freiheit und 
Überwachung wird ein dritter Teil angeschlossen, der die Möglichkeiten und Chancen autonomer 
Mobilkommunikation, die jenseits staatlicher oder kommerzieller Regelung operiert, diskutiert. Im 
Fokus  stehen  Open  Source  Funk  Lösungen,  wie  Mash  Netze.  Zwei  Fallstudien  flankieren  die 
Analyse:  SMS  zur  Unterstützung  und  spezifischen  Herausbildung  von  Protesten  in  der 
Anwaltsbewegung  Pakistans  gegen  den  Diktator  Musharraf,  und  auf  der  anderen  Seite  die 
jahrelange  Überwachung  von  Berliner  Aktivisten  durch  deutsche  Behörden.  Schlagwörter  sind: 
Gouvernementalität,  Überwachung, Open Source Software,  Privacy, Macht,  Protest,  Aktivismus, 
Mobile Medien, Überwachungsmedien.
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1
Introduction
Sent from mobile device. Please excuse brevity and strange typos.
The ubiquity of mobile phones and the ongoing integration of services into
mobile devices is a challenging subject to study. This almost global phenomena
connects very large parts of populations into a machinic addressable space. It is a
medium that connects the literate and the illiterate, those that have no access to
the banking systems, the street dwellers, and the children, to name only a few. It
appears as if mobile media has no limits. Global mobile phone penetration rates
are higher than electricity. Mobile media also brings the internet to new places
and milieus. It leapfrogs landline telephony and recently also internet access.
Most of the people don’t know how to read. But every family, even
very poor ones, have access to mobile phones. I stayed at a very basic
house, a couple with two kids, and they had two mobile phones. And
the kids used the mobiles. They didn’t have landlines and now they
have mobile phones.
Caminaghi / Campinas (Br)
Such a media revolution in an unprecedented invasive mode rearranges many
sectors and fields of sociality. It changes subjectivities in many ways and invokes
a whole new regime of powers. The way it restructures, but also reinforces power
relations, calls for an analysis from a governmental angle; from an analytics of
rule.
A great number of scholars have published a huge body of literature on mobile
media. To name only a few: Plant examines the effects of the mobile phone in
many different places and cultures (2002). While trying to cover very many top-
ics, and showing both the wide spread use and different practices, the analysis
1
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remains brief and reads more like a report. Goggin (2006) approaches the cell
phone from the point of view of a device for cultural production, consumption and
media convergence. This account is very much focused on the gadget as such.
Rich in statistics, documentations and in the style of a textbook, Ling (2004)
provides a history of mobile telephony that tries to cover the whole phenomena.
Vo¨lker combines a genealogy of mobile technology with the history of the idea of
virtuality (2010). But the technological stories, which are centered around engi-
neers and inventors, do not in my opinion connect very well to the philosophical
reflections about virtuality. There are of course many more monographes, and a
fast growing universe of journal articles on mobile media.
The Social Construction of Mobile Media
Anthropologist Raul Pertierra from Manila, who has written extensively about
mobile phones in the Philippines, argues that
the mobile, like all other technologies such as the computer and the
internet, or earlier ones like the telephone and the radio, are socially
constructed and located. Their effects are only the result, even if un-
predicted and unintended, of the possibilities that they make available
to their human operators. (Pertierra 2006, 16)
While the social construction of technologies certainly is a solid argument, it
lacks explanatory reach: the roll out of mobile media across the globe equals
new and conflicting layers of powers that structure those human operators in
their pursuit of mobile use and subsequent thinking, mentalities and practices.
As much as “[cell phones] themselves are embedded in existing social practice”
(de Souza e Silva, Sutko, Salis, and de Souza e Silva 2011, 412), the social practice
itself is structured, updated and made operational as a political rationality of and
by mobile media.
Thus, the influence that mobile media, by way of an ubiquitous arrangement
of numerous different and heterogeneous power vectors, has on subjects, social
relations, and society is the subject of this work. It is about the political ratio-
nalities of mobile media. The term ‘mobile media’ comprises a semiotic-material
conglomerate of heterogeneous sources and trajectories; therefore it is not limited
to the gadget and neither to the data it sends through the networks. And, as
already said, not to its social construction. Mobile media comprises the material
2
and the immaterial. Mobile media, in very general terms, here is regarded as an
apparatus of security for the production of neo-liberal freedom.
Towards an Analytics of Mobile Media Rule
By pursuing this ambitious and rich theme, the intention is to show that concepts
of mobile media need to acknowledge many more facets than commonly investi-
gated. As a political technology it prescribes and describes simultaneously, thus
establishing its own rationality and regime. On a very general level, it facilitates
the flow of signs, people and goods. Just as James Beniger in his seminal “Control
revolution” stated, “control encompasses the entire range from absolute control
to the weakest and most probabilistic form, that is, any purposive influence on
behavior, however slight” (Beniger 1986, 8; emphasis in original). Mobile media
influences with soft means behavior in many ways. It supplements technologies
of control.
When seen under the lens of governmentality, the faster ways of contacting,
communicating, exchanging data, and other productive constellations that sup-
port the flow of things, signs and people can be understood as techniques and
technologies of governing. Thus, mobile media is a social machine of circulation.
But what are theses virtues and qualities, that mobile media supports, enhances,
and strengthens? In what larger picture do they positively resonate? How does
mobile media fit into a larger dispositif or arrangement? What are the needs and
problems that push mobile media?
The Co-Presence of Signs and Material
Hartmut Winkler, with reference to Beniger, argues strongly in favor of a co-
evolution of media with other spheres: “The development of media appears to
be embedded within the larger context of an economic-technical-social develop-
ment, which in the first place produces the super structures of modernity that
are based on the division of labor”(Winkler 2004, 68; translation O.L.; emphasis
in original).1 In his semiotic-material investigation into the relation of media
and economy, Winkler proposes to put the concept of traffic to the foreground,
because traffic provides the possibility to “describe goods/commodities and signs
1 “Die Entwicklung der Medien erscheint eingebettet in den gro¨ßeren Zusammenhang einer
kombiniert wirtschaftlich-technisch-sozialen Entwicklung, die die arbeitsteilig vernetzte
Großstrukturen der Moderne u¨berhaupt erst hervorbringt.”
3
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albeit their obvious differences in concepts that can be connected” (2004, 93;
translation O.L.).2 One of the terms that he proposes to investigate amongst
others is transmission [U¨bertragung ] in the sense of postal delivery. By recourse
to Siegert (1993), Winkler asks: “Not only that the state owned postal service de-
mands the addressability of subjects is to be shown but that and why the subjects
‘themselves’ saw mailbox slots into their mahogany doors” (2004, 108; translation
O.L.).3 In a similar way, I am interested in exploring why subjects always carry
a digital transceiver around, which makes them addressable and integrates them
into the circuits of circulations of a political rationality. This echoes Foucault’s
notion that (neo-)liberal freedom facilitates “the possibility of movement, change
of place, and processes of circulation of both people and things” (Foucault 2007,
48-49). Different to Winkler, I am more interested in the political rationality in
relation to the emergence of (mobile) media, while I share the assumption that
only an approach on the semiotic-material co-presence can convincingly shed light
on the problem.
In addition, this work is limited by further specifications: mobile media has
reached a point of economical-technical-social integration where it seems prob-
lematic for me to formulate a thesis on the subject as a whole. While the angle of
an analytics of rule provides an entry point to the whole phenomena, the theme
here is reduced to two focal points of mobile media: protest and surveillance.
Mobile Protest Media and Mobile Surveillance Media
These focal points are no coincidence. Protests have gained a high degree of
enmeshment with mobile media. The mobilization capacity of mobile media, its
use within protests for coordination and its easy to use capacity towards media
production, such as small films and audio recordings for internet distribution,
have been generally acknowledged in the last waves of large protests; maybe most
emblematic are the mobile media video documentations from Egypt’s uprising. It
is here that mobile media is widely seen as a tool of empowerment.4 And there is
2 “Waren und Zeichen wa¨ren, ihren augenfa¨lligen Differenzen zum Trotz, in anschlussfa¨hi-
gen Begriffen neu zu beschreiben.”
3 “Zu zeigen eben wa¨re nicht allein, dass die staatliche Post die Addressierbarkeit der Sub-
jekte verlangt, sondern dass und warum die Subjekte ‘selbst’ Briefkastenschlitze in ihre
Mahagonitu¨ren sa¨gen.”
4 See the mobile active portal as an example of a hub for mobile media empowerment pro-
grams. http://www.mobileactive.org (accessed 4 March 2012).
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no question that a media technology that is in the hands of everyone, has effects
on empowerment and agency alike.
In my opinion, when we would not have been able to send out SMS, we
would not have been able to mobilize the people across the country. We
have successfully been able to manage it with SMS across the country.
Mohammad Azhar Siddique / Lahore
But what is gained when one acknowledges this? Many further questions need
to be asked: Who gets empowered? What kind of empowerment to which agency
is this? What political rationalities are set in the foreground by mobile media?
What effects on which subjectivities are the result? To understand which kinds
of power relations and which kinds of subjectivities are empowered, is one of the
central themes here.
The second leitmotif is surveillance. And again, this focal point is no coinci-
dence. As a political technology mobile media allows many new kinds of surveil-
lances, as well as many old ones, at an incredibly cheap rate. Be it targeted or
mass surveillance, be it on the contents of communications or relational about so-
cial networks, the issue of mobile media surveillance, be it commercial or by state
agencies, is unprecedented. The device on the body, seen from this perspective, is
a materialization of pure surveillance media camouflaged; never before was there
a digital location tracker that everyone enjoyed carrying around. In the activist
universe this has triggered specific fears that lead to radical practice.
There was a time, when at a social centre they had a sign on the wall
and that said ‘turn off your phone and take the battery out’. They
established this rule that everyone that would go to a meeting had to
turn off the phone and take the battery out. The reason being that if
you turned off the phone and leave the battery in it, it could be used
that people would be able to listen to your conversation through your
telephone. It was one of those things that I saw, where I thought: you
should be more concerned what you talk in a local bar than taking the
battery out of your cellphone.
Anonymous1 / Mexico City
Both focal points are in a very special relationship, which makes them a pre-
mium site of investigation. Mass surveillance schemes like data retention hold two
main capacities: on the one hand, they produce a larger picture, or better said,
they establish a new knowledge-power axis for rule. The algorithmic production
of knowledge about the population’s communication behavior entails a whole new
5
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set of possible measures for neo-sovereignty. This goes as far as to the production
of data derivatives for contemporary pre-emptive modulations of discrimination.
The other capacity relates to the first, and advances from there. Once a specific
target is calculated, relational surveillance provides access to the social network
and automatically shovels more suspects into the profiler’s file.
Participants in protests have always been of interest to governments and agen-
cies in many ways; the ongoing habit of police and secret services to collect
information about those who go out into the streets is just one. Another one
adheres to the problem of governing: one cannot economically govern against the
desires of the population. Those articulations of protests need to be channeled
into programs of government, they need to be made productive. In this sense,
mass surveillance provides abstract information that is available for mining, as if
it was statistical data on birth and death rates.
Mobile media serves both: empowerment and surveillance. One might even
say: what it gives to one, it just as well gives to the other. But this divide
is a problem. It feigns a contradiction. This contradiction is an effect of an
oversimplified concept of power, echoing the binaries of “the governing” and “the
governed”. This is where an analytics of rule is enlightening. At the core, it
understands that power is everywhere and foremost inter relational. There can
be no societal life without power. The idea is a radical ‘democratization’ of the
power concept: to show that power is effective in different modalities through
all fibers of social life; to make it a productive concept that bridges gaps as it
proscribes a continuum of relations.
Ubiquities of Powers and Traces of Rationalities
Foucault, who was the initial figure for such a power model, was often described
as a dark thinker; the thinker of the prison (Foucault 1977). A common critique
is that he never wrote a book about resistance. An even more common critique
is that he reduced the subject to an effect of powers. I cannot disagree more: an
analytics of rule can provide a fruitful base to analyze protests and resistances.
The paradigmatic shift that makes this possible is to understand government in
a very wide sense: that all sociality is interwoven by governmental aspects that
connect the subjects to programs of government while at the same time these
aspects offer choices and allow the subjects to experience a certain freedom. This
shift provides many different ways to look at government and thus understand
power. Then, I argue, the rationality, the horizon of truth, that justifies one
6
practice while it delegitimizes others, can be understood and questioned.
To see subjectivity as a primary site of investigation for power relations, takes
into account that by pure force no regime can prevail. It is necessary to find those
‘interfaces’ or points of affirmation that allow a ‘system’ of devastation and crude
social injustice to prevail. If power is seen this way, and one includes into the
problem of government the totality of society as multiple productive sites, as a
transit passage of rule, a substantial contribution to resistance and protest can be
made too, because protests and resistance, by their very own nature, articulate
societal issues and demand changes. Thus they are part of government.
Agency Revisited
There is a third focal point lurking behind the two others – empowerment and
surveillance – and in a sense this point fuels this investigation and is its trajec-
tory: how can surveillance mobile media, once it is analyzed and understood, be
deprived of its powers? How can communication technology make a difference
within the liberal paradox of secured freedom? How can a data collecting assem-
blage of surveillance technologies be confronted so that it no longer, seamlessly
and in a more and more automated fashion invades privacy and social relations
with a single click from an operator’s desk? The easy, but cynical answer is, by
switching off the mobiles. But there is a point here: while it has become in-
creasingly problematic to partake in social life without a mobile phone, because
mobile media is invested with great powers, the question is why are there no
privacy enhancing technologies in wide use?
If one divides surveillance into surveillance of contents and of relations, the
former can be encountered with privacy enhancing technologies, while the lat-
ter is situated in a technical necessity, that of meta data or transactional data.
Therefore, the retention of transactional data is an operation that benefits from
the neo-liberal scheme of mobile media. At the same time, it is an expression
of the paradox of liberal rule, which excessively tries to control what it cannot
control. Because meta data cannot be avoided in mobile communication, it does
not help much to use privacy enhancing technologies here. Only in self-operated
infrastructures, can the problem of meta-data be faced. And here the interviewees
come into play.
In this work the discussion of mobile media as, a facet of governmental rule, was
informed by 50 experts who I interviewed in 2009.5 These interviewees actually
5 This round number is a coincidence.
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guide the discussion to large parts as they provide the insights to practice. Be
it mobile protest media or the effects of surveillance, it is their encounters which
have informed the analysis and which made sure this research is based not only
on theoretical considerations but grounded in narrated practice. The interviewees
are reporting about their experiences in protests, how they use mobile media and
what surveillance means to them.
But one has to be cautious here: no matter how much one refers to the inter-
views as expert interviews, that are analyzed as discourse, they remain a problem-
atic hinge of knowledge transposition into an analytics of rule. On the other hand,
the gains are high: what they show is a discourse about protests and surveillance
that has a global reach.
Although this work it not about the goals, detailed interests and actions of the
interviewee’s groups and movements as such, I still felt a need to contextualize
them briefly. This is done in appendix C where, as much as possible, the inter-
viewees themselves explain their activities. Ethical considerations can be found
in appendix A. The problems treated there consider academic knowledge produc-
tion about activists that engage in fights for social justice. It provides information
about measures taken to protect the sources, and the problem of language and
dissemination of this work.
Mobile Protest Media Case Study and Mobile Surveillance Media Case Study
There are two case studies in this work that propose an understanding of mobile
media from two very different ends as a political technology: The first is about
the lawyers’ movement in Pakistan, which took place in 2007 and 2008. My
interviewees here provide detailed accounts of the first mobile media supported
civil society movement in the history of Pakistan. The case provides many good
arguments for a problematization of mobile media empowerment, as it shows
how a governmental subjectivity is facilitated by mobile media. The state of
surveillance during the uprising of lawyers against the Musharraf regime was
not able to cope with the unrest: it was not yet upgraded to deal with the
governmental powers of mobile media - a historical situation that very vividly
describes the dialectical relationship between these two facets of mobile media.
The second case study rests on court documents from Germany, which pro-
vide accounts and insights into the practice of surveillance in a Western, liberal
democratic regime. It describes mobile media in a neo-sovereign mode: how the
suspects are produced by the agencies themselves. After years of an unleashed and
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total surveillance operation, without any outcome that would be relevant enough
to open an orderly case in the courts, the agencies continued to invade the lives of
the Berlin activists. Shutting off the mobile here triggered suspicion to the point
of continued observations. The very intense use of sending silent SMS to the
suspects’ phones provides an illustrative example about the locational tracking
function of mobile media.
Global Governmentality via Mobile Media
Many of the interviews are conducted in countries other than the West. One
may ask about the applicability of an analytics of rule in countries as different
as Pakistan, the US or Japan. Or wonder how a concept, which was developed
vis-a`-vis to Western societies is applicable to non-Western societies.
I discuss this innovative claim in detail because, for the theme of mobile media
as a political technology, one can make very good arguments for an applicability
beyond ‘the West’. My argument is that (neo-)liberal rule is not bound to in-
stitutionalized democracy and not to ‘the West’ as a geographical region. Much
more, where there is mobile media, there is some sort of liberal rule. Mobile media
can be seen as a product of a globalized communication regime, which facilitates
and ’transports’ many mental states and habits once it is rolled out on a massive
scale. While the degrees and outcomes may vary, in general it enables to jabber
free from the state and from traditional ties. This invokes a new rationality: that
of the individual.
It is mobile media that includes, and thus exports, with its own reductive
modifications and means, the Western concept of the individual globally.
Architecture of this Work
To summarize: this work is constructed in three parts. Part one Play of Freedom
introduces the field of governmental studies in relation to mobile media. While
Michel Foucault introduced the concept of governmentality in his late lectures, by
now many other scholars have contributed to the field.6 As much as Foucault’s
texts, it is their texts as well, which informed the outline of the field and other
chapters.
6 To name only few: Nicolas Rose, Thomas Osborne, Andrew Barry, Thomas Lemke, Susanne
Krasmann, Hannelore Bublitz, and most importantly Mitchell Dean, whose “Governmen-
tality: Power and Rule in Modern Society” is used extensively here for its clarity and almost
didactical introduction into an analysis of rule.
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Part one also discusses the conflict-prone relation of empirical research and
governmental studies, and the applicability of governmental studies and generally
of an analytics of rule onto non-Western societies. What follows is an attempt to
come to terms with resistance, empowerment and protests within the analytical
framework. Finally, part one provides the mobile protest media case study about
the lawyers’ movement in Pakistan from where it finally develops a frame of
distributed action via mobile media.
Part two Freedom under Threat: the Liberal Paradox starts with a summa-
rization of surveillance studies and concepts of surveillance. It further discusses
in depth what I call algorithmic neo-sovereign rule, which can be seen as an
illiberal trajectory within the liberal paradox. Under discussion is data reten-
tion and databases on specific suspects. Blocking of mobile communications and
the mandatory registration of SIM cards are further examples where liberal rule
becomes illiberalized. The closing part then comprises the case study of the
§129a investigations against activists in Germany, which provides material evi-
dence about a mega surveillance practice in a ‘democratic’ country.
The third, final, and shortest part; Bottom-Up Security Against Neo-Sovereignty,
navigates the terrain of how mobile communications technologies can be freed
from illiberality. Concepts from the technological realm are presented which seek
out central weak points that allow the relatively cheap operations of the contem-
porary surveillance assemblage.
As closing remarks, instead of lengthy recapitulations, I formulate a couple of
closing arguments developed during the course of this work. They are not a sum-
mary and need to be seen in relation to the former chapters.
As a whole this work tries to make a contribution to the question of how mobile
media could have become so extremely successful. The sites of contestation –
protests and surveillance – that are under consideration, point to the limits of
mobile media. It is here that the trajectories of mobile media crystallize.
10
Part I
Play of Freedom
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2
Governmentality
Introduced by Michel Foucault, in his late lectures (see Foucault 2007 and Fou-
cault 2008)1, the study of governmentality aims at understanding how subjects
are constituted as governable and how governing produces subjectivities whose ra-
tionalities are in a productive relation to its surrounding societal settings. Within
its genealogical account it aims to understand how the economy could be con-
stituted as an object of government, and thus how as a practice of economical
governing, how such a rationality was produced.
This is a shift in Foucault’s theory of power, which establishes a third pillar, that
of governing as management of populations. While he very intensely analyzed
what he called sovereign power and disciplinary power, he now introduced the
concepts of a third type of power with this “rather awkward neologism” (Miller
and Rose 2008, 15); governmentality.
Foucault differentiates a triangle of power with different modalities of function-
ing and problematizations:
Let’s say then that sovereignty capitalizes a territory, raising the ma-
jor problem of the seat of government, whereas discipline structures a
space and addresses the essential problem of a hierarchical and func-
tional distribution of elements, and security will try to plan a milieu
in terms of events or series of events or possible elements, of series
that will have to be regulated within a multivalent and transformable
framework. (Foucault 2007, 20-21)
I will come back to this concept of security, as it is the most important element
here. For now, I want to emphasize that these new ‘power settings’ consist of
1 Smaller important texts are Foucault 1997a, Foucault 1997b, Foucault 1997c, Foucault
2000f, Foucault 2000g, and in part his lectures 1975-76: Foucault 2003.
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strategic and tactical techniques, and technologies of governing, in a different and
much wider sense than political science traditionally covers:
By ‘governmentality’ I understand the ensemble formed by institu-
tions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics
that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power
that has the population as its target, political economy as its major
form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential techni-
cal instrument. (Foucault 2007, 108)
Foucault identified a shift, or transgression, in ruling between the 17th and 19th
centuries, which led to an art of government that had new core issues. The new
trajectory articulated an answer to the old problem of the state: how can the
state survive? This also means that the aim of governing changed from mere
sovereignty, which at its center is answering problems of how a sovereign is re-
lated to a territory and disciplinary power, which was targeting the production of
“docile bodies”, to governmentality, one that targets the population via statistics:
[t]he final objective is the population. The population is pertinent as
the objective, and individuals, the series of individuals, are no longer
pertinent as the objective, but simply as the instrument, relay, or
condition for obtaining something at the level of population.(2007,
42)
The paradigmatic shift is expressed in that rule no longer understands a series of
individuals as the target of government, but an abstraction: the population.
Economical reasoning had invested such a shift in paradigm as the primary
rationality. This “funding act of economic thought and economic analysis” sought
a solution to the problem of scarcity, as scarcity leads to revolt: “freedom of
commerce and of the circulation of grain began to be laid down as the fundamental
principle of economic government” (2007, 33). The early modern state’s “essential
issue of government will be the introduction of economy into political practice”
(2007, 95). No longer can sovereign and discipline alone respond to the needs
of a population since its individuals are framed as free citizens with rights. The
predatory style of sovereignty power could, for example, not handle the need to
react on issues of scarcity of food. It invoked unsuccessful measures as it was
generally blind towards the population as a productive force.
Governmental regimes are then historically related to bourgeois revolutions.
But, as of today, governmental management is not limited to this tradition. In
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the present, political economy has become a pillar of government even in the most
rigid regimes.
In relating a population’s “natural” behavior, such as trade and exchange, to a
technique of governing, the emerging modern state was much more effective and
less costly then prior modes of rule, whose exercise of power towards its subjects
was primarily structured through exertion of force or violence, i.e. one of the
most common logics of rule was concerned with taking, not granting (life, food,
money).
Thus, for the first time in the history of rule, economic considerations became
the guiding principles of rule. This could only be established with whole new
perspectives on what ruling is about and what it encompasses. Foucault delivers
a deep description of the historical processes that brought to light what today is
seen as liberal rule, but this genealogy is not of particular interest here.
Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller point out the wide range of what counts as
government, as it is the:
historically constituted matrix within which are articulated all those
dreams, schemes, strategies and maneuvers of authorities that seek to
shape the beliefs and conduct of others in desired directions by acting
upon their will, their circumstances or their environment. (Miller and
Rose 2008, 54)
My claim is that this concept fits in understanding mobile media, mobile phone
dissemination, and the production of the corresponding subjectivity, which has a
need of “unlimited” communication as part of such a matrix.
Mobile phones are a very basic working tool, because our system here
works very much via information exchange. Before mobile phones it
was very hard: we went many times and waited for a call or go and
communicate with people personnally. We were using phone cards.
But sometimes people were late and couldn’t tell that everything was
alright, because they he had no phone card. Then some people would
go and look for that person. Now the mobile phones solve 80 percent
of our external communication needs.
Christoph and Bispo / Sa˜o Paulo
Mobile media, to my understanding, is a promising political technology to dis-
cuss what “is precisely the nature and limits of ‘the political’, the political as itself
a transactional space, a historically variable zone of rationalization and division”
(Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996, 7).
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There is an impressive phenomena in Mexico: the explosion of the use
of mobile phones. In a few years it became much more than landline
users. The social organisations are not an exception. Very fast it became
from something that only the business people used to a technology that
is used massively. I perceived something similar with laptop computers,
there are more offers to get one, there are credits.
Enrique / Mexico City
To affect will, circumstances, and environments are techniques that comprise
what government henceforth is. In the first moment, to ‘act upon will’ seems to
contradict the notion of the autonomous subject and the idea of free will. It is
a Christian tradition that according to Foucault helped to act upon the will of
subjects without interfering with the modern idea of the autonomous subject.
2.1 Political Technologies: Pastoral Power
But how could the modern state work in this way? What existing techniques were
available that would allow individuals to be conducted and be self-conducted? On
the individual level, the historical cultural quality that was made productive came
from Christian tradition.
Christianity had in large part organized power’s hold on the ordinary
preoccupations of life: an obligation to run the minuscule everyday
world regularly through the mill of language, revealing the common
faults, the imperceptible failings even, and down to the murky inter-
play of thoughts, intentions, and desires. (Foucault 2000a, 166)
Originally, it was Christian pastoral power that made subjects susceptible to
guidance. With the emergence of the modern subject the ability to guide the
self-conduct of subjects has been adopted by the modern state in a secular form
(Dean 2010, 90-101; see also Bublitz 2010a, 57-77).
The name “pastoral power” seems irritating as this coincides with the emergence
of secular rule and the secular state, but Foucault argues that “the modern West-
ern state has integrated into a new political shape an old power technique that
originated in Christian institutions” (Foucault 2000f, 332). This “ritual of confes-
sion” as an “individualizing power” (Foucault 2000g, 300) was outreached by an
administrative power, “a recording mechanism instead of a pardoning mechanism”
(Foucault 2000a, 166). The ‘cultural technique’ of confession served different aims
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within secular powers. One was to bring “the quotidian into discourse, to survey
the tiny universe of irregularities and unimportant disorders” (Foucault 2000a,
166) and to accumulate, make productive and transform these former traceless
uttering into a whole new body of knowledge.
Act Upon Will
Pastoral power provides the qualities to channel subjectivity, a power of govern-
mentality: it looks after the individual, it brings to light and into discourse the
inner thoughts and mentalities of the individual. It implies a knowledge of the
conscience and an ability to direct it. Here, the famous “conduct of conduct” gets
under way, which has found its historical programmatic fulfillment in neo-liberal
government. Rule conducts subjects as if they conducted themselves, it acts upon
their will. By this it adapted to the ‘free will’ of the modern subject. Pastoral
power emerged when the modern subject was invested with rights and autonomy.
The modern state, in its political and philosophical conception, at the same time
produced a power independent from ‘the political’.
Pastoral power operates vis-a`-vis a “field of possibilities in which the behavior
of active subjects is able to inscribe itself” as “a set of actions on possible actions”
(Foucault 2000f, 341).
I argue that mobile media seamlessly integrates into this form of power. Mobile
media encourages users to chat. It expands the plane of pastoral power to a tech-
nology over distance, which can inspect and nurture the quotidian and intimate
at any given place and time. Mobile media answers to the problem of mobility,
and it updates pastoral power to remain a technique of government also in these
circuits of circulation.
Pastoral power is thus one key ingredient of governmental power: it conducts
and its conduct is rationalized as freedom, as it conducts with offers and possibil-
ities much more than with constraints and prohibition. Techniques of confession
are part of this complex set, such as the Freudian analysis or self-help-groups
in feminism (Illouz 2008, 97-103). Recent television formats are part of this set
of techniques; empowering the subject to discuss its inner state in public to ex-
tend that subjectivity is a product of such self-presentations, what can be called
post-disciplinary subjectivation (Bublitz 2010a).
In contrast to previous forms of rule, now the subject was to be convinced of
acting within a specific desired realm of addressability and rationality, where it
could be held responsible as an individual invested with rights. In former rule
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the subject was to be disciplined at its outer layers; to make the body work, one
might say. Rule was ‘not interested’ in the inner state of subjects as such. This
was not part of rule. This field had belonged to religion and the Saviour of the
soul.
Governmental rule is now calculating immanently with this resource as it co-
functions with the goal of economic rule: the subjects (have to) care for them-
selves.
The way in which freedom is organized and laid out by rule has many facets, but
maybe most importantly “governing involves not just the ordering of activities
and processes. Governing operates through subjects” (Miller and Rose 2008, 42).
This can only be be achieved if the subjects are addressed as individuals with a
formal autonomy and rights.
So, government becomes a personal matter which enrolls “individuals as allies
in the pursuit of political, economic and social objectives.” Government programs
thus become a “part of the ‘self-steering’ mechanisms of individuals. Hence ‘free’
individuals and ‘private’ spaces can be ‘ruled’ without breaching their formal
autonomy” (Miller and Rose 2008, 42). Pastoral power is not a contradiction
to this concept of formal autonomy, as it directs the formal autonomous subject
and its decisions in a non-subjugating, soft and convincing manner. A convinced
subject acts as a free subject.
2.2 The Means of Freedom as Rule and Freedom as
the Correlative of Security
Enrolling individuals as allies in the pursuit of political, economic and social
objectives needs to rely on a broader and much more extended net of operational
entities and discourses. Miller and Rose are proposing different problematizations
of political rationalities “in which politicians, intellectuals, philosophers, medics,
military strategists, feminists and philanthropists have measured the real against
the ideal and found it wanting”, which translate into programmatic work
of designs put forward by philosophers, political economists, phys-
iocrats and philanthropists, government reports, committees of in-
quiry, White Papers, proposals and counterproposals by organizations
of business, labor, finance, charities and professionals that seek to con-
figure specific locales and relations in ways thought desirable. (Miller
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The rationality of political economy is translated into programmatic modalities.
Foucault characterized governmental rule thus as “centrifugal”, as the elements
authorities seek to render into government are, “in principle unlimited” (Miller
and Rose 2008, 63).
One can call the resulting heterogeneous ensembles for governmental manage-
ment assemblages. They entail
the routines of bureaucracy; the technologies of notation, recording,
programs, knowledge and expertise that compose a field to be gov-
erned and invest it with purposes and objectives; the ways of seeing
and representing embedded in practices of government; and the differ-
ent agencies with various capacities that the practice of government
require, elicit, form and reform. (Dean 2010, 37)
The advantage in describing governmental rule assemblages is that any reference
to this rule as a single command structure or other pure instrumental orders of
rule is excluded. An assemblage is a rhizomatic structure. It comprises links
to sovereign or disciplinary rule, but not on a privileged level. In the detailed
discussion about data retention I return to the concept of the assemblages as
used by Haggerty and Ericson (2000).
2.3 Economy, Freedom and Security
Foucault’s earlier writings, most prominently on discipline and punishment, did
not theorize much on the question of how a form of rule can remain in power
productively and in a sustaining way. To suppress the subjugated is expensive and
it cannot be done in a very fine granular way at the individual level. Further, it has
only short term effects compared to an organization of rule, in such a way that the
subjugated deliberately act in concord with rule. With the turn to governmental
management the key question becomes the “economic relation between the cost
of repression and the cost of delinquency” (Foucault 2007, 9). Thus, Foucault
has offered a reading of government that aims explicitly at governing “through a
particular register, that of the economy” (Dean 2010, 29; emphasis in original).
The freedom produced in such a rule “is nothing else but the correlative of the
deployment of apparatuses of security”(Foucault 2007, 48). Therefore, as freedom
is about the flow of things, signs and people, the measures that have to be deployed
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to provide this freedom are soft and managing. They need to connect to the
technologies of the self, like mobile media.
As Thomas Lemke writes,
Foucault corrects the findings of the earlier studies in which he in-
vestigated subjectivity primarily with a view to “docile bodies” and
had too strongly stressed processes of discipline. Now the notion of
government is used to investigate the relations between technologies
of the self and technologies of domination (2002, 4).
Economic freedom then does not refer to abstract aims, but to a civic mobiliza-
tion at a large scale: mobilizing the whole population as agents of government
translated abstract political economy into “a formula of rule, a resource for gov-
ernment” (Barry et al. 1996, 8). By now the population follows its ‘own interests’
without fearing sanctions in this pursuit.
Bernhard Siegert has discussed the establishment of the postal system for citi-
zens (Siegert 1993). By way of monopolizing postal correspondence, he argues, the
state has turned away from a Machiavellian view on population to a bio-political
view, which regards population as a productive entity: the postal system thus had
to serve the benefit of the population, population became its reason for existence.
“A goal of the postal system is to enmesh people in discourse” (Siegert 1993, 62;
translation O.L.), while at the same time, the ubiquity of the postal system acted
as an identification scheme: “Identity is not longer a question of biographical
depth, but a question of addressability” (Siegert 1993, 126; translation O.L.).
The postal system makes pastoral power a source of governmental rule and, just
like mobile media, demonstrates how power is dissipative and exhausts voluntari-
ness of citizen cooperation. Governmental rule organizes a milieu for circulation,
that of letters, signs, and, according to Siegert, literature. The circulation of
letters ensures an “existential precondition” (Bro¨ckling, Krasmann, and Lemke
2010, 6) of freedom as it works as an apparatus of security to organize this milieu.
When subjectivities are analyzed as products of this relation to freedom at
the core of government, then liberalism is not “an absence of government, or of
lessening of political concern with the conduct of conduct” (Barry et al. 1996, 9)
as neo-liberal ideology proclaims. On the contrary: government has nested itself
into the tiniest strains of intelligibility and affects to produce specific actions.
The means how government could nest itself within these tiny bits are what
Foucault calls the apparatuses of security.
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They are the products of the programs of government mentioned in the list
above by Miller and Rose. The apparatuses of security translate reality; to pro-
duce differences. As they deal with a complex and heterogeneous material in this
‘dirty reality’, e.g. the population and its actions, the precise outcome of their
operations is not immediately known and unforeseeable. Statistics deliver a cer-
tain kind of knowledge about the reality. Calculation thus plays an integral role
in governmental management. The space of security where economic freedom is
produced “refers to the temporal and the uncertain”, and the milieu is what is
needed “to account for action at a distance of one body on another. It is there-
fore the medium of an action and the element in which it circulates” (Foucault
2007, 20-21). Freedom, in this understanding, is not an antagonism to security
but its correlative. Freedom is a product of the milieu of security. Free subjects
are “individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in
which several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and modes of behavior
are available.” In this design “face-to-face confrontation of power and freedom”
is impossible as “mutually exclusive facts” (Foucault 2000f, 342). The freedom of
choices arranges a plane for power relations to act upon.
Freedom in this concept is not transcendental or metaphysical, but in very
concrete terms the ability to act upon choices, whose probabilities are laid down
by governmental techniques, by the apparatuses of security.
They are not only operating in the modality of probabilities to regulate reality,
as they might still be “possibly making use of some instruments of prescription and
prohibition” (Foucault 2007, 47) (read: discipline and sovereign power). Security
includes any means necessary to ensure the goal of the production of freedom,
although primarily security is not an enforcing, suppressing technique. Security
has to come to grips with desires as “every individual acts out of desire. One can
do nothing against desire” (Foucault 2007, 74). Economic government, and thus
the survival of the state, depends upon the viability of “how to say yes to this
desire” (Foucault 2007, 73). To render reality thinkable government had to reach
out and enroll all possible elements and entities, as “rationalities were a style of
thinking, ways of rendering reality thinkable in such a way that is was amenable
to calculation and programming” (Miller and Rose 2008, 16).
The Population and Society
This leads to an unprecedented need for knowledge about the governed ob-
jects/subjects, which, as they formulate their desires and bring them into dis-
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course, are the subjects of government.
The management of the population is informed by “a set of elements in which
we can note constants and regularities even in accidents, in which we can identify
the universal of desire regularly producing the benefit of all” (Foucault 2007, 74).
From the production of statistics, to the detailed and special interest in subgroups
and subsets of the population, the new managerial art goes much deeper into
people’s lives and affairs than any governing ever before has: “managing the
population means managing it in depth, in all its fine points and details” (Foucault
2007, 107), to the extent that statistical knowledge can provide.
A Nominalist Perspective on the State
When Foucault says that “governmentalization of the state has nonetheless been
what has allowed the state to survive” (Foucault 2007, 109), his emphasis on the
survival of the state is more than a comment on state centered thinking (which
itself can be understood as a product of governmentality). It derives from the
notion that from the point of modern governing “one can be nominalistic about
the state: it has no essential necessity of functionality” (Miller and Rose 2008,
56), or otherwise, one can call “this a radical political constructivism, a radical
constructivist perspective on the state” (Saar 2010, 39). This is a provocative
assessment, contrary to the established modern tradition to root political theory
in concepts of sovereignty that relates to feudal or absolutist phases (see Kras-
mann and Volkmer 2007, 10-12). For the understanding of the historicity and
political rationality of rule, this is a logical step: the state has no essence, no
non-historical core and even lacks core mechanisms. It is much more a “way of
dividing a ‘political sphere’, with its particular characteristic of rule, from other
‘non-political spheres’ to which it must be related” (Miller and Rose 2008, 56).
Governmentalization of the state essentially led to the emergence of civil soci-
ety. With the emergence of this ‘counterweight’, the state has naturalized and
immunized itself by artificially dividing government spheres: that of the state and
that of civil society.
The Birth of Civil Society as the State’s Counterweight
Government divided the spheres into political/state and non-political/non-state
spheres, albeit still both becoming terrains of governing. As government “is at the
same time both external and internal to the state” it is potentially limitless and
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total. It decides, “what is public and what private, what is and is not within the
state’s competence” (Foucault 2007, 109). But while this government identifies
and manages realms and fields outside of ‘politics’ it tries to do so “without
destroying its existence and its autonomy” (Miller and Rose 2008, 60).
This domain is what today we refer to as civil society. Protests and resistance
emerge from this civil society’s initiatives. Civil society can be understood as the
counterweight of the state, as in liberalism (and in general in the modern state),
“political rule was given the task of shaping and nurturing that very civil society
that was to provide its counterweight and limit” (Miller and Rose 2008, 59).
Mobile media’s success is a success based on the penetration of civil society
with this political technology.
The mobile is increasing, Bangladesh is connecting, there are 50 million
people now, there is also a sort of GPRS connection. Maybe there are
6 companies in the country. It is increasing, mostly young people, so
50 million does not mean 50 million people, but sim cards. Using them
reduces the cost to communicate with each other, so in general activists
are using email or the mobile so that groups come together, to call
“let’s have a meeting in the evening”. It helps to reduce cost of writing
letters. They come much closer in one time frame. Suppose there is a
rally, so you text it to people to come and join. It is very useful.
Swapan / Dhaka, Bangladesh
Civil society is once a necessity in functional and economic terms of rule, and
it is once the state’s reason to survive as the state acts as its counterweight.
Together, they form a functional, reciprocal entity. Civil society is “both distinct
from political intervention and yet potentially alignable with political aspirations”
(Barry et al. 1996, 9). It can function as a counterweight to the state because here
“power is confronted on the one hand, with subjects equipped with rights that
must not be interdicted by government.” In economic terms civil society fulfills a
function within government, as government “addresses a realm of processes that
it cannot govern by the exercise of sovereign will because it lacks the requisite
knowledge and capacities” (both Miller and Rose 2008, 59; emphasis in original).
Civil society is the answer to the problem of how to govern economically as it
allows the realization of processes that are not the realm of sovereign rule. Civil
society thus emblematically stands for what liberal rule has produced: an new
zone of rule with its own regularities, that acts as a correlative to sovereign rule
and at the same time as the sovereign’s (the state’s) raison d’eˆtre. Indeed, “the
objects, instruments and tasks of government must be reformulated with reference
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to this domain of civil society with the aim of promoting its maximal functioning”
(Miller and Rose 2008, 59).
The politics of the movements is something the state is increasingly
worried about. There have been successful actions [...] in terms of
stopping of projects, of not allowing land acquisition, of not accepting
displacement and rehabilitation. So there is that kind of pressure on
the state.
Vijayan / Delhi
From this it follows that protests originate from civil society and address the
malfunctioning of government. With this they have become an integral part of
government.
[T]he idea of an opposition between civil society and the state was
formulated in a given context in response to a precise intention: some
liberal economists proposed it at the end of the eighteenth century to
limit the sphere of action of the state, civil society being conceived of
as the locus of an autonomous economic process. This was a quasi-
polemical concept, opposed to administrative options of states of that
era, so that a certain liberalism could flourish. [...] the reference
to this antagonistic pair is never exempt from a sort of Manicheism,
aﬄicting the notion of the state with a pejorative connotation at the
same time as it idealizes society as something good, lively, and warm.
(Foucault 2000e, 371-372)
The administrative state and civil society have a relationship of mutual depen-
dency, where civil society serves as an identification figure in contrast to the state.
There exists a “mutual interdependence of power, freedom and resistance” (Death
2010, 239) in governmental management which is essential for the survival of the
state. By addressing the state and demanding participation civil society re-enacts
the state, appeals the state, calls for the state. It produces its raison d’eˆtre by
this invocation.
Governing then is the art of integration and production of performative answers
in regard to articulations and aspirations of the population: practices aiming
at channeling these aspirations towards a compatibility of economic production,
circulation of any sort, while the effect is maintaining the state. Governing is
concerned with the survival of the state, an aim that is circular and infinite.
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Mobile media as a political technology of civil society, as a governmental tech-
nology is a heterogeneous ensemble that adapts and is flexible, and has produced
specific practices, by which it can be identified. These practices have to be ratio-
nalized to become real. Bro¨ckling et al. summarize this point nicely:
It is rationalities and practices of government that generate subjects
in the first place, subjectivating by invoking and legitimizing certain
images of the self while excluding others. People are thus addressed,
for example, as citizens aware of their rights, as political activists
concerned about the societal future, or as artists who realize them-
selves through their creativity; and they also articulate themselves as
citizens, activists, artists, and so forth. (Bro¨ckling et al. 2010, 13)
Invoking the image of a productive self, whose communication needs are struc-
tured by the paradigm of circulation, mobile media is a strong facilitator of sub-
jectivity production and rationalized practices. I will return to this later.
Sovereignty and Discipline in the Age of Governmentality
We do have a legislation that is not much in any way with the practice.
We do have a legislation that requires, when my phone is tapped, a
permission from a particular level of authority by the police for doing so.
The authority from whom the permission has to be sought, for political
reasons their phones were getting tapped and they never agreed on this.
The police is very privileged with the communications department in
India. You just need a normal constable in India. Nothing has to be
given in writing, nothing has to be given as evidence, no reason has
to be quoted for doing that. The police access to the communication
department has been just disastrous in that they really end up not
following any legislation. If you ask the station head officer: do you
know that there is a legislation which prohibits you from tapping my
phone? He would laugh at you.
Vijayan / Delhi
The established, old power modulations of sovereignty and discipline (prohibit
and punish) are being rearranged, eventually in surprising ways, as they have
to be arranged within the set of managerial apparatuses. Subjects now respond
differently to such measures and they need to be accompanied by a whole range
of managerial settings, otherwise the population would regard them as ‘wrong’
or improper governing. Government runs high risks when it invokes its ‘hard’
registers too often or too contingently.
25
Chapter 2. Governmentality
The mobile phone network was absolutely working during the 2006/2007
protests. Without interruptions. That is really strange, because Oax-
aca was a strategic point of resurgency and all this shit since 2006. In
one minute they can shut down all the mobile phones, but they didn’t.
I don’t know why. Maybe capitalism is bigger than we think. Here
in Mexico, the boss of the cell phone networks is one of the richest in
Mexico. Maybe in situations like this, surveillance and network are the
same. This all is part of the contradiction.
Blax / Oaxaca (Mx)
They must arrange themselves with the established transit reality of society
as “the emergence of a new field for producing effects of power: the new, self-
regulating field of the social” (Scott 1995, 203). While discipline produces “docile
bodies”, governmental management produces mindsets, rationalities and perfor-
mative settings that relate the subjects to the state: it can no longer appear as
an exteriority of incalculability and fear, but has to rule in accordance with the
population’s needs and desires.2
2.4 Government Programs: Techniques, Practices,
Failures and Risks
More and more people in the movements are using 3g cell phones and
MST has been implementing lately IP-phones for those activists that
travel. So, anywhere in the world they can talk for free.
MST Workers / Sa˜o Paulo
Techniques and technologies of governing are not solely seen as reifications,
materializations of technologies, or gadgets of some sort. Governmental studies
are not technocentric. But “to analyse mentalities of government is to analyse
thought made practical and technical” (Dean 2010, 27). The
concept of technology here includes technical artifacts, strategies of
social engineering, and technologies of the self; it refers to both ar-
rangements of machines, medial networks, recording and visualization
systems, and so forth, and to a range of procedural devices through
which individuals and collectives shape the behavior of each other or
themselves. (Bro¨ckling et al. 2010, 12)
2 In chapter 7 I discuss the emergence of a neo-sovereignty that operates within this paradox
of liberal rule.
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Thomas Lemke points out that the
analysis of government operates with a concept of technology that
includes not only material but also symbolic devices. It follows that
discourses, narratives and regimes of representation are not reduced to
pure semiotic propositions; instead, they are regarded as performative
practices. (2007, 9)
It is the semiotic-material ensemble, which engages in actions, practice and chan-
nels behavior. Thus, a governmental technique is successful when a practice is
established, in wide use and performative.
It is the technology that does not rely on cable. I just received a phone
call for negotiations, but i don’t finish it by cell phone because human
to human contact is much richer. But this way the system works today,
you need a phone. Technology is created and so you must engage.
Today’s technologies are bad for the environment, and the capitalist
system and consumer society creates an environment where you need
those technologies.
Christoph and Bispo / Sa˜o Paulo
Mobile media is such a conglomeration of technologies, bodies and symbols,
which enable performative practices with different effects. It can be understood
as a channeled proposal of an unlimited demand for performativity that answers
its own circuits, as it prescribes and describes conduct at the same time.
Nikolas Rose highlights the difference of this conduct to other forms of human
reflection. “No doubts throughout the ages humans have reflected upon the con-
duct of themselves and others, but such thought becomes governmental to the
extent that it seeks to render itself technical, to insert into the world by ‘realiz-
ing’ itself as a practice” (1996, 41; emphasis in original). This is an established
setting of rules, conduct, and norms. Practice in the governmental sense is al-
ways a historical product of a heterogeneous ensemble that together sets up this
practice, but is never ultimately fixed. Practice as part of reality means it is
always comprised of a larger operational set of functionalities to deal with the
undetermined complexities of reality.
Also regimes of practice can well work with deviance and resistance to these
technological strategies. Mobile media is incorporated into practice differently.
This is a kind of people’s assessment. With social movement people, for
them social movement is their goal, so first social movement, and then:
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how to use mobile media for that. But general public, for them, mobile
media exists from the beginning in their daily life. They are immersed
in mobile media. When they felt that they want to participate in a
social movement, they just use what they are used to use.
Two Korean Activists
Regimes of practice immanently include alternatives, updates and actualizations
towards specific problems. They need to renew themselves to remain operational
as they internalize critique to the point and goal of remaining operational. They
“possess a logic that is irreducible to the explicit intentions of any one actor
but yet evinces an orientation toward a particular matrix of ends and purposes.”
(Dean 2010, 32) Whereas the particularity of this matrix is not a singularity, but
immanently loops back to desires and governmental programs alike. A singularity
would ‘disconnect’ from the regimes of practice.
Due to the systemic limits of governmental knowledge, governmental practices
are continuously in the process of iteration and updating as it aims to work
productively with the biggest possible part of the population. Direct intervention
into sub-groups is costly and to be deferred as long as possible. Political economy
factors decide on the viability of a regime of practice.
The japanese mobile media costs are high, so even when you like it, it
is difficult to use. If I had more money, there would be a lot of things
to do with it.
Yasuda / Tokyo
This necessary constant adaption of governmental practice, which includes fail-
ures to certain limits, is systemic in so far as it works vis-a`-vis an abstract: the
statistical knowledge about the population on which it decides and reflects. But
“solutions for one programme tend to be problems for another” (Miller and Rose
2008, 71).
By nature, government risks malfunctioning or producing unintended effects.
Programs of government are “confronted with forces removed from their access
or blocking it, deflecting it, or neutralizing it, these programs also consistently go
astray” (Bro¨ckling et al. 2010, 11). Government cannot adjust to the particulari-
ties on all levels of scale and in real time. “Hence the description and prescription
always involves elusion in that knowledge of government is always also an erring,
inadequate, or failing knowledge.” (2010, 11)
For this reason programs of governing are invested with a calculation of their
own risks. The reality has its own resistances towards programs as it appears “to
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escape those bodies of knowledge that inform governmental programs, refusing to
respond according to the programmatic logic that seeks to govern” (Miller and
Rose 2008, 71). But resistance from reality and inadequacies of programs are part
of the calculus of governmental management. Failure is a feature, a part of rule,
at least to the extent that the state can continue to exist.
Unplanned outcomes emerge from the intersection from one technol-
ogy with another, or from the unexpected consequence of putting a
technique to work. Contrariwise, techniques invented for one pur-
pose may find their governmental role for another, and the unplanned
conjunction of techniques and conditions arising from very different
aspirations may allow something to work without or despite its explicit
rationale (2008, 71)
For the conglomerate of protest, mobile media and surveillance, which com-
prises, evokes, and updates a large set of governmental programs, it is likely to
have failing pieces of programs and new outcomes that are unexpected or work
against an outlined rationale. I will return to this in the sections that discuss
technologies of securitization and surveillance.
There is no master plan governmental techniques can follow, but they prescribe
according to what they presume to find. Their “programmes presuppose that
the real is programmable, that it is a domain subject to certain determinants,
rules, norms and processes that can be acted upon and improved by authorities”
(2008, 63). The outcomes of the programs themselves operate in the plain and
open, struggling to form a milieu. Governmental practice thus produces a truth
by acting in the real, a truth that only exists if it performs productively in reality.
Truths need vigor, agency. Regimes of practice “can be identified whenever there
exists a relatively stable field of correlation of visibilities, mentalities, technolo-
gies and agencies, such that they constitute a kind of taken-for-granted point of
reference for any form of problematization” (Dean 2010, 37). The conduct of
mobile media is such a taken-for-granted point of reference. As mobile media
connects the individual technologically to regimes of communications, it emblem-
atically follows a trajectory of integration into the circuit of addressability and
rule. One might understand it as a programmatic empowerment of the subject
for governmental rule.
One problem in occupations we always have is the batteries and how to
charge them. We don’t have electrical power. That is one of the reasons
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why we try to make contacts with the people around the occupation:
to be able to charge the phones. Usually within 2 weeks we get a
clandestine powerline.
Ferna˜o / Sa˜o Paulo
If “powers are stabilized in lasting networks only to the extent that the mech-
anisms of enrollment are materialized in various more or less persistent forms”
(Miller and Rose 2008, 65), and thus these lasting forms act as stabilized channels
for established regimes of practice, their modification, rejection, or affirmation is
a trigger and strategic point for societal change, as “‘Power’ is the outcome of
the affiliation of persons, spaces, communications and inscriptions into a durable
form” (2008, 65).3 Such a perspective understands durability as a result of re-
curring inscription processes that iterate power stable into a strategic, stabilized
node. Inscription is a “way of acting upon the real, a way of devising techniques of
inscribing it in such a way as to make the domain in question susceptible to evalu-
ation, calculation and intervention” (2008, 626). Mobile media in many different
ways fits into a larger inscription scheme: it acts upon the real, intervenes, gets
evaluated and calculated, and at the same time triggers another will to knowledge
and power: that of the sovereign state to control and surveil.
To briefly summarize: mobile media channels regimes of practices for the indi-
viduals who in their performance produce the reality of those regimes. But this
performativity cannot be determined and the effects in reality are manifold and
vary, so that mobile media as well serves purposes beyond, or in contradiction
to, programs of governmentality. Still, mobile media ‘serves’ as a governmental
programme for the addressability and enhanced productivity of the political eco-
nomically governed.
What is left for now are questions of method. On the one hand, the relation
of empirical research and an analytics of rule, on the other the applicability of
governmental studies within non-Western societies.
3 Actor Network Theory can contribute to an analytics of government, as it also follows the
actants, that are both human and non-human. See Conradi and Muhle (2011), Ro¨hle
(2011), and Seier (2011) for the potentialities of a Foucauldian ANT and its limits.
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2.5 Insertion: Empirical Statements and Govern-
mental Research
Unlike many other studies that relate to post-structuralism, governmentality re-
search is explicitly historical in its perspective, as it engages in the history of the
present, and empirical in its orientation. “This has much to do [...] with a concern
with power in its multifarious practical, technical manifestations.” (Larner and
Walters 2004, 3)
The body of empirical material in this field is comprised of a discourse analysis,
which relates to documents that describe and prescribe programs of government.
Less common is the application of interview statements within a governmental
studies frame. Bro¨ckling et al. argue why:
The focus is on the interrelations between regimes of self-government
and technologies of controlling and shaping the conduct of individuals
and collectives, not on what human beings governed by these regimes
and technologies actually say and do. (Bro¨ckling et al. 2010, 13)
An actor centrism contrasts with this focus of interrelations of entities and arti-
facts, discourses and subjects.
For instance, a research interested in biographic assessments, individuality
in statements, bottom-up theory approaches (like grounded theory), and the
methodology of working as careful as possible towards any interpretation of the
interviewees’ statements clashes with a framework that draws on discourse, dis-
positifs, and in general non-personal residua.
The interviews here are referenced as expert statements, there is no ethno-
graphic or anthropological interest. Neither their biographies nor the intervie-
wees’ own narratives are highlighted or play a significant role. Moreover the
interviews focus on the how : how mobile media is used in protests and social
struggles, how it renders empowerment. How mobile media becomes, within the
paradoxes of liberal rule, surveillance media.
In a reciprocal move, the interview statements have guided the writing and the
unfolding of arguments. This was done in a recurring reading the statements
against theory. Therefore, some statements are directly interwoven within the
text, others contribute to the larger argument, while again others are introductory
statements to sections or single arguments. As they are referenced and discussed
as expert statements, they are part of an analyzed discourse on mobile media.
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Many interview statements consider local issues. Many do so in the hope to
make the practice and interrelations better understood. The telling of contexts
and situations refers to the goal of situating a practice within a context of rule
and thus to make it translatable into non-local reports4.
Methodologically, expert interviews can be referenced in the same manner as
documents and other parts of specific discourses. Because it is not the person
as such that is of interest, but her function in an institution or organization,
which can contribute in semi-open interviews to the field of action. Experts have
operational knowledge (Meuser and Nagel 2005). But statements that reflect the
practice and use of mobile media are not academic in nature. They are single
expressions of a discourse, which is prevailing around mobile media.
Still, some issues of empirical research within governmental studies remain. I
do not think there is a ‘clean’ solution to this. A remaining ambiguity of the
performance that these statements can achieve within governmental studies goes
along with this work. But the accounts here are rarely personal accounts, and
they commonly describe practices with mobile media. The interviewees are part
of groups or organizations. In this regard they contribute, not as single actors.
It is not the interviewees’ own life that is of interest here, but the effects of mo-
bile media as a political technology on activist’s practices, and thus processes of
subjectivation resulting thereof. In that sense, the statements can highlight gov-
ernmental practices, whether as statements of (self-)governing, or as statements
that proclaim resistance to certain aspects of governing.
Resistance then is addressed in two senses: once as an appealing resistance,
one which locates itself within governmental framings to update governmental
practice towards aspirations of the society or specific group, and once as ‘refusing
resistances’, which do not address the state or corporations, but claim autonomy
from the state as its strategy. These statements refuse to address the state and the
official designated space of politics and society. Both are kinds of resistance that
face the illiberal and disciplinary modality of rule (see chapter 7 for a distinction).
The documents provided in chapter 8 about the surveillance operations on the
‘militant group’ are examples of practices, which have rationalized themselves in
the logic of endless suspicion. It is the general lack of access to such documents
that reduce the discussion of mobile surveillance media practice to one case. More
would be useful. Many interview statements also provide details, but these details
4 This is not a contradiction: context serves as a medium of comparison and description of
rule.
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do not originate from the surveillant party. This is a difference in quality.
To summarize: the intermingling of interview statements with governmental
theorizing remains ambivalent. It is of a limited resilience, but on the other hand,
is seen as uttering of a discourse about subjectivation; about processes that ratio-
nalize the political technology mobile media. It is an informed and detail-prone
way of representing governmental and disciplinary practices and techniques in a
field of contestation. The interviewees’ statements, I propose, may be read as
statements delivered from an informed, experienced and reflected position. They
sum up to an agglomeration that meets an explorative space in which the gov-
ernmentality of mobile media is expressed. They allow a granular and precise
discussion thereof.
Before entering the specificities of mobile media and rule in further detail, an-
other matter has to be discussed: to what extent can an analytics of rule that
relies on the concept of governmentality be applied across the globe?
2.6 The Locus of Governmental Studies, or Euro-
centrism and ‘Postcolonial’ Societies
The price of a cell phone is not an obstacle, maybe the half of Oaxaca’s
population has a cell phone.
Blax / Oaxaca (Mx)
Governmental studies do not point at normativity or provide tools to describe
ethics. They are “not concerned [...] with making judgments as to whether and
why this or that policy succeeded or failed [...] to analyse what one might term
‘the will to govern’ is not to participate enthusiastically in it” (Miller and Rose
2008, 29). Additionally, they do not have a point of reference in meta-historical
terms, no teleology, or narratives of emancipation (Dean 2010, 75-86).
They show how rule has rationalized itself as acceptable and how it came to
be regarded as such through a huge and heterogeneous arsenal of performative
practices, techniques, and technologies. For governmental studies there are no
universalities.5
5 Or, being asked what liberty might be, Foucault puts it simple: “Liberty is a practice.”
(Foucault 2000d, 354; emphasis in original)
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Governmental studies much more follow the idea of what can be called de-
objectivation of objectivated settings. With this I mean the prospect to make
comprehensible and thus question how it came to a formation of diverse dispo-
sitional settings – to denaturalize and decompose. By doing so, the frictions and
power-vectors become visible and traceable, which have led to the present condi-
tion and the sort of productivity of society.
How torture is perceived in discourse is an apparent example, as it differs in
meaning and function throughout its historical manifestations. The rationaliza-
tion of torture itself is bound to historical criteria:
The ceremony of public torture isn’t in itself more irrational than
imprisonment in a cell; [...] One isn’t assessing things in terms of an
absolute against which they could be evaluated as constituting more
or less perfect forms of rationality but, rather, examining how forms
of rationality inscribe themselves in practice or systems of practices,
and what role they play within them – because it’s true that ‘practices’
do not exist without a certain regime of rationality. (Foucault 2000b,
229-230)
And if one thinks about the reappearance of torture within dispositifs of se-
curitization in late liberal societies, most prominently after 9/11, the way how
it is conceived in general is with disgust and embarrassment. It functions differ-
ently today than it did in the “classical age”, before the bourgeois revolutions,
because today’s rationalities – the contemporary production of truth – provide dif-
ferent values about the political technology of torture.
Then, if governmental studies ask “how” programs and practices are established
(Miller and Rose 2008, 6), and if they do not deal with “subjects then, but
subjectivations, as a mode of action on actions” (2008, 8), I do not see an intrinsic
reason why they should not be used to analyze non-Western and, more specifically,
former colonial societies, or postcolonial societies. What makes the case for this
task even more convincing is that “it seems impossible to even grasp the formation
of the modern European state and its biopolitical dimension without accounting
for its colonial dimension” (Saar 2010, 48).6 The limits are set, as focusing on
governmental programs one applies an inherently Western diagnostic view onto
6 See also “Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the Colonial
Order of Things” by Ann Stoler (1995).
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societies such that indigenous knowledges and rules that prevail, are pushed to
the back of analysis.
In the context of this study it is a potential source of analytical trouble that
governmental studies demand an argument in terms of location and historical set-
ting. The interviews referenced here are statements from more than 10 countries,
that are as different as Mexico, Pakistan, and Japan. But on the other hand,
the larger subject discussed here is a global affair technically, as well in large
parts governmentally. Although mobile media always finds its own expression
and specificities of regimes of practice in local circumstances, no universality of
mobile media regimes exists as such. Still, as a programme of government it is
rolled out to achieve briefly the same effects: a less constrained flow of things,
signs and people. In many instances, mobile media bridges deficits of other media,
which further contributes to the empowerment of the self. With regard to China,
Tibet and Burma, Nathan Freitas names what mobile media steps in with.
It is mainly used to tell these stories often from places where traditional
media isn’t accessible.
Freitas / NYC
By claiming the applicability of governmentality via mobile media in a global
context, the limits already on the technical availability of mobile media are re-
flected. It goes without saying that mobile media as discussed here, is not rolled
out everywhere.
In Agre we have no mobile phone signal. That’s why we choose radio.
Caminaghi / Campinas (Br)
My general claim is that research that focuses on how signs are made to circu-
late, how the flow of signs is fabricated,7 and in what way mobile media supports
this, and how and when. This research can in part neglect local criteria that
deeply reflect local cultural structures, while a straight-forward universalization
remains problematical.
7 It is interesting how Innis arranges his research:“I do not intend to concentrate on micro-
scope studies of small periods or regions in the history of the British Empire [...] Nor shall
I confine my interest to the British Empire as a unique phenomenon” (Innis 2007, 23).
By way of understanding communication as in a “crucial position in the organization and
administration of government” (2007, 23) Innis suggests to see communication studies
invested with a wide explanatory power, which is limited by cultural factors only to small
degrees.
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An Analytical Grid for Development
Governmental studies trace political reason and rationalities in Western, and by
and large liberal societies (Foucault explicitly analyzes post-war West Germany,
the U.S. and, not surprisingly, France). An application onto other societal con-
stellations in different regions encounters problems: as it is precisely the refusal to
draw on universal concepts that allows this analysis to work, such a study cannot
but only look at specific historical and local settings. Bro¨ckling et al. note that
in “reconstructing local orders of knowledge and regimes of practice of varying
scope, studies of governmentality deconstruct the idea of universal reason” (2010,
11). Studies of governmentality are thus localized studies, they are situated. I
propose they can be situated in a global regime of practice, which expresses itself
with different facets locally, like the global practice of mobile media.
CHECK Interestingly, a governmental research framework has been deployed
which is more of an analytical grid of government. For the purposes here, this di-
rection of governmentality studies, as proposed by Mitchell Dean amongst others,
is sometimes called the ‘British school’, and allows for an analysis of geographi-
cally non-Western countries or societies, as the focus of studies lies on everything
else but state administrations.8 It allows the analysis of other “forms of govern-
ment, including authoritarian rule, and is in line with the way in which Foucault’s
own understanding of governmentality was developing” (Death 2011a, 15).
It is evident that Foucault draws on material of European history in the de-
velopment of his concept of governmentality. At the same time though, Dean
has a convincing point in carefully broadening this to an analytical grid with a
perspective “that seeks to connect questions of government, politics and adminis-
tration to the space of bodies, lives, selves and persons” (Dean 2010, 20). Here it
develops into a study of any form of rule that channels regimes of practice, and of
how the three forms of rule, the triangle of sovereign, discipline and governmental
management, relate to each other. Evidently, possible different conglomerations
of these forms of rule manifest themselves differently in different contexts.
Also Musharraf was really a victim of his own policies because he
liberalized the government controlled media. And as a result, one of
the things he did, there was a lot greater media freedom than there
was in 1999 when he took power. And you can certainly say that he
was a dictator, but this doesn’t mean that everything he did was bad.
But because of that, when he did have his second coup as they say
8 Which has been criticized for its neglect of state administration by Jessop (2010, 57-60).
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in Pakistan: when General Musharraf overthrew President Musharraf,
because he was both President and General at that time, the media
would not sit down and take it.
Theriot-Orr / Seattle
In a simplified way, one might say that the litmus test if governmental studies
can contribute to the analytics of rule in a specific region is provided by the critical
question of the exercise of freedom: “Government is an activity that shapes the
field of action and thus, in this sense, attempts to shape freedom. The governed
are free in that they are actors, i.e. it is possible for them to act and think in a
variety of ways, and sometimes in ways not foreseen by authorities” (Dean 2010,
21). If the governed are not in the position to act in ways they choose, the extent
of governmental rule is limited and the dominant model of rule is structured by
a different mode, by sovereign rule, which demands obedience.
Surveillance in the Philippines is different from others, here it is quite
primitive. They also use the cell phone, so people in my hometown
would text the military that I am home, others would text me “get out
of the house”, so it works both ways. For a while I thought it is funny
to play hide and seek with the local militias, but the next step, after
locating your exact whereabouts, they are at you and you just disappear
like a bubble in the air.
Cruz Reyes / Manila
But even in most repressive modes of rule some ‘quantity’ of freedom remains
which materializes itself by practices such as using YouTube to disseminate proof
of brutal assaults.
Since last year, a few of the activists especially involved with the
Teacher’s Union [APPO, O.L.] tried to use the cell phone with video
recording capabilities especially to document the events of the police
repression and to send it immediatly to a webpage, sending it to You
Tube.
Blax / Oaxaca (Mx)
The vector of technologies of dissemination, the machines of circulation, to my
understanding, preserve choices and in this sense demonstrate that liberal regimes
of practice, once established, cannot simply be nullified.
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Postcolonial Societies
Postcolonial theory has been inspired by a “rethinking of power” and “the concept
of discourse and the power/ knowledge nexus have found particular resonance in
analyses of colonial and postcolonial relationships” (Abrahamsen 2003, 199). Carl
Death has shown the applicability of such an analytical approach towards agency
in some African contexts. I agree with his claim that
Whilst using governmentality synonymously with neo-liberalism does
indeed restrict its applicability, the use of governmentality as an an-
alytical framework or grid for understanding power relations more
generally [...] renders it more broadly applicable. (Death 2011a, 24)
In this perspective, governmentality studies are broadened to an application be-
yond their genealogy from neo-liberalism and thus enriching the analytical tools
to understand rationalizations of rule more generally.
Human rights activists in Brazil or India, which fight for the recognition of
indigenous people and their needs, fall within the dilemma of liberal rule: whom
to include into civil society invested with rights and whom to leave out of the
picture. What is more, indigenous struggles for recognition of their own concepts
of property or commonality can be understood as a competitive endeavor to lib-
eral rule, which itself is based on Western concepts of property and enterprise.
The trajectory of Western rationalizations disqualify native knowledge. “[A] more
public circulation of reason would serve to undermine and break down the sup-
ports of native knowledges, to disqualify them.” (Scott 1995, 209-210) Liberal
rule competes with non-Western rule and regimes, it tries to nullify other notions
of rule by way of its mechanism of centrifugality. The area of development aid
demonstrates many examples of how governmental management is being invoked
in new fields and areas.
In more general terms, and for a better understanding of this argument, an
article about the dissent of the Botswana Bushmen, against their relocation, is
instructive as an example in showing how political technologies, such as partic-
ipation and integration into government, are deployed in this region. Odysseos
refers to Foucault’s framework of government in his analysis:
In understanding the Bushmen as merely subsisting in their traditional
ways of life within CKGR [Central Kalahari Game Reserve, O.L.]
and insisting that providing them with basic services for health and
38
education therein was non-viable, the GoB [Government of Botswana,
O.L.] has sought to control and enhance their activities, to promote
more productive paths for them to traverse. To be viable and to
transcend beyond mere survival, the Bushmen must be enmeshed in
the governmental project of development. (Odysseos 2011, 444)
Control by means of enhancing activities: offer possibilities, nurture with choices,
integrate into circuits.9 Odysseos gets to this point only some pages later:
And those governmental agendas wish to ‘elevate’ the Bushmen out
of ‘mere subsistence’, develop them as increasingly self-reliant and
sedentary subjects engaged in agro-pastoralism, but also open and
welcoming of pastoral interventions in the economy, health, and ed-
ucation. Their production as ‘governmentalizable’ subjects, then, in-
volves generating new desires and interests in different (settled) ways
of life. (Odysseos 2011, 447)
The production of ‘governmentalizable’ subjects has always been of central con-
cern for governmental management. And a means to do so has been, and still is,
“to put in place a public sphere in which only certain kinds of knowledges and
not others could circulate with any efficacy” (Scott 1995, 209). Like civil society
“in which fluency in these knowledges [...] would be a condition of participation;
and in which participation would be the only rational and legal way of exercis-
ing influence in what now counted as politics” (1995, 210). In the Botswana
case a contemporary state is struggling with the production of its population as
governmentalizable. In effect, this demonstrates how broad the application of
governmental studies can be.
Colonial Governmentality
Kalpagam writes about colonial India as a case where a new regime of norms
was established that replaced, with and without means of force, other variants of
economy:
Colonial governmentality, in thus setting its own norms, disrupted the
moral economy of peasants that was also governed by norms, albeit
9 Control in relation to a convenient lifestyle is discussed by Legnaro (2003).
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different ones. Such substitutions were clothed in a discourse of bu-
reaucratic rationality that framed peasant behavior as ‘fatalistic’ and
‘superstitious’. (Kalpagam 2000, 433)
The trajectory of economic inclusion into a global sphere of interchangeable
goods, and the establishment and enforcement of the market regime as the place
of exchange of societal relations remains an ongoing venture. Such a program
from its inception to its enforcement needed a milieu in reality that only gov-
ernmental subjectivities could provide, even within the populations of colonial
rule. Many scholars of colonial and postcolonial rule understand the production
of an economical environment is key to understanding what made colonial rule
successful. “Colonial governmentality in India thus made it possible to conceive
the Indian economy in the modern economic categories of income, wealth, pro-
duction, exchange, distribution, and consumption.” (Kalpagam 2000, 421) Alpha
from Mexico echoes the connection between technologies and the establishment
of capitalism:
As an anthropologist I have realised that technology is very much linked
to capitalism and creates needs. So, this idea of progress linked to tech-
nology is not attractive to indigenous groups who are different in their
communities. For them, communication means sometimes wandering
30km from one point to another. I relate technology mostly with the
question of consumers.
Alpha / Mexico City
The target of “modern power is not so much the body of the sovereign’s subject
[...] as the conditions in which that body is to live and define its life” (Scott 1995,
199; see also Lemons 2008). This is the milieu of the apparatuses of security.
There is a very complex nexus of different kinds of rules present in colonialism,
and “one of the things the new game of politics came to depend upon was the
construction of a legally instituted space where legally defined subjects could
exercise rights, however limited those might have been” (1995, 208). For Scott,
who systematically included Foucauldian thought into his postcolonial analysis,
a new form of power emerged;
which was concerned above all with disabling old forms of life by
systematically breaking down their conditions, and with constructing
in their place new conditions so as to enable – indeed, so as to oblige –
new forms of life to come into being.” (Scott 1995, 193; emphasis in
original)
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These new forms of life were the ones that could be administered and governed
although colonial rule was first of all sovereign rule, which possessed the bod-
ies – and only in the enforcement of a market regime the subjects gained rights.
Scott thus wants to bring to light “the formation of historically heterogeneous
rationalities through which the political sovereignties of colonial rule were con-
structed” (Scott 1995, 193), and he engages in different power perspectives and
regards “colonial modernity” as a “discontinuity in the organization of colonial
rule” (1995, 193).
This is the emergence of
a colonial governmentality – in which power comes to be directed at
the destruction and reconstruction of colonial space so as to produce
not so much extractive-effects on colonial bodies as governing-effects
on colonial conduct. (1995, 204)
The production of conduct aims at bodies and subjectivities. Although some-
thing of its own kind, one can understand colonial rule a heterogeneous mix of
sovereign, disciplinary and governmental management. When “colonial power
came to depend precisely upon the systematic attempt to intervene at the level
of [...] ‘society itself’” (Scott 1995, 207), the modal way of governing resembles
European rule in that political economy became the horizon of truth for both.
When economy was remodeled, so that “only principles of economic authority and
distinction to be allowed were those defined by the abstract and self-regulating
demands of the market”, the narrative is very familiar to that of (neo-)liberal
ideologies, as it “operated not on such aggregates as caste but on individuals re-
sponding only to the rational or natural pressure of want and self-interest” (1995,
211; my emphasis). Colonial governmentality established a new rationality, “one
which the colonized could accept or resist, but to whose rules they would have
to respond” (1995, 212). The response, one may conclude, was part of a govern-
mental programme in which “the native was made to work upon himself; he was
now conceived of as a productive agent” (Scott 1995, 213).
This short detour about colonialism provided an argument that governmental
rule in a specific way appeared not only in liberal Europe, but in parallel in
the colonial space. It even was centered around the production of conduct and
targeted the individual. It promoted productive agents, which would engage in
exchange – just like today the Bushmen of Botswana are addressed and interpel-
lated, although, I guess, to a much lesser degree by force.
41
Chapter 2. Governmentality
Today, the topos is ‘globalization’ when it comes to the subjugation of spaces
under one economic regime. Mobile media is not only a signifier of a global
sphere, but as well in practice facilitates regime change towards global patterns
and connections:
If globalization is understood very broadly as an increasing porosity
of boundaries and changing experience of time and place [...] mobile
phones contribute to such processes by facilitating a multiplicity of
relationships in areas that used to be relatively isolated. (Tenhunen
2008, 515-516)
Mobile media acts, and has effects, as an agent of globalization by invoking
the individual, making it literally perceptive to calls, which is just a way of
interpellation, and facilitating relationships beyond traditional ties. This is what
Sigley points out:
A number of the key administrative states undergoing ‘governmental-
ization’ were also concomitantly administering or acquiring colonial
possessions. It is, therefore, impossible to do justice to the dimensions
of this process by which the ‘conduct of conduct’ becomes preeminent
without considering the global dimensions of its coming into being.
The governing of subjects at home and abroad are closely intertwined.
(Sigley 2006, 491)
Further, he reminds us that the liberal image itself could only have been con-
structed through its exterior, as it was “to a large extent reliant upon the char-
acterization of non-liberal, that is, non-Western, societies as liberalism’s Other”
(2006, 490-491). Thus, outside of the European discourse, this ’Other’ has been,
as Scott argues, subjectivated in a governmental manner, too, albeit in a different
configuration of the programs, and produced with other means.
Katherine Lemons (2008) reminds us about the modifications necessary for an
application of an analytics of rule onto postcolonial spaces. She argues that it
is possible and fruitful to analyze current Indian rule within a frame of govern-
mentality, but rightly warns that modifications are necessary in regard to religion
within this analytical grid. Especially since religious law is codified in contem-
porary India in the fields of marriages, she argues, governmental studies need to
be modified for an application in this context. This is convincing for the study
of these societal fields, as it shows the limitations and necessary modifications
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for specific fields. Such modifications need to be applied on particular fields of
study. Mobile media programs, and the subjectivities it produces, can be analyzed
without considering religious laws and their effects on subjects.
Nancy Holland (2002) argues that without pastoral power Foucault’s frame-
work does not make much sense, thus it can be applied only to regions with a
dominant Christian culture. My argument is that there is no direct, necessary
connection between these fields. Pastoral power as a functionality is not limited
to areas of Christianity. In the 21st century pastoral power has become a power
of telecommunication circuits. The genealogical strands of pastoral power need
to be rewritten. Pastoral power has, maybe to lesser degrees and maybe in a
different way and form, implicated societies that are not dominated by Christian
heritage. In a sense mobile media is a bearer of pastoral power, a medium of and
for pastoral power, that engages users in chatting and jabbering. Pastoral power
has modified, just as it has in the genealogy described by Foucault. Pastoral
power of the 21st century, in the sense of the history of this present, continues to
develop into new strains of social relations, and most prominently and naturally
within the realm of communication.
The most dominant force of its limitation is of economical nature.
Problem is that most people don’t have credits for the phone.
M / Sa˜o Paulo
My impression from a poor country like the Philippines sustains this further
development of pastoral power. Undoubtedly one should not describe the Philip-
pines as a country of dominantly liberal rule; still there are aspects that are lib-
eral. A convincing example is the massive use of mobile media and the Philippine
people’s affection towards SMS.
The mobile phone in a country like the Philippines introduces far reaching
features, as Pertierra states:
While lacking domestic space to develop private liaisons, many Fil-
ipinos have turned to mobile phones as another alternative. Texting
has become the major way for most Filipinos to cultivate a network of
acquaintances known only to them. [...] Several telecom and other ser-
vices exist to cater this need. While contacting strangers was possible
in the past, texting provides the anonymity, privacy and convenience
not hitherto available. (Pertierra 2006, 6)
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To check the availability of mobile media, I bought many SIM cards during my
stay in the Philippines and tested the many possible ways in how to load it. It
could always be done without registration, without a bank account or credit card
payment. Such is a technique of liberal rule: to include the biggest possible part
of the population in telecommunications. The effect changes societal relations in
general, as new ways to connect weaken traditional modes of social interaction.
The individual is addressed as having choices upon its own considerations.
In that sense I doubt that an analysis of mobile media use from a governmental
perspective has to restrict itself to European and U.S. terrains. Liberal rule is not
once laid down, activated, and then exists, but must be understood as a process
of permanent re-evaluation and modifications of regimes of practices. A global
mobile phone network therefore refers to a sedimentation of an aspect of liberal
rule. If, and how, this is more than a sediment depends on the terms of use,
the roll out, the way it is used locally, how payment can be done, and finally on
the many illiberal measures that try to minimize the risk of this production of
freedom.
Additionally, a hint from a MST worker in Brazil points to a strength of gov-
ernmental studies:
Laws in Brazil are not important.
MST Workers / Sa˜o Paulo
Whatever laws are written down, whatever official ‘government’ exists, it is
the regimes of practices that establishes the realities of rule. The existence of
democratic institutions, the existence of a constitution or of a civic code are
never enough for an analytics of rule, because of interest is how the process of
rationalization succeeds.
Mobile Media in the Global South: Hook Them Up!
Mobile media’s connectivity reach is far beyond that of the internet. The internet
failed to include large parts of populations into the circuits of addressability.
To describe the internet as a facilitator of governmentality on a global scale is
dangerous. Even institutions are not yet well connected in a country like Mexico:
Here in INA [National Institute of Anthropology and History, O.L.] we
have for 300 computers a 4 mbit connection.
Alpha / Mexico City
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Also, mobile media connectivity has limits. But these are far beyond the limits
of the internet. Still, some areas will maybe never be connected to the global
infrastructure of GSM. So satellite connections help to communicate at a basic
level:
If you take something like the satellite uplink for the internet. This
has been incredibly important. Apart from being able to give the com-
munity access to the internet and then have to maintain contact if you
are in some remote area in Guatamala, where it takes three days to
go to and there are no other communication means. And maybe they
would have one computer maintained to get onto the internet, then you
can talk to them and help them fix stuff remotely without having to go
there. Also get feedback by email from that community instead getting
feedback only when someone goes out. That stuff is hugely important.
Anonymous1 / Mexico City
But this is not a mass phenomena, and its exclusivity limits new regimes of
practices and subjectivities to be teletransported.
But for specific practices, counter-practices, the problem of connectivity can be
bridged with analog means.
There was a protest march from India back to Tibet where a number
of 12 monks and other lay people were marching back to Tibet. And so
they had these little cameras and they would document every day and
they get into their camp each night and use the satellite to upload the
footage. Or they would put it on motorcycle and the guy would ride to
the nearest internet cafe.
Freitas / NYC
Looking at the strategies and efforts of mobile phone companies and their part-
ners in the Global South or ‘developing world’, it turns out that the mobile phone
is a key facilitator of developmental management. My argument is that mobile
media is in many cases part of a ‘development’ plan to establish governmental
practices. At the contemporary frontier of governmentalization mobile media is
rolled out where former means failed due to different reasons, and often because
the state has been too weak to penetrate the population with other means of
communication. Mobile media works as an economic productivity factor on mi-
cro levels. Jonathan Donner, a mobile phone researcher for Microsoft, states:
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M-banking and m-payments systems, such as M-PESA in Kenya and
WIZZIT in South Africa, are among the most exciting applications:
they are surprisingly simple, often using SMS or other basic interfaces,
and they have demonstrated broad appeal, even among traditionally
“unbanked” populations. In Kenya, at least four million accounts
have been registered by M-PESA in its first two years of operation,
a number that is rapidly approaching equivalence to the number of
formal bank accounts in the country. (Donner 2009, 96-97)
Mobile phones integrate more into the liberal financial system and make them
partakers of the market. Of course, changes in the banking model occur in parallel,
as the companies that provide these services are not banks. As the costs for
accounting and administration are lower, smaller balances already produce a good
return of investment. Mobile phones are able to integrate larger parts of the
population whose productivity has not been brought under the rule of a regulated
economy. The incentives had been too low so far. Mobile media changes this scale.
It is striking to see very similar procedures at work today as in 19th century
colonial India “in the myriad of economic transactions that enveloped the colo-
nial economy” (Kalpagam 2000, 421). This time, the addressability the phones
provide facilitates the circulation of money.
Mobile media becomes part of rendering instrumental rationalities and as such it
is a technology just like “all those devices, tools, techniques, rendering, personnel,
materials and apparatuses that enabled authorities to imagine and act upon the
conduct of persons individually and collectively, and in locales that were often
distant” (Miller and Rose 2008, 16). The distance between the subjects, and
between the subjects and authorities, can be bridged swiftly and cheaply with
mobile phones. Mobile media governs literally from a distance, while it is carried
at the body.
Many people in Brazil have a cell phone but don’t have a landline,
because there is a fixed cost for a landline. And you can get a cellphone
for some 40 to 50 real with the SIM card. That’s cheap enough for
everyone. I have friends in the homeless movements, street people, who
have mobiles, too
M / Sa˜o Paulo
Street people, I would argue, are the natural target of mobile media, once the
costs can be neglected. In a sense, street people, without proper residency, are
the natural beneficiaries of mobile media.
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Very blatantly Donner characterizes mobile phones as market enforcers. “[M]obiles
improve the efficiency of markets, enforce the law of one price, reduce waste, and
increase productivity” (Donner 2009, 92). Others disagree as “it is far from es-
tablished that the mobile is yet affecting income distribution in either direction”
(Coyle (2005, 5); see also Rao and Dasgupta (2010) and in regard to Chinese
low-income population Wallis (2011)). Donner goes further, as he argues that
the societal relations a population establishes and nurtures within the realm of
mobile media, “later can be used for transactional and ‘productive’ activities of
interest to the economic development community” (Donner 2009, 97).
How to return profits under different and harsher conditions are the key ele-
ments in this roll out of governmental management technologies. One example
is “the use of a pre-paid chip or phone card, which can be used with a handset
belonging to someone else. This arrangement allows the user to place a call using
someone else’s hardware and battery power, but with their respective pre-paid
mobile phone chip or card” (Sinha 2005, 10).
The means chosen to hook up poorer populations to mobile telephony are im-
pressive: corporations such as Tata in India suspended “charges on mobile calls
within the company’s network for a two-year period” (Tenhunen 2008, 519) to
promote mobile telephony amongst those that otherwise could not afford it.
The maximum people that we are connected with are not on the in-
ternet, many people are not even literate. But they have a phone. The
main demographic that we are relating to, like the fisher people, all
these people are not on the internet, maybe one person, some leaders.
But all the others are not. But they all have phones. Everyone.
ManasaSarovara / Bangalore
Mobile phones are even direct means of payments. The ability to call has
literally become a currency as “pre-paid phone cards and chips are becoming a new
form of currency in some areas – where communication capacity is a commodity
that is in high demand” (Sinha 2005, 11).
Communication capacity can be traded, but there are interesting loopholes
within this economic regime, such as “beeping” instead of calling someone to save
costs (Tomitsch, Sturm, Konzett, Bolin, Wagner, and Grechenig 2010, 3; Sinha
2005, 12-13). This practice is widespread on a large scale in so many countries
that it poses problems for the telecommunication companies. In India, nearly
40% of the bandwidth is used for ‘missed calls’ (Rao and Dasgupta 2010). In
Bangladesh, in 2008 “mobile penetration is roughly 23%, what sets Bangladesh
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apart from most developing nations is the extremely high network coverage of
98%.” The result is an increase in a free use of the infrastructure by letting the
phone ring only (Geirbo and Helmersen 2008, 77). The free-of-charge method
fits illiteracy as “[f]inding a number in your contact list, hitting the ‘call’-button
and then, once you hear the call signal, pushing the ‘end call’-button is far easier
than composing an SMS, especially if you are illiterate or not familiar with the
alphabet on your phone’s keypad” (Geirbo and Helmersen 2008, 78). As well
practical and entertaining, romantic motives are present in the phenomena of
‘missed calls’ (Geirbo and Helmersen 2008, 78).
For many parts of India, mobile telephony exists where electricity does not.
Mobile phones are very useful in a country like India, because many of
these movements work in places where electricity is not there and no
access to internet. The emails are only for the urban situation, but for
the rural it is the mobile where you can communicate on the phone using
voice but also SMS, which became useful in the way that if anything
happens anywhere in the country you create a text message and send it
across the country to all supporters in the villages and the cities, and
it is easy and quick to organise a support.
Kumar / Delhi
This is another indicator that mobile media introduces governmental rule to
new areas.
Something like 40% in India have mobile phones, also deep in the rural
areas. The penetration is on a high level, except in the tribal villages,
where people don’t use technology so much. But many of the people in
movements are too poor to have phones. But the main contact people
always have a phone.
Kumar / Delhi
Vijahan in general shares the assumption of this huge dissemination of mobile
media, but he also points to the problem of exclusion for those that are not
connected.
Sometimes when you use texting and email you forget that there is a
large part of the population that is outside of this network. And for a
country like India the masses of this country are beyond the reach of
technologies now. Many times, typical middle class people state “even
the fishermen have mobiles now”. This is a class problem for them, but
at the same time it is only a very privileged few among the working
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classes who have access to this. Even mobile. It has a great range in
rural areas. There are hardly any places left where there is no network
coverage at all. There are some left. But this does not mean everyone
has a mobile. If you go to indigenous people, they don’t have it. In
whole villages not even a single person has a mobile phone. The land
gentry, who has land, socially middle class, there every household has
a mobile. So this is a class/caste difference that exists in terms of
technology reach. For people who have traditionally not been able to
get hold of any technologies, even a second hand mobile, they don’t
pay for making phone calls. It is just a status symbol. The middle
class have huge access to it. To realize that just by communicating on
technological basis is enough for your dissemination is wrong and can
be an extremely dangerous approach.
Vijayan / Delhi
To conclude: I have shown that efforts have been huge to further disseminate
mobile media globally, with high success as the penetration rate is extremly high.
Mobile media facilitates forms of exchange, the flow of signs, even in the rather
limited vocabulary of the ‘missed calls’ amongst poor populations. It inscribes
itself into a governmental mode of rule that encourages the subject to express
itself, to enter into communication, and offers the disruption of traditional social
bonds, such as segregations. It allows communication free from ties and as such
empowers the individual. It reinvents banking (modified to specific capacities).
This has effects on processes of subjectivation: the subjects produced adapt to
self-technologies as self-management. Mobile communication as such has become
a currency: the currency for participation. In both senses: as it integrates into
the circuits of addressable spaces, and as it integrates in modalities of payment
from a distance.
But there are limits, in many ways specific groups remain excluded from its
use.
People who do not know English face problems with the mobile phone.
How to press “on”, how to send a message. That problem is still there.
Akkai / Bangalore
One might say that these limits are the limits of governability from a distance
by technology. There are prerequisites.
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The next chapter looks at the ways how resistance and counter-conducts can be
seen under a governmental lens and I try to connect mobile media subjectivation
to the focal point of protest.
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Mobile Protest Media: Resisting
Government–Governing Resistance
In 2003 half a million people got to protest against the celebrations of
the reunifications. There also was an Asian economic crisis, and SAS,
a lot of people died. The atmosphere was intense. The government
passed a law then, a national security law, that law includes one article
that the government can sue individuals that speak up if they think it
is a threat to national security. For example if you advocate the idea
of Hong Kong independence, or Tibetean independence or you criticize
policies that are sensitive. The government tried to pass that law in that
tension. You need to know that before 1997 [the year China resumed
sovereignty, O.L.] the biggest debate was about free speech in HK. So
that is the background. In 2003 lots of people joined the protests and
after that, people got together to discuss how to maintain the power and
the people, because of this kind of incident, people got very dissatisfied
with the government, so one or two of the government people had to
resign.
Freddie / Hong Kong
This chapter shall serve as a brief discussion of a possible framing of protest.
The intention is not to rewrite theories of protests; this would be a different work.
But as mobile protest media is a topic here, I argue that a discussion of protests
and resistances is insightful as mobile media relates differently to different kinds
of protests, and restructures according to their specificities. The amalgamation of
protest and mobile media, its semiotic-material ensemble, changes the ’problem’
of protest.
Governmental management is powerful because it enrolls individuals into pro-
grams of government without interfering with their formal autonomy. Even more
so if this happens, to some extent, without individuals being aware how much
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the rationalities they themselves orientate at are technically and instrumentally
brought into being, to channel the individual’s very own practice and choices.
Then resistance and protests against ‘the government’ appear in a new light.
The field of protest now grows in complexity if power and rule is understood as
immanent to the many resistant practices.
A Tibetan man, who grew up in exile, traveled back into Tibet under
saying he was not Tibetan, but he was from India, and did a protest on
Mount Everest that was timed with the big event about the Olympics.
This was like a year and a half before the Olympics. So, he did a protest,
we used a small satellite broadcasted Bgan [a satellite transceiver, O.L.]
with a high def video camera and streamed that back to New York.
All for just a few thousand dollars. So we produced this video clip
which then we provided in NTSC and PAL format and MP4 to the
BBC and AP and they all used it. They showed like “Today in Beijing
a ceremony” and baba “and on the Mount Everest” and there was this
great shot of the people on the Mount Everest and the banner, and so
that received huge coverage and then they were detained for four days
and we almost wondered where they were.
Freitas / NYC
I have already addressed the different modalities of power. When it comes to
protests and resistances, this modulation of power at first seems confusing: how
is resistance itself power driven and ordered by power vectors? I argue, that the
different modalities of power are interwoven in resistances, but produce different
effects. Effects which themselves translate into power relations.
There is a constant repression, social movements have been criminal-
ized, MST constantly. We suffer a lot of surveillance and attacks. When
we had a round of actions, in these weeks of actions, we suffer a lot of
attacks. The servers at the school suffered a hundred thousand attacks.
We were monitoring this, no breaking in.
MST Workers / Sa˜o Paulo
Sovereignty intervenes into protest with the limit-figure of the police. This
repression, as an effect of power, itself affects subjectivities of participants of
protests, in that the self-conduct turns to other directions. Although the ‘protest
self’ is well configured along lines of conduct and discipline, these are expressed
differently and have other effects. As I will try to show, the conduct of conduct,
as a soft power of rule, is the first domain of powers affected by the experiences
of protests and resistances. Mobile protest media, I argue, is a transit passage of
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such an affection and its effects, that reshapes and reorganizes power relations.
But first, before entering the matter of mobile protest media, the difference of
this approach to social movements studies and ethnographic approaches is worth
consideration.
Social Movements Studies, Ethnography
There is a large field of literature and research about social movements and protest
available, and it is growing. The field of social movements studies is an established
field of its own,to which many social science scholars have contributed. From an
European and American perspective, Hellmann (2002), Haunss (2005), Herken-
rath (2009), and Cox and Nilsen (2007) give an overview on social movements’
research. Following Herkenrath, five strains of this research can be differentiated:
Collective Behavior Research, Interaction Research (Chicago school), Collective
Action, Political Process, Framing (how to reach people), and New Social Move-
ments.
Donnatella della Porta has been an influential researcher in the field as well,
particularly on the ’anti-globalization movements’. Amongst her numerous pub-
lications, the introduction to social movements with Mario Diani (2006) and
the collected volume “Social Movements in a Globalizing World” (co-edited with
Hanspeter Kriesi and Dieter Rucht 2009) have become a common source of ref-
erence in the field.
Amongst the many other works available Manuel Castell’s “The Power of Iden-
tity” (2004), which looks specifically at identity construction in a networked soci-
ety, for example within ‘the feminist movement’, has become a classic reference.
The approaches of all these works differ significantly with an analytics of rule:
none of these scholars looks at protests and resistances with a Foucauldian ap-
proach, one which tries to shed light on the political rationalities that organize
power. The general narrative within social movements research reformulates as-
pects of an universalistic image of the state. This image is confronted with a
static, essentialist conception of the subject as an entity that fights for justice.
The black boxing of protest subjectivities, as an antagonist to power, thus cannot
contribute much to an analysis which foremost understands power relations as
ubiquitous, and from there differentiates strains of effects, agency, and affects.
Quite often, modern concepts from the political sciences are transferred to the
analysis of social movements. This leads to a reproduction of state-centrism and
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its concepts within the analysis of protest. By echoing the divide of political and
non-political spheres, the episteme of social movement studies are themselves
structured by modern political thought.
My claim is that, if I am right, one misses important immanent aspects of
protests that are in relation to rule, and immanent with rule, once the separation
of the spheres of civil society and the state are reproduced.
Rather than seeing protests and social movements as antagonists to the state
(or ‘global capital’), and thus reproducing an ahistorical naturalization of civil
society, I suggest a different perspective: first, to see protests as a transgressive
vector. What is immanent to protests are deterritorializing forces that cannot
be accounted for and analyzed with a vocabulary and concepts that hold up a
separation of societal fields, which itself is an effect of governmental manage-
ment. Protests in this transgressive account appear as singularities, which in
its course can set aside history1 and open up an unidentifiable, temporary space
of possibilities, or an temporary autonomous zone, as Hakim Bey (1991) called
it. Power relations here have organized differently and the overall political ra-
tionality of neo-liberal government was overwritten by counter-rationalities and
counter-conducts (I will return to these two concepts).
And second, to understand protests explicitly as part of civil society, as an
element of this milieu organized by apparatuses of security. Civil society, as a
transit reality of rule, is the natural realm of resistances and protests. To my
understanding, such a historical-genealogical account is not present in current
social movements studies.
Another approach to protests is that of ethnography. A recent ethnographic the-
sis on the ‘anti-globalization movements’ was published by Jeffrey Juris (2008).
Juris acted as a participant observer mostly in Barcelona and participated in
demonstrations. He gives an account about the recent horizontal anti-globalization
movement that started in Seattle in 1999, had a peak in Genoa 2002, and on-
wards to the World Social Forums 2005 in Porto Alegre, and to other places. His
work is remarkable in the sense that it is a critical insider account with detailed
information of gatherings, discussions and lines of conflict from within mostly
anti-hierarchical political networks, such as the People’s Global Action2 or the
1 Or, in the sense of Badiou (2009) make history.
2 See http://www.agp.org.
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Dissent! network.3
This approach, again, is very different from social movement studies. I see
one particular problem within this approach; a problem that is more or less
ubiquitous in ethnographic research, and not new either: to whom does it report?
Who is interested in a detailed account of how social movements operate, how
they organize meetings, how they see different uses of force? The ethnographic
work of protests enriches the knowledge, I would say, not for and not of the
social movements themselves. It rather extracts their realities and reproduces a
dense description for a different audience. To give one rather random example:
“The pinelli social center served as the base of operations for the Black Bloc in
Genoa, while militant internationalists slept at nearby Sciorbia Stadium. The
first evening planning took place on July 16, where activists decided to separate
from the GSF because of the restriction on sticks, rocks, and firearms” (Juris
2008, 182). The ethnographic discipline’s imperative of dense descriptions and
embodied experience (militant observation), produces great insights that, when
it is about protest, no undercover police could do better. I see ethical problems
in such a dense description.4
3.1 Power and Resistance
Returning to the approach here, government is understood as constantly being
confronted with resistances, it “is always a precarious affair: it must always take
account of the unforeseen and crises of governability” (Bro¨ckling et al. 2010, 19-
20).
Thomas Lemke takes a decisive point of view, as struggles and fights, “rather
than ‘distorting’ the ‘original’ program, they are actually always already part of
the programs themselves, actively contributing to ‘compromises’, ‘fissures’ and
‘incoherences’ inside them” (2002, 9). Lemke argues that government cannot be
escaped, but that resistances are already always part of government programs.
But the important issue is: government can be changed, struggles can be suc-
cessful. For example, because government needs to adapt, needs to integrate.
This is the pivotal point in this concept of government: while on the one side,
it comprises many different fields that stretch over the whole of the society, so
that the impression might occur that resistance has no place in this concept. On
3 See http://2007.dissent.org.uk.
4 See a reflection in appendix A in this regard.
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the other hand, these distant points are not without power. The net of powers
is not top-down. Social struggles, resistances have their say and their effects on
government. This is not a one directional model. Repercussions of struggles can
restructure large parts of society and even reshape institutions and other sedi-
ments of power.5 But this never means the abolishment of power per se. There
are no machines of liberation.
While Foucault did not produce ‘the’ key text about resistance, he has argued in
many ways that power and resistance are mutually inclusive. Power only functions
where there is resistance, and resistance only functions in fields of power. Other-
wise one could speak not of power, but pure domination, and not of resistance,
but pure obedience. “You have to use power relations to refer to the situation
where you’re not doing what you want. So resistance comes first, and resistance
remains superior to the forces of the process; power relations are obliged to change
with the resistance.” (Foucault 2000c, 167; my emphasis) Because power is dissi-
pative and organizes even the smallest elements that comprise human’s relations
to one another, and even more so, power relations are a necessary condition of
societal relation, it is possible to change power relations, so that resistances either
change government, or reshape to confront anew. Additionally, in a governmental
society, power of rule is ubiquitous because of the very nature of this style of rule.
This is not always wrong.
During everyday life you feel you can access the social movement in a
very quick manner. For example if you know a squat is gonna be evicted
you can mobilize people to come within 30 minutes thanks to mobiles.
15 years ago it would take hour. So it is more instantanous for social
movements to react.
Anonymous2 / Madrid
In very general terms, the Foucauldian power concept, to my understanding, is
sensitive to societal change, as it analyzes the ubiquity of power on very different
levels. Thus it makes power relations quite accessible, whereas classical concepts
of power, which rely on a differentiation of power holders and powerless actors,
actually cement power lines in their analysis, because access to power relations is
then only provided by those who hold power.
5 For a discussion of Foucauldian thought and post-anarchism, see Todd May (1994).
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The ‘Agonism’ between Power Relations and the Intransitivity of Freedom
Foucault asks “how are such relations of power rationalized?” (Foucault 2000g,
324-325). How has power been grounded and dissipated all over societal struc-
tures, and how is a truth being developed on this? This is what Foucault addresses
as rationalization: a process to make power appear “normal”, “natural”, “ratio-
nal”, or “true”. By way of addressing a problem like this, power can become
a subject of investigation on every level of society, in separate fields, and for
separate phenomena.
First, Foucault states that “a society without power relations can only be an
abstraction.” Thus, he suggests, one should analyze “the source of their strength
or fragility, the conditions that are necessary to transform some or to abolish oth-
ers.” And he continues to say that “for to say that that there cannot be a society
without power relations is not to say either that those which are established are
necessary, or that power in any event, constitutes an inescapable fatality at the
heart of societies, such that it cannot be undermined.” And he closes by saying
that “the analysis, elaboration, and bringing into question of power relations and
the ‘agonism’ between power relations and the intransitivity of freedom is an in-
creasingly important political task – even, the political task that is inherent in all
social existence” (Foucault 2000f, all citations 343; my emphasis).
To bring into question “the ‘agonism’ between power relations and the intransi-
tivity of freedom” is necessary. As Miller and Rose highlight,“to become govern-
mental, thought had to become technical” (Miller and Rose 2008, 15). But tech-
nical thought is subject to analysis, which can be reversed and changed. Whereas
“the forms of resistance and counter-conducts are contingent. They have to be
accounted for, but they are not calculable. There is a science of government,
but there cannot be one of the art of not being governed” (Bro¨ckling et al. 2010,
17). An art of not being governed would rely on the transitivity of freedom, as
it would entail in establishing a practice that allows to be free from power. In a
governmental conception, power never vanishes and resistances are the drivers of
societal relations. The agonism then refers to the infinite progress of sites of con-
testation, because freedom is a milieu, prepared by the apparatuses of security,
that is always under development and negotiation. Its permanent reconfiguration
entails the space of resistance. Static freedom, free of power relations, would be
pure domination.
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3.2 From Resistance to Counter-Rationalities
The first basic termto look at on the way to conceptualize mobile protest media
is ‘empowerment’ (which I have so far not discussed). Mitchell Dean writes: “em-
powerment is [...] the normative correlate of the explanatory focus on agency. If
human beings are, at least potentially, agents, then they need to be empowered
to become so” (Dean 2010, 83). Agency is a potentiality, that unfolds through
empowerment. As such, it seems, agency is the most potent and potential re-
source of government, it is here that the conduct of conducts connects. Agency is
the resort that (neo-)liberal government effectively targets in its endeavor to acti-
vate the governed, to conduct their conduct. Dean continues that “[p]rogrammes
of empowerment are particularly clear examples of those contemporary liberal
rationalities of government that endeavor to operationalize the self-governing ca-
pacities of the governed in the pursuit of governmental objectives” (2010, 83).
On the other hand, if agency must be activated in the pursuit of self-governing
capacities, it is not determined to which objective this empowerment is pursued.
Empowerment of agency can have many outcomes, and different practices may
be the effect. It is not dependent on governmental programs of empowerment.
I suggest to understand protests and collective actions potentially as indepen-
dent empowerment processes, independent from government programs. They can
produce counter-rationalities, independent in the sense that they are, by and
large, not envisioned by government programs, although they might even be trig-
gered by them. And at the same moment, they can reshape and reorganize
programs of government. But as a process as such, they open the field of possibil-
ities and pass a plane uncontrolled by government programs. This plane is not,
and I risk repeating myself here, free from power relations, and also not from dis-
cipline, but the “disciplining should not necessarily be regarded as pacification or
domestication, but rather as evidence of the co-constitution of relations of power
and resistance” (Death 2011b, 432).
Mobile media both criss-crosses this development, as it is a political technology
of governmental rule, but at the same time it empowers counter-rationalities and
counter-conducts as it, for example, facilitates coordinated collective distributed
action (see chapter 5 in this matter).
David Couzens Hoy speculates about the necessary conditions for a critical
resistance. His starting point is that “governmentalization is what ‘subjugates’
or ‘subjectifies’ people by defining for them the legitimate answers to questions
about what counts as a person, what counts as a proper relation to one’s gender,
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or what rights a citizen has” (Hoy 2004, 88). He understands governmentaliza-
tion as legitimization of certain mindsets over delegitimization of others, which I
called the ‘channeling of practice’. Critique then is the “desubjugation or desub-
jectivation of the subject.” Thus, it is not about an alternative identity, but it
functions “by dissolving your sense of who you are and disrupting your sense of
what the right thing to do is” (Hoy 2004, 88-89).
Dissolving one’s sense, to follow Hoy’s term, is to challenge the political ratio-
nalities that guide one. A desubjectivation interferes with such rationalities. This
is close to what Barry, Osborne and Rose explain to be the goal of the study of
the history of the present, as it would be “a shattering of conventional thought
that strikes at the heart of our most taken-for-granted motivations [...] What
occurs is a potentially productive uncoupling of experience from its conditions”
(Barry et al. 1996, 6).
Counter-X
Counter-rationalities and counter-conducts rely on empowerment of agency. To
unleash or deploy processes of de-subjectivation relies on a reconfiguration of
subjectivations. Hence vectors of power change – protests and resistances allow
for the experience of de-subjectivation; temporal alternatives that, depending on
intensity and duration, entail the production of stable counter-rationalities and
counter-conducts. These are conducts that escape the political economic conducts
of the subject, overwrite them to different degrees and thus allow experience of
collective action against the dominant mode of conduct. By this, power relations
are restructured, which manifests in the necessity of rule to reform and to redeploy
new programs of government. As Foucault stated: rule has to be in concord with
desires, as they are too strong to be ignored by government. Counter-rationalities
and counter-conducts are sites of desire production.
One example: during the Tokyo City Mayor election, right now we have
a right wing mayor. I sent out a message: “add some nose hair on the
election ads”, so a lot of people did that and it was impossible to say who
did it all. Noone knew who had sent it, because it is relayed through a
lot of people. My personal name does not appear on the adress. I use
this mobile mailing list with 500 people. It is all free to send, we have
our own server for this shop, which we use for the mailinglist. Another
example: when I go to a city I have never been to, then I have a lot
flyers that I leave on bicycles with my phone number and “eat the rich”
on it. So people call and meet at the station and we start drinking beer.
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Like this I was going around to every stop all around Tokyo and made
a lot of friends.
Matsumoto / Tokyo
If “movements for freedom and emancipation are not located outside or beyond
power relations, but themselves produce regimes of subjectification” (Bro¨ckling
et al. 2010, 14), an analytics of rule (or better: analytics of protests) needs to
investigate these very own regimes of subjectivation and what their effects are,
as they “inaugurate counter-truths centered on the question of how liberated,
emancipated subjects are to understand and to shape themselves and others”
(Bro¨ckling et al. 2010, 14).
The activities involves strengthening the struggle of the collectors,
organising the collectors, so that they can claim collectively the ac-
knowledgement of their job. And claim rights, be acknowledged by
government and society.
Christoph and Bispo / Sa˜o Paulo
Hence
an analytics of protest is specifically designed to show how protest
and government are mutually constitutive, and thus how forms of
resistance have the potential to reinforce and bolster, as well and at
the same time as, undermining and challenging dominant forms of
global governance. (Death 2010, 236; emphasis in original)
Protest is comprised of this permanent duality: to reinforce and to challenge at
the same moment, as it is immanent to government, not exterior.
The politics of the movements is something the state is increasingly
worried about. There have been successful actions [...] in terms of
stopping of projects, of not allowing land acquisition, of not accepting
displacement and rehabilitation. So there is that kind of pressure on
the state.
Vijayan / Delhi
Montgomery argues that “discourses of civil disobedience produce norms and
imperatives governing the conduct of protesters themselves. The subjects of
protest are produced by this discourse, and these subjects often rely on it for
their actions to be intelligible” (2010, 102-103). Rationalized by this discourse,
counter-rationalities make counter-conducts intelligible.
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3.3 From Counter-Rationalities to Mobile Protest
Media
Taking conduct to the center discussion, the question arises how counter-conducts
come into existence. Death proposes to understand counter-conducts as a way
to develop an analytics of protest for the study of contentious poli-
tics. [...] it approaches protests and contentious politics not from an
actor-centric perspective, but rather orientates itself toward specific
practices and rationalities of protest, which themselves work to consti-
tute particular identities and subjectivities through the performance
of dissent. (Death 2010, 236; emphasis in original)
Counter-conducts are thus understood as productive as they constitute subjec-
tivities. Their mode of operation is the performance of dissent. By way of per-
formance they produce counter-subjectivities.
My claim is that this is the point where mobile media inscribes itself. As a
political technology, mobile media has an effect on the performance of dissent
and thus the production of counter-subjectivities. If counter-protests under the
lens of an analytics of protest (or rule) are seen “as assemblages of mentalities
and practices, which come to constitute dissenting subjectivities” (Death 2011b,
429), then the practices that produce these dissenting subjectivities comprehend
the political technology of mobile media.
As the discourse reproduced here, by way of expert statements, proposes to
adhere mobile media as a dominant factor in protests, the production of dissenting
subjectivities is massively influenced by mobile media.
Months ago, we had a graffiti action. It was on the metro tree cutting
here. On July 12th we had a Non Violent Direct Action. We all went
with cans of paint and gonna graffiti. The government was going to cut
some hundred trees in a park, so we chose those walls, long walls. It
was youth and children. We painted one whole section of the wall, in
English and Kannada, against the tree cutting. We sent SMS to many
people to come. SMS was the primary tool again. The SMS are being
forwarded, we sent it to a community radio, they used it. We were 20
to 30 people, which is a good number to do this kind of action. To run
away or to protect someone. It worked out very well. In India there is a
lot behavioral control, people are expected to dress like this and talk like
this. What kind of action you do. People become control freaks. There
is a lot of control freaking in this non-profit social movement sector.
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We are not into this style, we don’t tell people how to march. A bunch
of people just went out, painted the wall, painted what they wanted,
we had a really got time, which is very important for us, because life
is short. Otherwise the oppressed are oppressing again. We always had
the arts involved, which allows a lot of expressions. Even sports, soccer,
whatever. We found that in these ways rather than intellectual ways,
more in full body involvements, it is better to express.
ManasaSarovara / Bangalore
As mobile media is an integral part in the performance of dissent, its capacity
to organize, to mobilize, and to coordinate alters this performance. My general
point here is: the facilitation of circulation is as such a (neo-)liberal government
programme. It is a core trajectory of liberality. The seamless integration of this
factor of productivity in the performance of dissent is a sign for mostly two as-
pects: first, the circulation and flow of signs as such are not a monopoly of one
political rationality. Liberal rule made it a trajectory of liberal rule, but this is
not embodied in this functionality as such. It can be transposed to suit differ-
ent trajectories, and apparently, this is the case with mobile media, a concrete
manifestation of this (neo-)liberal trajectory.
Its emergence in the full scope of a semiotic-material agglomeration, as a politi-
cal technology of circulation, apparently had no essential core but this circulation.
In this sense, other established means of circulation might share this function, like
the internet. If counter-rationalities can render mobile media instrumental for
their counter-truths, no continuity exists between the material and the semiotic,
at least at first glance. The performance of dissent incorporates mobile media to
make it mobile protest media.
But it not this simple. So, second, mobile media has its say (and does) in
the course of becoming mobile protest media. While it empowers the dissenting
agencies, it so empowers to a specific practice. It channels practice, favors some
over others.
The common use is sending messages that say “today is a big protest
and we can stay there and there”, but not to communicate in a strate-
gical way. You can send news in a text message, but it is not conceptu-
alised here in Oaxaca. Maybe in the next years, because also here the
use of cell phones is growing. It is a new technology that people only
used recently. It is used for individual communication, not for the mass
communication.
Blax / Oaxaca (Mx)
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At first, mobile protest media favors the individual. The individual is its natural
anchor. Not only because it is carried around by individuals as a device. Mobile
media has become an intimate media, it has become a steady accompanying
technology throughout the day and night. This immersion within the intimate
radius of the body reshapes practice.
Whereas telecommunications until then had been bound to fixed places,
the mobile phone moves the psycho-social home to the mobile proxim-
ity of the body. Thus paradoxically it is the growing independence of
social communication from a stationary infrastructure that up values
the here and now of the body. (Winkler and Tischleder 2001, p. 102;
translation O.L.)
And it is not a collective body that is being up valued, but that of the individual.
Likewise, much earlier in its roll-out, it addresses the individual: as a technology
of the self, as facilitator for the homo economicus, who can perform her market
participation in even greater independence from place and time. It is not a media
for the family, like landline telephony used to be often. As I wrote: it integrates
individuals into a space of individual, personal addressability.
This can be used as a tactic, if it is rationalized.
Sometime it is also the tactic that, let’s say people have been arrested
and detained in a police station, so by any chance you do manage to
get the mobile phone number of that station house officer and then you
pass it on to all the supporters and everyone starts calling that person.
That creates an extra pressure, having people calling from Delhi, from
Bombay, it does work. Because also the mobile gives you a thing of
person to person communication. When calling a landline number they
can say the person is not around. But with mobile the chances are
better. This is useful mostly in the firefighting situation.
Kumar / Delhi
But this space of addressability works in any direction, and here mobile protest
media carries a specific trajectory of empowerment: it divides collectivity. It
excludes everyone except the addressed. For ‘social media’, this specificity is
addressed by Fenton and Barassi (2011).
[P]olitical participation is frequently defined by and takes place in
relation to and in coordination with others. Foregrounding creative
autonomy and the power of individuation may well be appropriate
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analytical tools for social media, but to do so negates the collective
dimension of political participation and thereby dissipates the political
properties of the participatory communicative act itself. (2011, 183)
They continue that “in an era of blogs, individual websites, and social networking
sites, individual messages are often given the same importance as the messages
that have arisen out of the tensions and negotiations of a collective of people”
(2011, 187). Much the same is the case with mobile media (and its integra-
tion with ‘social media’ might even spur this effect). The dissenting practice
of counter-rationalities face a technology of individualization, a technology that
divides the social plane.
Now, if a decision is to be taken, you don’t need to sit. The village
leader takes a decision by calling four or five people. But there is still
this kind of interaction which happens on the phone in contrast to
the kind of interaction when you are sitting in person with 10 people.
Which is much more useful for the political consciousness to build a
team. So the coming of the mobile has an impact on this process.
Much of your work is done on the phone. Sometimes you can bypass
people, sometimes the information is not passed on.
Kumar / Delhi
This is the most prominent site of frictions and where resistance against the
very technology itself develops. How can a technology of individualization be
changed into a technology of collective action?
The system that is installed in the squat here is: you push a button and
500 people get a SMS that the squat is evicted. This is for emergency.
This is very cheap and effective. By mistake it was activated once, so
it works.
Anonymous2 / Madrid
To come to grips with a situated account of protest and mobile media, the next
chapter investigates the wave of protests that happened in Pakistan in 2007 and
2008. By providing this section, mobile media’s potential of a specific circulation
of signs, a circulation from individual to individual, is described. But as well the
social means to disrupt this divide of the social plane, for example by intense
resending of messages to the complete address book in one’s phone, I try to frame
mobile media within these specific protests as mobile protest media – where the
protest is paired with governmental programs.
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4
Mobile Protest Media Case Study: The
Lawyers’ Movement
In 2007 and 2008 Pakistan was shaken by a movement called the “Lawyers’ Move-
ment” or “Anti-Emergency Movement”. What started as a protest by lawyers and
judges against the sacking of the Chief Justice of Pakistan, Iftikhar Chaudhry,
gained momentum after a proclamation of the state of emergency, and finally
led to a mobilization of large parts of Pakistan’s population. Although the main
groups were rooted in middle and upper class milieus, to defend the abstract
good of the independent judiciary, the working class and poor people also took
the streets.
In a country like Pakistan where 60% of the people are living below the
poverty line and they don’t know where their next meal is coming from,
for a country like Pakistan to sustain a movement on an ideological base,
because you can not see the rule of law, the man on the street thinks
about bread on the table, it was an amazing movement.
Hamid Zaman / Lahore
Based on interviews, online material, and the available literature, what follows
is an analysis that takes a deeper look into the movement, its actors and the
context. Therefore, I try to provide a detailed description of a protest movement
and its use of mobile media, online media, and the role played by broadcast media.
The reason for this case study is the movement’s intense use of mobile media. By
doing so, this chapter in part is a narration of the events. To provide this, I
decided to quote extensively from interviews and articles.
The protesters interviewed about the lawyers’ movement and, likewise, the
movement itself, differ from all other interviewees in one point: whereas all the
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others in their efforts aim at social justice, including economic equality as a com-
mon goal, and thus understand themselves as protagonists that are antagonistic
to the capitalist mode of societal relations, the Pakistanis I interviewed can be
considered less radical in these terms. The fight for an independent judiciary is
not in itself targeting capital means of societal relations. Some commentators
even argue that the lawyers’ movement was mainly after a status quo for a milieu
of professionals.
The lawyers’ movement in Pakistan, for example, while employing the
devices of people-power movements and using the language of democ-
racy, was not primarily about shifting power to a wider spectrum of the
population. Rather, it was about resisting the reduction of power of a
proportionally small elite that the military regime had initiated. This
was not an attempt to bring about a great new South Asian democ-
racy – although a strong and independent judiciary is associated with
stable democratic regimes in Western Europe and North America,
so it was not incompatible with a potentially more far-reaching and
broad-based pro-democracy people-power movement. (Lyon 2010)
But the specificity of this profession, being the ones that either act as represen-
tatives of the law as judges or as lawyers, makes them agents of an abstract goal
as well. In my encounters with lawyers and students I was often confronted with
a very strong nationalist wording, most prominently towards India, and an un-
derrepresentation of poverty in the discussions that took place. Nonetheless, to
present the lawyer’s movement in more detail, although it clearly is not represen-
tative of the general spectrum of activists I interviewed, can be argued for:
First, in a more general sense, mobile media is a tool for empowerment and
protest agency, irrespective of the goals it is used for.
Second, for an analytics of rule, as outlined above, this movement in Pakistan
is a convincing case, as both sovereign and governmental modes of rule can be
separated and it can be shown how these modes of rule can be in contradiction
and thus have the potential to clash. Especially, the invocation of the state of
emergency as an act of sovereignty allowing the state to shoot protesters in its
boldest manifestation (even though this never happened overtly), is in direct
contradiction to both the massive use of mobile media as an facilitator of liberal
rule, and the protests for an independent judiciary, claiming legitimacy due to
the existence of a civil society. These two modes of governing became observable
in almost purity during the lawyers’ movement’s protests, and thus provide an
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excellent case to discuss the theoretical framework of an analytics of rule as laid
out earlier on.
Third, for the relationship of surveillance and mobile media in protests, this
case highlights the importance of understanding them in a reciprocal relation-
ship, where one answers to the state of the other. One might say that if the
Musharraf regime at that time had the technologies and capacities to surveil mo-
bile communications which became available to the Iranian regime during the 2009
post-election protests through the network equipment specialist Nokia-Siemens,
the outcome of the protests in Pakistan and, much more, the accuracy of repres-
sion would have been different. Therefore, I suggest that the support that mobile
media in protests provides is inversely proportional to the state’s surveillance
capacity: its finesse and granularity.
My general argument is that this case study highlights the necessity to connect
both, the dissemination of mobile phones, its massification and roll-out, including
the economic regime of its use, and the technological and operational status
of surveillance systems during these protests, to understand the capacities of
empowerment that mobile media may facilitate.
4.1 Pakistan and Musharraf
Some context is needed to look at this fight for an independent judiciary in Pak-
istan. Pakistan as a political entity emerged in 1947 during the process of partition
when the Indian subcontinent gained independence from British rule. It is the
home of roughly 170 million people, of which 97 per cent are Muslims. Formally,
Pakistan is a federal democracy, but only nine years after its formation the first
military coup took place.
It was soft martial law. It does affect people, people do disappear, but
it has never been a harsh martial law. Our dictators want to be popular
also.
Sakham Khan / Lahore
Since that time the country’s rule has been dominated by dictatorship. Begin-
ning in 1979, under the rule of dictator Zia, a deep islamisation of the country’s
structures and institutions took place, including the army. Even today the state
and its structures are enmeshed with Islamic servants leading to a defensive po-
sition of secular groups (see Cohen 2004).
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In 1999 general Pervez Musharraf, then the Chief of Army Staff, in a bloodless
coup d’etat overthrew the elected prime minister Navaz Sharif. He assumed power
as Chief Executive of the army and on June 20th 2001 Musharraf appointed
himself President of Pakistan, backed by the party PML-Q. He remained Head
of the Army during his presidency and allied with the US in the ‘war on terror’.1
His reign came to end in 2009, amongst other things, as a result of the protests
described here. It would be an oversimplification to claim that the protests alone
were able to push Musharraf from his presidency. “While there are a great many
reasons why Musharraf was ultimately forced to resign [...] the sustained public
protest of the educated elite class of attorneys and judges was clearly instrumental
in that process”(Lyon 2010). The complex international political situation, the
‘war on terror’ in neighboring Afghanistan, and a diversity of national players
need to be taken into account to understand the heterogeneous forces leading to
his resignation. Still, it is safe to say that the protests had a strong impact with
the restoration of the judiciary and an elected government in Pakistan.
4.2 The Dissemination of Mobile Phones in Pak-
istan
Mobile telephony was a liberalized market from the start in Pakistan, leading to
five main companies offering services: Telenor, Ufone, Mobilink, Warid and Zong.
The dissemination of mobile phones in Pakistan shows a significant rise during
2006 to 2008 (see figure 4.1). In 2008, very roughly, every second Pakistani owned
a mobile phone. “To describe the spread of mobile-phone usage between 2000
and 2007 as an explosion is an understatement, and such access became relatively
common even among relatively poor peasants” (Lyon 2010). This coincides with
the rise of the lawyers’ movement: at the same moment in history when the larger
part of Pakistan’s society had only recently gained access to mobile telephony, a
mass civil society movement was able to reinstate the Chief Justice and free the
judiciary from a dictator’s grasp.
In Pakistan, as in most countries, the largest share are pre-paid phones. Thus,
although receiving SMS is free of charge, it remains unknown how many of these
phones have credit to regularly send SMS or initiate a call. With regard to SMS
though, the curve of numbers of sent SMS coincides well with the number of
1 For a detailed discussion about the figure Musharraf see Jones (2005).
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Figure 4.1: Growth of mobile phone dissemination in Pakistan. Source: TechLa-
hore.com
phones disseminated (see figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2: Growth of SMS sent in Pakistan 2006 - 2010. Source:
http://propakistani.pk
In 2006 approximately 8.7 billion SMS were sent through Pakistani networks;
by 2008 this number had grown to approximately 61 billion.
But still, these numbers in no way reflect the number of phones used to send
SMS and it is quite possible that a relatively small number of phones initiated a
large share of SMS sending. Nonetheless, these numbers show that a countrywide
boom of short messaging coincides with the first nationwide civil society move-
ment. Asked about the costs of sending messages, all my interviewees in Pakistan
considered SMS cheap.
Actually in Pakistan text messages are very cheap. We bought un-
limited packages. You could buy for 250 rupees 7000 text messages.
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Abeer Hamid / Lahore
In 2008, 2,500 Pakistan rupees equaled approximately AC2.50. Although this
appears to be cheap at first glance, when confronted with the fact that more than
half of Pakistan’s population is illiterate, and with big varieties in gender and
region, and that poverty is the country’s most prevailing issue, SMS are clearly
not available to large parts of the population. According to the 2009 Human
Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
60.3 per cent of Pakistanis live on less than $2 per day. In the UN’s Human
Development Report from 2009, Pakistan ranks only 141st of 177 ranked countries
(see United Nations Development Programme 2009).
Access to internet remained below 10% of the population “although the growing
popularity of internet cafes makes it difficult to produce an accurate estimate of
how many individuals have occasional access to the net” (Bolognani 2010, 404).
4.3 The Protest Movement
Some commentators understand the “Anti-Emergency Movement” as the first
civil society movement in Pakistan (see Abbas and Jasam 2009). Sakham Khan
from the Concerned Citizen of Pakistan (CCP) depicts one of the central demon-
strations very much in the tradition of U.S. civil society movements:
At the first long march, when it took place, in July 2007, when we
got to Islamabad, it was a feeling very much you would have in the
western world, like the anti-war movements in the US, people would
get together, happy, but upset. You saw in these demonstrations almost
whole families.
Sakham Khan / Lahore
The composition of the protest movement is heterogeneous to some extent, as
Asad Jamal tells:
The laywer’s movement was heavily concentrated from the center Pun-
jab, starting from the regions around Lahore, it was heavily concen-
trated in the urban areas. I think people from all kinds of backgrounds
and affiliations were participating. When the movement matured, I
guess that it turned somewhat against the Pakistan Peoples Party. The
majority of the participants, it seems, they are inclined to support the
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centrist or right-leaning parties. Centrist because a lot of the people in
the movement were against the PPP, because of Zadari or Bhutto. The
media is either. There were a number of leftists, too.
Asad Jamal / Lahore
Clearly urban centric, and led by the middle class, the Anti-Emergency Move-
ment could encourage large parts of the population to engage in the struggles,
although the backbone clearly were the lawyers themselves and their organiza-
tions.
If a Punjabi farmer can see in a Chief Justice’s legal struggles a parallel
to his own, if the bookstores in a city the size of Lahore can sell
all of their copies of the constitution, and if the electoral success of
political parties and the market share of television networks can hinge
on their attitudes toward judicial independence, then the notion of the
Supreme Court as merely a tool of elites cannot be the entire story.
(Anonymous 2010, 1725)
Even political parties advocating the shari‘a law in Pakistan backed the secular
protest by and large. “The Jamaat-e-Islami was one of the parties most actively
engaged with the lawyers’ movement, despite the latter’s aim of strengthening
the secular legal system in the country.” (Munir 2009) The common target was
Musharraf and the goal of his resignation could channel and combine even opposed
interests. Clearly, working classes involvement was limited and this has been
“related to a general feeling of resignation about the recurrent use of martial
law in the country, the fact that social justice issues (such as the rise of flour
prices) would have been much more appealing to them, and also a widespread
disenchantment about democratic rule” (Bolognani 2010, 403). Nonetheless it is
safe to say that, at least from the phase of martial law onwards, heterogeneous
forces joined with the single goal of an independent judiciary that eventually
led to Musharraf’s resignation. Maybe one of the reasons for success originated
from its perception as being authentic: “The movement was not dominated by
any single ethnic or sectarian group, thus giving it a truly national complexion.
And it was not a facade for political party activism, although parties occasionally
participated—especially at key events”(Munir 2009). Additionally, it is important
to understand the role of the Chief Justice himself, who became an identification
figure for the masses, what had become rare in Pakistan:
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I think for the first time in our history somebody stood up to a dictator
and said “No, I am not doing this”. That was the Chief Justice. That
is why people across the country, regardless of their province, stood up
on this. And they had somebody to follow. We don’t have leaders like
that, people only fight for their own interest.
Hamid Zaman / Lahore
The independence of justice had a face and was embodied in purity by the Chief
Justice. This certainly helped identify with the abstract dimension of law.
A brief note about the composition and economic standing of the Pakistan
lawyers, as well as its organizational model and a description of two other groups,
complete this introduction sequence before I turn to the chronology of the events.
The Pakistani Lawyers
As in any larger profession, different social strata are present within the thousands
of lawyers in Pakistan, depending on were they work, in what position and what
seniority they have. Thus “lawyers in Pakistan also represent the middle class and
the lower middle class, while the rest are part of what is commonly and broadly
called ‘the elite’, referring to the upper classes” (Bolognani 2011, 22).
The lawyers have associations all around the country, so that helped.
And then like maybe there are 10.000 lawyers in Lahore, that is impres-
sive, and their dedication: they just went on and on, without getting
jobs. It was their commitment that made other people follow.
Hamid Zaman / Lahore
This commitment, it has been commented, would often find its origin, not so
much in the interest of the idealistic good of independent judiciary, but much
more in a material interest. As an independent judiciary strengthens the powers
and position of the lawyers and increases their income, as opposed to dependency
and good will from a dictator.
Beneath the idealistic sheen of the lawyers’ protests, the strategic
maneuverings of elites were a prime driver of the movement and a key
determinant of its success. First and foremost, the lawyers themselves
were from an elite profession, and from a certain perspective their
protests could be understood as a narrow defense of the professional
interests of the bar. (Anonymous 2010, 1719)
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This is truly the case, but the ones taking to the streets, engaging in risky
operations during the protests, and as well lacking any income for an unforesee-
able time were most certainly not, primarily, calculating their personal interests.
“[M]uch of the impetus for the lawyers’ protests came from the youngest and
often the poorest members of the profession. These so-called ‘common lawyers’
tended to be more politically active than their elite counterparts.” (Anonymous
2010, 1720)
I was not in the position to pay the rent anymore, telephone was
disconnected. It was a period of one and a half years. I had to take my
children from school, I have not been able to pay their fees.
Mohammad Azhar Siddique / Lahore
The other outstanding point is that hardly any other profession can claim that
their professional interests, and the interest of the public, for the fair and due
process of law, fall together.
The backbone of the lawyers was their high level of organization through bar
councils and associations.2 The protests did not emerge out of the blue and did
not lack steering and hierarchy. The lawyers’ ability to mobilize lawyers across
the country made their protests especially effective. Nonetheless, without hundred
thousands of mobilized non-professionals, even such an organizational structure
as the bar associations would most likely not have been successful at such a scale.
2 Zahid Shahab Ahmed gives a concise overview of the organizational structure that was
imperative for the functionality of the lawyers’ self organization. As I am not primarily in-
terested in social movements structures, but focus on mobile media use, I take the liberty
to quote in full length but in a footnote: “The 160 local bar councils and associations in
Pakistan, with their 85,000 to 90,000 members, comprised the organizational backbone of
the movement, which was led by a small group of lawyers headed by Aitzaz Ahsan. The
movement’s main decision-making body was the National Action Committee of Lawyers
(NACL), whose main leaders were Ahsan, Ali Ahmad Kurd (president of the SCBA), Munir
A. Malik (ex-president SCBA), Hamid Khan (member of the Pakistan Bar Council (PBC)
and ex-president of SCBA) and Tariq Mehmood (retired justice). Most decisions were
made in consultation with the Pakistan Bar Council (PBC) and the SCBA, whose leadership
was represented in the NACL. The lawyers’ nation-wide infrastructure and decentralized
character (albeit with a centralized leadership) strengthened the movement’s organization
and communication, enhanced unity of effort, and made it very difficult for the regime to
suppress the lawyers’ activities. In addition, the NACL benefited from charismatic leader-
ship. One lawyer from Lahore said that that ‘the NACL member, especially Hamid Khan
and Aitzaz Ahsan, successfully dominated the media’. But charismatic leadership cannot
compensate for lack of organization, which is where the power of nonviolent resistance
resides.” (Ahmed 2010, 502-503)
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This was by and large achieved with a very effective interplay of peer to peer
mobilization via SMS, a functional and ad-hoc cross pollution of online media
and mobile media, and a strong support by broadcast media, which was informed
and updated as well by mobile and online media. This successful interplay is the
central part of this case study, but two shorter passages are instrumental for an
understanding of the protests: first, the important role that elite students played,
as they primarily provided the means for an online dissemination, and second a
brief chronicle of events is necessary.
Student Protests and LUMS
Students from elite universities played an important part in the protests, e.g. the
Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), who benefited from privi-
leges that made their protest effective and safer at the same time: as in other
countries, also in Pakistan university campuses are ‘autonomous’ areas guarded
by university security personnel.
They have a private campus and like many others they have their own
security staff. Actually there is some tradition of this in many other
countries as well but maybe not in the US. There is a tradition for
autonomy for universities. The government is not going to send troops
into the campus. And so, at LUMS it was the same way. The students
were doing a lot of organising on campus, while the troops were not
going there. But if they left the campus, than they could be picked up.
Students were arrested and prosecuted in some cases.
Theriot-Orr / Seattle
Additionally, they had good access to online capacities and provided the digital
literacy to function as routers between online media and mobile media.
During this state of emergency when every news sources was banned,
the students organized a political movement using the Internet’s social
networking tools, such as emails, online petitions, blogs, the Facebook
and text messages from cell phones. (Shaheen 2008, 143)
I interviewed students from LUMS during my stay in Lahore and it appears
to me that the anti-emergency protests were their initiation to political protests.
This explains the furore and energy they engaged with. Also they played a pivotal
role as they came as a surprise. Amber Voha, who was present in Lahore during
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the protests as a journalist, writes: ”If there was anywhere Musharraf might
have expected tacit support, many thought, it was among these children, many
of whose families are closely connected to his regime” (Vora 2007). But on the
other hand: that law students are keen to enter their professional life under an
independent judiciary seems rationale, unless they plan to go abroad to find a
better professional perspective.
Additionally, in personal conversation with students it became clear that some
understood their engagement in the protests as well as a revolt against their
parents, who broadly did not participate, and thus deligitimized themselves in
the eyes of their children.
The students, although not yet lawyers, belonged to a milieu that in different
ways was connected to the lawyers.
The student groups were largely law students, but not lawyers yet.
The protest movement in Pakistan was much bigger than just lawyers.
Although that was probably the majority: most people had some con-
nection with the lawyers, either a friend, or parents. But there were also
economics professors, anthropologists, various people from academia, as
well as journalists
Theriot-Orr / Seattle
The Pakistani students’ connection to students abroad was instrumental in the
distribution of information and funding of the protests.
Pakistanis abroad participated a lot. During long march one we needed
to raise funds and there were a lot of people who were sending us money
through Paypal. One of my friends was managing this. And then there
were people who were writing articles in newspapers abroad and they
were sending articles to us to distribute.
Ahmed Salemi / Lahore
The special circumstances under which the students were working are expressed
as “[w]here the Gates of LUMS start, Pakistan ends” (Bolognani 2011, 31). This
gated community sphere is criticized by commentators as it would lead to mostly
virtual protests that are considered non-instrumental: “the great majority of the
student involvement was witnessed within the LUMS gates (and projected on the
Web)” (Bolognani 2011, 32). But one can well understand that the students acted
as providers of networked information, which played an important role in keeping
communication between cities and to fellow students abroad, up to date. With
this, the LUMS students were part of a functional division within the protests.
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Additionally, the organization of two long marches spurred their agency and thus
they engaged in street protesting. I understand the students’ contribution as a
smart intermingling of online and oﬄine protest.
During long march one we had done a lot of work with the students
in Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad. So there were some people who
were actually doing an online reporting of what was happening during
the long march. We usually sent a SMS and they would upload it on
Twitter and Facebook and the internet immediately, on their blogs as
well. Things like “we are so and so many now”, “we are here now”,
“this just happened”. So, people who could not join us could help us
like this.
Ahmed Salemi / Lahore
Online communication did not reach the poorer parts of the protesters. This
produced different informed milieus within the protest movement. In a heteroge-
neous and large protest movement, homogeneous strata of society stick together
and use the tools and knowledge available to them in the sense that it is part of
their agency and mentalities. Power relations prevail within movements.
Amongst the many publications the students provided, a flier by the Student
Action Committee (SAC) (see figure 4.3) titled “Students demand a check on the
establishment” directly addressed their claims: besides an independent judiciary,
they addressed food issues as well as demanding free media.
After describing the general composition of the larger protest movement, I ex-
plained the heterogeneity of the lawyers themselves. This is often neglected,
especially as large numbers of poorer lawyers hit the streets in an unanticipated
way as they could well identify with the Chief Justice as a leader of integrity.
Then I described that elite students backed the lawyers: first, they came as a
surprise and second, they could operate safely from within the university gates
and set up a cross media information network whose outreach was national and
international. Next is a time-line of the events.
A Brief Time-Line of the Events: First Sacking of the Chief Jus-
tice
Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry can be considered the central figure throughout
the events. He was appointed by Musharraf on 30 June 2005 as the highest judge
of Pakistan. Up to his appointment, Chaudhry had not caused any trouble to the
regime or made spectacular decisions. Though, since his appointment as Chief
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Figure 4.3: Flier by the Student Action Committee February 2008
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Justice he showed a different face. “There was a paradigmatic shift in the core
function of Pakistan’s Supreme Court when decisions started going against senior
members of the executive.” (Munir 2009) Amongst the many surprising projects,
the launch within the court of a Human Rights Department to investigate cases of
missing persons – people that had been detained incommunicado under the aus-
pices of the Anti-Terrorism Act – was maybe the most provoking to the regime.
“[F]rom 2006 to 2007, the Court required representatives from Pakistan’s intelli-
gence agencies to appear before it and account for certain missing persons that
the government had allegedly detained in connection with the ‘war on terror’.”
(Anonymous 2010, 1712) As Daud Munir puts it:
In an astoundingly bold move, Chief Justice Chaudhry accepted a
case involving 41 missing persons. The court upheld the right to due
process for extra judicially detained individuals and ordered the state
agencies to produce them in court. This was an extraordinary contra-
authoritarian step in the judicial history of Pakistan. Chaudhry’s
activism generated immense respect among lawyers and the human
rights community, and was widely reported in the burgeoning in-
dependent Pakistani media. Emboldened by the positive feedback,
Chaudhry accepted another case involving over a hundred forced dis-
appearances on March 8, 2007. The next day would prove fateful for
both Chaudhry and the military regime in Pakistan. (Munir 2009)
Additionally, he directly intervened into one of the most important privatiza-
tion tasks of the regime: the selling of the biggest Pakistan steel mill to private
investors. “In a landmark judgment, the Chaudhry Court annulled the sale agree-
ment on the grounds that the deal had been done in ‘indecent haste’.” (Munir
2009)
Amongst the many accounts available, this one by lawyer Mohammad Siddique
recounts the events of March 2007 from the perspective of a juridical activist who
became a central node in the distribution of SMS to many lawyers across the
country:
And now the bad day came, the 9th of March 2007 when Chief Justice
was thrown out from the court, from his premises. He was a custodian
of the supreme court premises and 60 other judges. A deterior constitu-
tional law has been used as a weapon. It is known as PCO. Musharraf
got a PCO and urged the judges to take a oath under that PCO rather
than under the constitution. There are 60 judges who were offered to
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take oath and some refused. That was the day when the movement
started, the 9th of March. It was Friday, 12.30h, we were preparing
ourselves for jummah prayer [friday prayer, O.L.], when we heard cer-
tain voices that there is gonna be some action against the Chief Justice.
On that day in High Court Lahore was a proceeding against a famous
general on the way. On that day these proceedings were withdrawn.
And at about 2 or 3 we came to know that Chief Justice had been
sacked and that they decided to take an action against the jurisdiction.
We had developed a plan how to develop that movement. And on the
9th at night I had sent messages cross the country given them the news
that Chief Justice has been sucked. To all lawyers. My mechanism are
concerned with the heads of bar association, secretary, member of bar
councils and the leaders of the bar.
Mohammad Azhar Siddique / Lahore
When “Musharraf put an end to these investigations by deposing the Chief
Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry on charges (not followed by official proceedings) of
corruption”(Bolognani 2010, 402) and misconduct, Chaudhry refused to resign
and thus was placed under house arrest by Musharraf. That the Chief Justice did
not bow to the regime was unseen and unheard of for a long time in Pakistan,
and it had a great impact, as lawyer Asad Jamal explains:
And when he said “no”, that took people to the streets. The patience
of people had to come to the point were they had to come out, express
their dissent, whatever political background they belonged to. And the
media was ready to grap the opportunity. Media has had a explosion
in recent years, a lot of investment came to the country, a lot of media
grew, and the government gave them at least the freedom in establishing
the channels. This was an instance when commercial media wanted
to display what people wanted to watch. In the initial weeks of the
movement in early 2007, the movement was on TV all the time.
Asad Jamal / Lahore
To understand what this behavior of a high judge in Pakistan stands for, this
anonymous writer from the Harvard Law Review explains:
In Pakistan, where the military has dominated politics for sixty years
and where generals demand a high degree of deference from legislative
and judicial officials, the Chief Justice’s refusal to resign represented
a shockingly radical break from political and social norms and an ex-
treme assertion of judicial independence. As one civil society activist
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put it, ‘We Pakistanis are not used to people taking stands.’ Within
days, Chaudhry was transformed from a little regarded jurist into a
folk hero. (Anonymous 2010, 1712)
When Chaudhry left his residence on March 13th, he was received by a police
car to transport him to the court where he was to face charges. He refused to be
transported in a police car leading to a harsh treatment by the security forces.
“At this point, the security forces pulled him by the hair and forced him into the
car. Their actions were captured on film and widely circulated on news channels
and reported in the print media.”(Munir 2009) Many commentators view this
moment as the origin of the lawyers’ movement: to see on news channels all
around the country how the highest judge was mistreated.
The support for Chaudhry strengthened and developed pressure that eventually
led to the unlikely event that on July 20th the “Supreme Court passed a landmark
judgment annulling the presidential order [of the Chief Justice’s sacking, O.L.]
and restoring Chaudhry. This was the first judicial ruling in the country’s history
directly challenging the action of a military dictator” (Munir 2009).
Musharraf’s rule was overturned by a court that had, up to that day, been
generally in favor of Musharraf. This early phase of protest is recounted in detail
by Mohammad Siddique, as well pointing to his personal achievements:
On the 10th of March we had decided to launch a protest across the
country. In Punjab alone are around 110 bar associations. Across Pak-
istan are about 240 bar associations. And later on we involved political
workers, civil society, students, liberals, and again the mobile device
played a pievotal role. We got numbers of activists, student leaders. We
had sat out Thursday as a protest day for lawyers. After the restora-
tion of the Chief Justice we stopped, but until then we walked on the
roads every Thursday. And I myself with the help of NGOs and civil
society organised a protest on Sundays as well. Even on a holiday, I
with my family, all the people came out of their houses and protest in
front of the houses of the supreme court judges at that time. This was
my brainchild, I organised this in front of parliament in Islamabad and
the court house.
Mohammad Azhar Siddique / Lahore
The Second Sacking of CJ and the State of Emergency
Reinstated, Chaudhry continued with his independent juridical work,also now
challenging Musharraf directly by preparing a court decision against Musharraf’s
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reelection based on the question of Musharraf’s eligibility to run for reelection as
president while remaining in a military uniform. When the Pakistani Supreme
Court was about to rule on the validity of Musharraf’s reelection as president
(see Anonymous 2010, 1716), Musharraf suspended the constitution and declared
emergency rule.
Under his directions, the chief justice and seven other judges were
arrested. Musharraf replaced Chaudhry with Justice Abdul Hameed
Dogar. Dogar promptly obliged by declaring Musharraf validly elected
as president and by declaring valid Musharraf’s National Reconcilia-
tion Ordinance, which provided immunity from prosecution to numer-
ous corrupt public functionaries. (Iqbal 2009)
The other direct action initiated by Musharraf, as part of the state of emergency,
was the ban of media. Thus, online media became crucial in the course of the
movement. “Millions of Pakistanis were faced with a ban on about a dozen
domestic and international TV news stations and curbs on newspapers due to
the emergency imposed by the Pakistani government.” (Shaheen 2008, 143) Due
to the liberalized media scheme that made Musharraf a more popular dictator,
now “30 privately owned channels were promptly taken off the air.” Media was
targeted also physically as “policemen raided the Islamabad offices of Aaj TV, an
independent news channel, and attempted to confiscate the channel’s equipment.
The telephone lines of Pakistan’s first independent news channel Geo TV were
cut and their broadcasters were threatened with long jail terms” (Yusuf 2009, 6).
Additionally, demonstrations and public gatherings were banned, so that “thou-
sands of lawyers and activists were beaten and arrested, including most of the
leadership of the lawyers’ movement. Students and other activists protested in
defiance of military rule and faced brutal police crackdowns” (Anonymous 2010,
1715).
And as Muneer Malik, one of the lawyers leaders recounts in his detailed book
“The Pakistan Lawyer’s Movement. An unfinished agenda”:3
The imposition of Emergency was followed by a massive crackdown.
Virtually the entire leadership of the bar was placed under arrest.
3 This is a very detailed account from the view of a high judge that contextualizes the
lawyer’s movement within the bar association’s inner political fights before and during
the protest. In its detailed and dense description, including the names of hundreds of
judges and lawyers, it provides an internal perspective on the bar’s mechanisms and it is
written almost like a diary, up to concise descriptions of every hour.
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Justice Tariq Mehmood was picked up from his residence and packed
off to Sahiwal Jail where he was confined in a rat infested cell and had
to sleep on the floor biting cold. (Malik 2008, 240)
Although martial law was invoked, it failed to mute and stop the protests. On
a less visible level main media outlets continued to work:
Even after the imposition of emergency, when all channels were closed,
not being allowed to air any program, they worked, but the program
was not relayed through the cable. You could watch via Internet, and
the radio was there. I was actually interviewed by the Voice of America,
it was the 2nd night when the judge had to vacate the house. I know
many journalists who would stay up whole nights to get information,
calling me and other people, to get information.
Asad Jamal / Lahore
The martial law phase during the lawyers’ movement actually fueled the protests
and widened participation. What had been the outcome of a well organized
profession now turned into weeks of nation-wide protests as “the lawyers began
to cooperate more directly with opposition parties. Protests became much larger
and more diverse as a result. In addition, new protest groups emerged and came
to include not only secular urban elites, but also some poorer and more religious
Pakistanis” (Anonymous 2010, 1715).
Pressure increased to the degree that Musharraf resigned as Chief Executive
of the Army on November 2007 and on December 15th a ‘light’ version of the
constitution was restored. General elections were held in February 2008. On
March 24, the newly elected government released Chaudhry, his colleagues, and
his family from incarceration. Musharraf resigned under pressure on August 18.
Asif Ali Zardari, who promised to restore Chaudhry to office, was elected president
on September 6 (see Iqbal 2009).
The new government took its time to reinstate Chaudhry and the other lawyers
that had not bowed to Musharraf. The reasons are manifold and only by way of
a deeper look into Pakistani politics, including the role of the different political
parties and other public players, can this process be duly reconstructed. This is
off limits of this analysis (for a more thorough analysis, see Abbas and Jasam
(2009), Anonymous (2010), Ahmed (2010)).
The lawyers’ and civil societies success story ends when they organized a second
long march in March 2009. But “before the hundreds of thousands of protesters
reached the capital, the prime minister announced the restoration of the deposed
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judges. Chief Justice Chaudhry once again resumed office on March 22, 2009”
(Munir 2009).
After this brief description of the events, that focused largely on the phases from
the first sacking of Chief Justice Chaudhry to the end of the state of emergency,
the larger role of mobile, online and broadcast media can be taken into account.
4.4 SMS, Online and Broadcast Media
In the early days of the emergency, SMS text messaging was lauded
across the Pakistani blogosphere as the savior of communication in a
time of crisis. (Yusuf 2009, 13)
The regime fought hard against broadcast media that was in support of the
protests. First, through the state of emergency, they banned independent broad-
cast media altogether, but after lifting martial law, the pressure on the media
continued.
Under his rule in March 2002, Musharraf had established the Pakistan Elec-
tronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA), thus facilitating the opening of
56 private TV channels. Many local and national radio stations with private
ownership emerged as well as a flourishing newspaper market.
Also Musharraf was really a victim of his own policies because he
liberalized the government controlled media. And as a result, one of
the things he did, there was a lot greater media freedom than there
was in 1999 when he took power. And you can certainly say that he
was a dictator, but this doesn’t mean that everything he did was bad.
But because of that, when he did have his second coup as they say
in Pakistan: when General Musharraf overthrew President Musharraf,
because he was both President and General at that time, the media
would not sit down and take it.
Theriot-Orr / Seattle
This moderate freedom of the media came to an end in June 2007, when “the
Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) imposed strict regu-
lations on live shows and forced those TV channels to drop their famous anchors”
(Ahmed 2010, 505). But the harder broadcast media were hit by censorship, the
more online media and mobile media kicked in. What is commonly referred to
as civic media was invented for Pakistan in these weeks. “It was in this media
vacuum that other alternatives began to flourish: the public realized that to fulfill
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its hunger for news in a time of political crisis, it had to participate in both the
production and dissemination of information.” (Yusuf 2009, 10) The production
and dissemination produced new media structures, connecting broadcast media,
online media, and mobile media (see also Shaheen 2008).
As such, new media in Pakistan has helped old media survive. The
result is a media amalgamation in which information is pushed to the
public, promiscuously distributed across broadcast media, new media
platforms, and various digital technologies to prevent being disrupted
or corrupted by the authorities. Thanks to amateurs and activists,
students and concerned civilians, a nugget of information can leap
from local televised news broadcasts to YouTube to SMS text message
to FM radio broadcasts to blog posts to international news reports –
whatever it takes to go public. (Yusuf 2009, 35)
This amalgamation of very different media technologies had one prominent
effect: by using all means available and not only using online media and blogs,
larger parts of the populations, especially poorer parts without access to the
internet, but equipped with a cell phone, were kept updated about the events and
could be mobilized within short notice. “The coverage of the Emergency seemed
mostly based on a circle of trust, created by an ad hoc virtual community who
had, if not democracy, at least the rule of law as a common objective.” (Bolognani
2010, 408) The students endorsed this conversion of online and mobile media and
professionalized it to the extend that every minute updates would be delivered
by SMS to online sources:
There was a blog or a site. We text the contents of what is going on
right now, e.g. during the long march, people started from one end
of Pakistan going to the capital. People from Karachi usually text all
their members and to the blog. There was number which you could
text to and the site would automatically rearrange the text online. So
that site gave the people in Lahore and Islamabad updates. It was a
start up company running that site, a blog from a Doctor in Karachi
and CN report. CN report was a start up from a LUMS doctor. You
could MMS the pictures to CN report and the pictures showed up. The
number was associated with the server there. They connected the server
which was running from a GSM server. It was open posting. And this
number was published. It was our source of information. Media was
not broadcasting the news of the long march at that time. And before,
during the emergency, channels were shutdown. So, we developed our
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own sources. E.g. if I text, then the messages online would appear like:
Abeer Hamid texted this.... And my fellows see that and know it is
a reliable source. You had to register if you wanted it to appear as a
text from your number, otherwise it would appears as anonymous text.
This was nation wide. All the people that were texting with the same
keywords, that messages would all appear online as a stream.
Abeer Hamid / Lahore
But the students as well operated an infrastructure that would provide a dis-
semination of SMS:
Another site was at LUMS, it was a mass messaging site. You text to a
number there and that would be delivered to all the registered numbers
there. It was a PC that is online 24h and from internet it has a gateway
to SMS. If you write “save pak”, then you join the group “save pak”
and all your text will be delivered to the lists “save pak”.
Abeer Hamid / Lahore
In addition, emails by the net-connected upper classes “inevitably included
synopses that were copied as SMS text messages and circulated well beyond cy-
berspace” (Yusuf 2009, 5). Information flow across social boundaries was initi-
ated. This included Pakistanis in the diaspora who“created discussion groups on
the social networking site Facebook” (Yusuf 2009, 10).
Video recording and picture taking, besides SMS, was important. We
were able to move images very fast into the web. Especially the stu-
dents exploited this feature. The people overseas were constantly being
updated, so someone studying overseas was able to move that informa-
tion back and forth, that did put a lot of pressure on the media. That
was to me the most phenomenal thing. I could take a picture and put
it on Facebook while I was there. We had a CCP group on Facebook.
The social networking is now connected to the phone.
Sakham Khan / Lahore
The heterogeneity of the protest movement thus resonated within the diversity
of media technologies available. And in return, the heterogeneity of the media
technologies ensured that groups from almost all societal strata got into the in-
formation loop.
In most cases, emails included short messages that were meant to
be copied and further circulated via SMS text message. The parallel
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use of SMS text messages allowed activists to reach a wider audience
while continuing to keep information about their monitoring activities
restricted to trusted recipients. (Yusuf 2009, 29)
Within this rhizomatic media structure, the lawyer’s kept circulating SMS in
their inner organizational structure, to the extent that one nationwide inner com-
munication circle existed within the protests.
Mohammad Siddique recounts numbers of SMS he sent personally on his private
phone:
I had then build up a mechanism to coordinate the lawyers across the
country. I had sent a lot messages. In these days the quantity of mes-
sages was less than 10000 a month. But when the movement starts it
jumped to 25000 a month.
Mohammad Azhar Siddique / Lahore
But behind this capability was a tedious analog work. To be able to reach all
the lawyers he had copied into his phone the phone numbers printed in the bar
association directory:
I put in all the numbers by hand. And normally when I am going to
convey a message to them there are about 3000 to 4000 numbers which
I have on my list to whom I have to send messages. Whether they are
living in Karachi, Sibbi or NW certain districts, Shangla, Peshawar and
so forth. All provinces.
Mohammad Azhar Siddique / Lahore
This backbone of coordination by the lawyers “enhanced intra-movement com-
munication and coordination. Most movement instructions originated from the
NACL and were sent to the heads of the local bar councils via cell phone and
SMS.” From there “the local leaders, in turn, communicated with the local bar
members” (Ahmed 2010, 505).
As for another active group, whose agency was restricted to Lahore, the Con-
cerned Citizen of Pakistan, Hamid Zaman explains their main motivation to use
SMS and how it was used:
All our messages used to go out by mobile phone because a very small
percentage of people have email and internet. Out of the people that
were with us maybe 20 percent. And so the mobile phone was the most
effective way of mobilizing, because you are always carrying a mobile
and so I can send you in the morning a message for a demonstration in
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the evening and you would read it some time in the day. So all messages
used to be send via mobile phones. Any direction and instructions that
needed to be given. We had a CCP number, one central phone, so that
any person who wanted to send back feedback would send it to that
number, that number was monitored by a secretary all day. This could
be used for people to send comments. Any feedback anybody wanted
to give would go there.
Hamid Zaman / Lahore
As SMS had become the main technology on the ground for updates and inner
communication, it is because of its instant mobilization ability in tense situations:
In Pakistan SMS were absolutely key. People would organize in an hour
or two in a way that would be equivalent to that idea of flash mobs that
is trendy. In Pakistan they would not call it flash mob, but they would
have these text messages saying: “go to the chief justices’ residence in
fifteen minutes” and then people would be there.
Theriot-Orr / Seattle
But SMS as well provided a function of gluing the protests together in many
different ways, such as jokes about the regime that circulated on a massive scale,
as Asad Jamal highlights:
People were sending not only informations, but all kind of jokes against
the military regime. I think 99% in English, even if it was Urdu, it was
written in romans.
Asad Jamal / Lahore
The students used their own SMS information circuit that would fit into their
specific needs, as Ahmed Salemi recounts:
At a meeting we had the idea we would float a paper and take phone
numbers of all these people to join the protests so that we could contact
them for future protests. We did that, it was very successful, it was
covered by international media, because a lot of students showed up.
That’s were we four or five people wanted to do something, we developed
a strategy and float a paper where we put numbers. I started feeding
these numbers in my mobile so that we could communicate, sending
SMS and exchange what is happening. Eventually we texted people
and they came to the second protest as well, there we again circulated
the paper and took the numbers and I got around 50 numbers the first
time, the second time around 300 and it went up to 400 numbers of
students. Not only we circulated text messages regarding meetings, but
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we also started to circulate breaking news, if anything would come up,
if someone is getting arrested or the state pressure against the judges or
whatever. People were really applauding it. They had the feeling and
wanted to get the messages, so while being very busy in their studies
they could actually track the media of what is going on.
Ahmed Salemi / Lahore
Asad Jamal gives a general description of texting activities, of using the phone
to record audio and video and forwarding information.
Messaging all the time. I started subscribing to special packages in
order to spread the messages. And of course for voice calls. I was
told, soon after the imposition of emergency, not to use my mobile
phone, so that I am not caught. And then people filmed the events
with their mobiles. And we were speaking to media people and people
were sending multimedia stuff around the country to update them. We
were also recording slogans and taking them back home. Everyone who
could afford to do it, did it. We sent messages to lawyers, journalists,
friends. I used only my numbers.
Asad Jamal / Lahore
It seems that for Pakistan the mobile phone found its ubiquitous multi func-
tionality on a mass scale during these times.
In the age of instant IT communication, which is global and decen-
tralized, not only could multiple narratives (complete with ‘facts’) be
distributed in almost real time, but they could not be entirely stopped
by anyone. The Pakistani diaspora was no doubt instrumental in en-
suring that, regardless of the government’s capacity to shut down the
mobile-phone networks during a crisis (which occurred only on very
few occasions, to be fair), there was simply no way to completely block
the flow of information. (Lyon 2010)
Such a heavy endorsement of SMS and mobile media as well causes dependencies
on these technologies. This puts the success of protest movement at risk and
individual actors lose their agency, once the technology is out of their hands.
Mohammad Siddique gives a picture, that shows the limited understanding of
SMS for protests within the authorities, although the ban of SMS was announced:
I had been able to manage a mobile in our jails. And I forwarded
messages to my wife who forwared it to all the committees. And I
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remember the day when an attempt was made to ban SMS. At that the
time minister of information specifically declared the agenda that they
are going to ban SMS.
Mohammad Azhar Siddique / Lahore
As SMS was the main information currency of the protests, one might expect
that the regime would in some way suspend its use or even ban it as a whole.
Why this only happened in rare cases remains, to some extent speculative, still,
in the next section reports of surveillance attempts are discussed that provide
further legitimation on the speculations as why the regime could not control this
’SMS uprising’.
4.5 State of Surveillance in Pakistan during the Lawyers’
Movement and Anti-Surveillance Tactics
The overall importance of mobile media has been described at large. In chapter
5 I discuss how distributed action ,facilitated through decentralized, peer to peer
mobile communication, can be understood as an antagonistic model to centralized
surveillance. Thus, accounts of experienced surveillance are discussed in this
section, that hint to the larger type of surveillance applied during the protests.
In the course of the protests, one event highlights the importance of mobile
media. Here, the regime intervened decisively to reduce the impact of mobile
media during the protests. It shows how a central figure can be muted with
relative simplicity once identified. The ousted Chief Justice, from within his
house, were he was arrested under emergency rule, “chose to address the nation
via cellphone” (Yusuf 2009, 12). The trick to enhance a usually one-to-one media
technology to a mass broadcast technology, shows the flexibility mobile media has
once it is used beyond personal communication:
In his talk, he called for mass protests against the government and the
immediate restoration of the constitution. Justice Chaudhry placed
a conference call to members of the Bar Association, who relayed his
message via loudspeakers. That broadcast was intended to be further
relayed by members of the crowd who had planned to simply hold
their cellphones up to the loudspeakers to allow remote colleagues
and concerned citizens to listen in on the address. (Yusuf 2009, 12)
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This ad-hoc construction of a rather classical one-to-many media infrastructure
can work if dissemination is relayed through many nodes, each amplifying to either
other places, or to a loudspeaker. To bridge the limited multiplying functionality
of voice calls via analog loudspeakers is the technical hack. Having many others
relaying, by catching the loudspeaker’s output with their phones, means a social
distribution mechanism.
This distribution model failed, because the regime was well aware of what
was going on and could thus intervene at the strategic points of multiplication:
“most mobile phone services in Islamabad went down during Chaudhry’s address,
prompting suspicions that they had been jammed by the government” (Yusuf
2009, 12). This shows that the more concentration of power at one point (here:
the Chief Justice’s address to the nation), the easier to interrupt the communi-
cation.
Abeer Hamid, a student of telecommunications at that time, provides a smart
analysis:
During second long march, which lead to the restauration finally, they
blocked the net in islamabad. And during a rally in Lahore, they blocked
a particular cell, for two three hours. They can easily block from the
MSC or BSC. Text messages can be blocked. It can be done from the
core end, you can block the text or calls from a particular area. Without
jamming the whole network, you can block text from a specific area.
As well of specific content, but there they blocked all texting from that
area. We observed that thing at that time.
Abeer Hamid / Lahore
These “sporadic efforts to cut telephone lines and jam cellphone networks were
common” (Yusuf 2009, 12), focusing on focal points of protests, as “mobile connec-
tivity at the Supreme Court, protest sites, and the homes of opposition politicians
and lawyers who were placed under house arrest was jammed at different times”
(Yusuf 2009, 12).
This is seconded by Hamid Zaman for Lahore:
At other times what happened was that the entire phone system would
be jammed for a few hours, we couldn’t send messages or even call
people. When something big would happen they didn’t want the infor-
mation to get out. I think several times for a few hours the networks
were blocked
Hamid Zaman / Lahore
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I agree that “the government’s attempts to jam cellphone networks during the
emergency demonstrates that, much like television, cellphones had become an
integral medium of information dissemination and community organizing across
Pakistan” (Yusuf 2009, 12). The specific point for this analysis thus is not yet
made: the large scale dissemination of cell phones and its use for means of protest
was new at that time in Pakistan. The regime tried to suspend strategically
important communication with limited means only: either by focusing on known
leaders of the movement or jamming areas that had already proven to be of special
interest:
There were many efforts to smuggle cell phones into the house of the
Chief Justice during his house arrest. And then they just set up phone
jammers around his house. In that sense, there was active jamming.
Theriot-Orr / Seattle
The Pakistan authorities at this time had not been prepared for the empower-
ment and increase in agency via mobile phones. I assume that no proper surveil-
lance technologies had been in operation for mobile telephony. Many of the
interviewed affirm this. Asad Jamal, a central figure of the lawyers in Lahore
during the times of emergency, estimates that:
Surveillance vis-a`-vis mobile phones. I don’t know. I assume that
people were being tracked, but I don’t know if they were tracked because
of their phone. And I know that a lot of people stopped using their
phones. I called Mr. Hamid Khan after the imposition of martial law
and he was never caught. He remaind underground for a long time.
I am not too sure about this technological savvy of the intelligence
agencies in our country, most of the time they rely on physical resources.
Rather than using very sophisticated instruments. I am sure they have
developed some knowledge by now.
Asad Jamal / Lahore
Taking such an estimation as the base for consideration how to protect oneself,
even basic measures would help, such as using code words:
I decided not to send messages at some times. Sometimes we decided
not to use the word “army”, so we used a code word like “the strongest
forces of this country” or the “only establishment”.
Asad Jamal / Lahore
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Another principle that helps, when direct tapping of phones is the prevalent
mode of surveillance, is to relay communication via other people. This mechanism
was used by the inner circle of lawyers:
I know people who were being tapped. People were alert to that fact.
People had certain phones that they were using for certain activities.
Some of the lawyers leader were very alert to that fact, some even
wouldn’t carry phones, but people around them would. It was almost
like you created circles around the leadership.
Sakham Khan / Lahore
Tapping still remains a strong tool of classical surveillance techniques. A fact
that the students realized, as Abeer Hamid recounts:
For three months it was very hard. Many people were chased by the
military intelligence in the university. They came to the director of
the University and gave him a list: “these people are involved in the
movement, don’t let your campus be used, do not interfere with the
military, it is for the national trust, you can not allow your students do
this.” Which was all due to the mobile phones they were tapping.
Abeer Hamid / Lahore
Nonetheless, tapping of phones requires a lot of man-power. It is not a machinic
operation, such as data retention. For every phone tapped, somebody needs to
listen in from time to time. Computational analysis of speech is unlikely to have
been applied here. Even if the authorities only identified the phone devices that
would concentrate on protest sites and produced lists of people based on device
id’s, this still would have been a rather manual operation.
Additionally, relational surveillance, the (re)-construction of social structures by
analyzing meta data of communications and thus reproducing the social network
in operation – this most powerful technique to identify larger groups – was not in
the hands of the authorities then. With such an analysis, important nodes of
(re-)distribution of information can be traced down and silenced, even when the
protests are in the thousands. To suspend protests, this has to be applicable in
almost real-time. These systems, which only started to appear from 2009 onwards,
first publicly noticed in Iran, signify a whole new era of mobile and surveillance
media. The Pakistan lawyers could still operate in the pre-era of fully established
mobile phone surveillance.
Jamming of the cell phone infrastructure is like using a sledgehammer. It is the
most simple tool of force, as it cannot differentiate or discriminate within its area
of operation. Either “on” or “off”. Such methods can initiate irritation and fear:
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Once there was a very strong rumor about Musharraf and I remem-
ber that started because the telephones got jammed and nobody got
through and by evening people met and said: something big is happen-
ing, maybe that’s why they shut down the phones.
Hamid Zaman / Lahore
While direct phone tapping and jamming of the whole network, or particu-
lar cells, have apparently been the means of the regime, the most basic safety-
enhancing techniques by the protester have been the use of code words, not using
the phone at very critical moments or by very important persons, and a gen-
eral awareness. Additionally, protesters’ assessment of the capabilities that the
regime had to surveil was conservative: although Pakistan’s secret and military
agencies employ many servants, they were generally not conceived as being pre-
cisely smart in their operations. The US lawyer Devin Theriot-Orr compares two
different ‘cultures’ of intelligence agencies (US and Pakistan):
It is different in Pakistan, because the government is not very discrete
when it comes to surveillance. In the West, people don’t understand
surveillance, in part because it is much more subtle.
Theriot-Orr / Seattle
If relational surveillance is both powerful and far more commonly applied in
Western societies, one can ask if these two modes, the ‘sledgehammer’ and the
silent collection of relations amongst people, are expressions of two different prin-
ciples of governing. I address this in the next section, where I try to relate the
actions taken by the Pakistan regime to sovereign rule, whereas the actions taken
by the protesters are in accordance with governmental rule: one that is fueled by
a mentality that this rationality is in accord with a truth it relates to and from
where it operates.
4.6 The Clash of Rule
I argued in section 2.6 that the framework of governmentality can be applicable
to societies and regimes outside of ‘the West’. This, I argue, is as well the case
for Pakistan, an Islamic country, but to make these claims more comprehensive,
some limits on the application of governmentality for Pakistan are helpful.
There are many fields and issues that are less well to see with a governmental
lens: particularly the poorer regions, where close to slave labor like conditions
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prevail in agriculture or in the NWFF Provinces, which are tribal territories. I
would find such an analysis difficult, because a main condition is hardly met there:
the autonomy of the modern subject, invested with rights.
For governmentality, the modern state and the modern, autonomous subject are
but different sides of the same coin. By separating the sphere of the state, com-
prised with its servants and institutions, and society, comprised of autonomous,
free subjects invested with rights, a totality for governing had been established.
Thus, the population could become both, the target and the means of govern-
ing. Free subjects are “individual or collective subjects who are faced with a
field of possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting
and modes of behavior are available.” In this design “face-to-face confrontation of
power and freedom” is impossible as “mutually exclusive facts” (Foucault 2000f,
342). Being invested with agency and a set of possibilities and choices are the key
ingredients of governmental rule. The urban elite and middle classes that were
dominant within the lawyers’ protests acted on the base of their own will, in the
sense that the “governed are free in that they are actors, i.e. it is possible for
them to act and think in a variety of ways, and sometimes in ways not foreseen
by authorities”(Dean 2010, 21).
Such a predisposition cannot be switched on or off arbitrarily, but develops his-
torically over time. To understand oneself as invested with possibilities of action
is part of education, learning, and the challenge from one’s social environment to
act independently; to pursue one’s own goals. These mentalities are assisted and
further developed to find their own expressions with the dissemination of mobile
phones. One of dominant political technologies of governmentality during the
lawyers’ protests had been mobile media. To some extent mobile media perpetu-
ate pastoral power, or better: pastoral power, a cornerstone of modern rule, can
gain a high degree of operability through mobile media. Being able to communi-
cate freely from the state often falls short with the loosening of ties to traditional
bounds, such as family. The meaning of this for Pakistani or Indian society can
hardly be overestimated: for example where the segregation of male and female
teenagers is harsh, a whole new field of communication was established, where for
the first time these teenagers can communicate freely from this harsh segregated
regime with others. A teenager who took part in the interview I did with the
alternative education project Ankur in Delhi describes this very vividly:
You find 100 SMS in my phone, but you won’t find ten in a girls’
phone, because she deletes them. She doesn’t want to read the message
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to anyone. Boys have less privacy. In our locality, LNJP, girls need only
communication. The meaning of communication for boys is different
to that for girls. Boys have different characters. Society thinks she
is getting in contact with boys. You write a letter to someone, but a
letter to a boy has a different meaning. Same with SMS. This is also
a community problem. This is not a specific girls problem in a way,
because there are differences within each community. She was using a
phone for six months without her parents knowing this. This is not
about hiding the telephone. The meaning of the world according to the
parents is different to the girls that communicates via phone. There are
different personalities. I can use my 2nd personality in chat and phone.
Anonymous People from Ankur / Delhi
If “the meaning of the world according to the parents is different to the girls that
communicates via phone” the power of mobile media is obvious: it makes pos-
sible the construction of new meanings because it allows communication beyond
hegemonic boundaries.
But why is mobile media a new pastoral power? Because it facilitates expres-
sion of feelings, accounts of personal stories and generally instructs to jabber.
Whatever the precise reasons, the fact can hardly be denied. So, if mobile me-
dia triggers a modified pastoral power within users who engage in intense mobile
telephony, this happens largely irrespective of the cultural tradition, the religious
background or the segregational degree of communities; it follows a transversal
power vector, one might say. The process that integrates freely chosen personal
communication into quotidian life at the same time stimulates governmentality as
rule as the process of subjectivations initiated with mobile media, as well initiates
a sense of independence and freedom: the possibility of choices. This produces a
troubled tension between mobile media users and the powers of discipline, which
targets the formation of “docile bodies”, or sovereignty, which targets the exis-
tence as such. Foucault’s third pillar of power is still being unfolded today, in
Western and non-Western societies, with specific outcomes and through recent
political technologies: mobile media.
The economic regime of mobile phone communication helps to bring to light
these new subjectivities. Most of the Indian subcontinent is penetrated with low
cost phones and prepaid schemes (see as well 4.2). Devin Theriot-Orr gives an
example for Lahore:
This family who we were friends with there. It has a husband, wife
and five kids. And they were in the Christian minority in Pakistan,
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which is very small, two percent of the population. Quite persecuted,
marginalized, not having good jobs. And in that family every kid had
a cellphone. They were in that category of working poor.
Theriot-Orr / Seattle
And he refers to the general availability on the subcontinent:
The other thing that is different to the US is that everybody in Pakistan
and India has a cell phone. The rickshaw driver who earns 2 dollars a
day has a cell phone because unlike in the US, incoming calls are free.
There is no ongoing monthly contract. So you spent one time for getting
a used phone for five dollars and then you have no running costs and
text messages don’t cost anything to receive. And sending them is quite
cheap. Certainly people who are really poor are not going to have a cell
phone, but even people who are barely the working poor will have access
to cell phones which is very different to the US.
Theriot-Orr / Seattle
Returning to the lawyers’ movement or anti-emergency protests, the first thing
to reconsider is that it were urban, well-educated and media savvy protagonists.
Marta Bolognani states that “the effects of the interaction with new commu-
nication media by the educated classes both as consumers and as actors not
only helped the protests, but for the very participants opened up ways of think-
ing, strategies of self-identification, self-projection” (Bolognani 2010, 408). Zahid
Shahab Ahmed also identifies the impact on thinking and identification of the par-
ticipant and civil society as a whole, as the “lawyers’ movement was significant
[...] for its impact on Pakistani civil society, which saw first-hand how organized
grassroots activism could achieve results” (Ahmed 2010, 508). But it important
to remember that civil society in Pakistan does not equal the population of Pak-
istan; it is much more comprised of the educated, urban middle class and elites
that are affected by protests for a more democratic state, and as such entrenched
in governing as part of civil society.
A further argument comes to hand when one takes into account that “many
lawyers came to see themselves as participants in a narrative of lawyers’ resistance
to illegitimate state authority stretching all the way back to independence.” And
only one sentence later, “for many students, organizing against military rule had
a profound impact on their political awareness and sense of self” (Anonymous
2010, 1723).
Seen from an analytics of government, different forms of rule, that are most
likely always in tension and can be contradictiory by nature, came in Pakistan
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to an overt, week long conflict, most drastically during the state of emergency.
Not because during this state, public gatherings were forbidden and took place;
this is more an effect of the forms of rule. From within the logic of government,
sovereignty could no longer uphold its territory, and governmentality claimed
hegemony within the modalities of rule. This is not meant in terms of literal
territory but in terms of agency of rule: sovereignty, in the manifestation of
martial law, was overruled by governmentality in the form of a rationality that
understood the independence of the judiciary as a truth, embodied in the many
lawyers, citizens and students. One might say that the civil agents of governing,
the members of civil society, performed the outcome of a governmental program
seeded by Musharraf’s regime itself, by way of liberalization of the mobile phone
sector and the Pakistani media economy. The freedom to self-technologies, to
self-motivation, to choices and to an economically self managed life-style took
its share in governing as the draconian martial and anti-terror laws were not
rationalizable; the gap between the regime’s ability to rationalize its rule and the
societies’ desires widened too far. As I wrote earlier: governmental management
produces mindsets, rationalities and performative settings that relate the subjects
to the state no longer as an exteriority of incalculability and fear, but as a totality
that has to rule in accordance with the population’s needs and desires. If a regime
fails to acknowledge this and these desires are not met, a clash between the forms
of rule develops. In the case of Pakistan the scene was an overt month long unrest.
4.7 Mobile Media as an Agent of Governmental Rule
If the argument unfolded has teeth, then one might conclude on this basis that
mobile media in protests is not only a tool for organization, for mobilization, or
a danger as it as well facilitates surveillance, but increases a very specific kind of
power: one that goes hand in hand with the individual invested with a “free will”,
whose horizon of truth is in accordance with a specific idea of participation and
of self-management. Mobile media increases the self-perception as a righteous
protester. Its immersion with mentalities is more than just a functional or tool-
like link. It increases a condition of subjectivity, it rearranges it and it sustains
it. Mobile media helps specific subjectivities in its performance. It empowers and
assures a rationality that acts out of its own belief into its freedom and indepen-
dence. And it is in this sense that one can say that mobile media is empowering.
As a tool, this is always the case and an evident, almost self-fulfilling claim: yes,
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mobile media allows better communication, for sure. But this is not enough to
understand when, where and how. My claim is that mobile media needs to rest
on or needs to trigger a specific mindset, it needs to resonate within this mindset
and that is, in terms of an analytics of government, the activated subjectivity,
the citizen whose agency is processed within a governmental program.
What makes this argument critical is its perspective on mobile media, which
now appears to be part of governmental rule although it facilitates the protest
against a concrete government. I agree that the imposition of emergency rule was
“a clear instance of the diversion of the regime’s energies to fighting civil society
rather than focusing on important policy issues or confronting the growing threat
of Islamist militancy in Pakistan” (Munir 2009), but there is more: evidently
the regime lost its cause. Civil society ‘took over government’ in the wide sense
of the Foucauldian framework. An activated citizenry found its technologies of
governing; mobile media. Mobile media facilitates those that learn to jabber,
that are immersed with ‘pastoral power 2.0’. The rationality, the truth, that
needs to be a sustainable layer all the way through the protests, was jabbered
and communicated by SMS and voice calls throughout the country’s urban areas,
on which a discourse then motivated agency to perform. It was amplified by
online media and received its echo from Pakistani communities abroad. The flow
of signs, one might say, continuously and nationwide, facilitated by mobile media,
and part of mobile media, empowered governmental rationalities.
From here, it looks promising to take a look at distributed mass action, that
is supported, if not made possible, with messaging and mobile phones; to see
how this operates within a different topology, following a different media logic
than the common centralized approaches of surveillance. This difference of logic,
decentral or distributed vs. centralized, opens the possibilities of coordinated
action without a classical top-down hierarchy.
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5
Distributed Action and Centralized
Surveillance
The importance of a distributed SMS use during the lawyers’ movement was the
key narrative of the previous chapter. It enabled a specific kind of coordinated
action amongst the activists. Interestingly, although coordinated, it was by and
large still decentralized and distributed.
This brings in another topic: protest movements that intensely use mobile media
for coordination purposes are following the logic of distributed action: although
the media technologies as such, here mostly GSM, is technically centralized, its use
is independent from this. Such an action is close to bottom-up processes, which
establish their structure in the course of emergence in an ad-hoc manner and
change their structure constantly, as new nodes pop up whereas others become
inactive and drop out. The social structure that emerges is temporarily visible –
otherwise it is hidden. Its backbones are the social relations amongst partakers
of the protests, manifested in the address books of each protester’s cellphone.
On the other hand, surveillance technologies operate much more from a cen-
tralized standpoint and structure, trying to oversee the whole. For the surveilling
parties, it is hard to estimate where the tactical outbreak of protests will hap-
pen, as the crowd has no center. Nonetheless, the social relations amongst the
protesters might be made intelligible via surveillance technologies. But then, ei-
ther a real time analysis of traffic or a focused tapping of the coordinator’s phones
needs to take place. But this has to be arranged beforehand, sometimes by al-
lowance from a judge, depending on the laws and also depending on the reality
of separation of powers, which tends to be blurred in many states.
In structural terms, two different media logics are operating at the same time
during protests – the distributed protest logic and the centralized surveillance
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logic. While these two logics operate at the same time, they still are unlikely
to meet at the same time. In between the distributed actions and the catch-up
of surveillance is a tactical window of opportunities open for protests to emerge.
Once recognized by centralized surveillance the window closes again; but it might
pop up elsewhere.
In Foucauldian terms, mobile media thus can be understood as crystallization
points, where two modes of rule – governmental and sovereign – realize themselves.
The strength of mobile media governmentality is its independence from top-down
organizing and planning. It operates tactically, but cannot free itself from the
strategic settings and matrix laid out by ‘sovereign mobile media’. Thus, it is
strong in ad-hoc presence, but weak in holding a position over time. Sovereign
rule, once it mobilizes its agents to a location, interrupts the spontaneity of dis-
tributed action. But it needs time to do so - it mostly fails in case the protesters
disappear fast enough. This indicates that different kinds of rule are organized
in different organizations of time and space: mobility and deterritoriality here,
immobility and territory there.
In some instances, where surveillance has caught up with governmental mobile
media, the empowerment of agency is reversed into disempowerment. Nathan
Freitas recalls this in his narration about the Republican National Convention
protests in New York.
In the US today the police have figured out that activist A would call
activist B and they track their location. This happens through the
RNC 2008. I have been working with people like that: don’t call each
other directly, set up an indirect number that bounces you to the other
phone. This simple stuff is like really changing.
Freitas / NYC
Distributed action and governmental mobile media are only as empowering as
their practical counter-part cannot catch up with it: the surveillance technolo-
gies and their means to capture tactical media use. Avoiding direct device to
device communication, using proxies that blur the social network, are strategies
deployed by activists that have studied or experienced surveillance at work. On
the other hand, such a strategic upgrade of activist technologies is, most of the
time, incompatible with spontaneity and the idea of an open and fast growing
mass of people. Thus, strategic media use has an effect on tactical media use. It
depends on the concrete setting, on the circumstances and situation if a strategy
that excludes spontaneity as a tactic can gain momentum.
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Additionally, such a way of planning and deployment borrows elements of mil-
itary thinking, like an arm’s race. Protest culture, by and large, is inspired by
solidarity and fun.
But still, it remains an open problem, which I discuss in chapter 9. Daniel
Kahn-Gillmor addresses it here briefly:
I am not convinced of the emancipatory power of the global communi-
cation network as it is currently implemented. I think they are offering
a lot of opportunities for centralized control and I would like to see
things used as end to end communication but I am not convinced that
that is what is happening and I am not convinced that in the end these
tools weigh in a positive way over all.
Kahn Gillmor / NYC
This technical consideration, stated by a long time software developer and main-
tainer of many software packages, I agree, remains an issue. But notwithstanding
the shortcomings of the contemporary technology deployed, its use can catch
up with some of the shortcomings, when it is used in spontaneous and mostly
catch-and-run tactical ways, as the following statements show.
5.1 Mobile Media Facilitates Collective Actions
What follows are prototypical examples distilled from the interviews, that very
precisely describe the logic of dissemination for distributed action. Basically all
interviewees expressed this practice, wherever they were located. A technology
of individualization prominently serves collective actions. This contradiction is
addressed in the second section of this chapter, 5.2.
Asad Jamal, a lawyer in Lahore, explains the common practice of SMS forward-
ing. He points to the fact that SMS that originated from him, went back to him,
to the degree that he would resend his own messages.
The messages have been forwarded as well, some came back to me.
And it happened that in a hurry I did resend my own messages.
Asad Jamal / Lahore
Someone like the lawyer Mohammad Azhar Siddique represents a node in the
distributed network, that serves as a major distribution point. He copied the com-
plete address book of the bar associations into his phone (hundreds of numbers)
and arranged the database into subgroups of different places.
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When I sent a SMS to a member of a bar association, he would forward
the message to his colleagues by just pressing forward. That’s why the
activists were on the street on 5th November.
Mohammad Azhar Siddique / Lahore
As he was in the inner circle of the lawyers’ organization himself, he was a
special point of distribution, centralizing the social network to some degree. But
nonetheless, after he sent the messages, there was no coordination where the
receivers would send the messages to. The structure was undetermined and would
only be established as a whole during the course of its emergence; in different
materializations each time.
Activists from other countries express the same dissemination practices, leading
again to the same distributed mode of action.
In Delhi, Madhuresh Kumar explains, the idea that SMS should be distributed
further is sometimes expressed in the messages themselves.
In Delhi for our own solidarity group events, for press conferences,
demonstrations, we regularly use SMS as a medium to mobilize or even
remind people, email as well, but every day when we have an event
we send 100 to 200 messages to people to remind them. The text is
a reminder. We send it with private phones. People also forward the
messages to other people. We also write “please forward”.
Kumar / Delhi
Vijahan from Delhi reports about the efficiency of short-term mobilizations of
media and how he organized his phone:
The last phone I was using, there you would find eight different groups,
one is called “Delhi Media”, if there is an action where we only want
to inform the media, for example in front of the prime ministers house
for the Bhophal demonstrations. 12h was the action, 11h I sent out
the SMS. The key photographers come. That’s a way to get rid of the
police. By email there is always a way it gets public, and the police
then will do everything to prevent the action from happening. So then,
it is much better to wait till the last moment, like one hour before and
sent alerts to the media. It will be a quick action, maybe 20 minutes.
In that kind of situation it is extremly efficient.
Vijayan / Delhi
For Oaxaca in Mexico, Blax recounts the dissemination practice. Adding that
one SMS then as well is passed over to others nearby, by reading them out aloud.
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In 2006 it was very clear, people came to a meeting, or a barricade or
a camp by text messages. You can also send to other people that are
in direct contact with other people. It is the massive use by the people.
One person receives it and tells others about it. Like a radio.
Blax / Oaxaca (Mx)
In Seoul the tactic was integrated into a strategy: knowing that coordinating a
meeting point beforehand would increase the possibility of police presence, only
on the fly a meeting point for action would be negotiated, when the protesters
were already moving.
I explain how mobile media was used in the protest: it was used to
gather people. Textmessages on cellphones were used. We call cell
phones hand phones. We made appointments to gather, there were
no points to meet beforehand. People picked certain locations in ad-
vance, but due to police actions, these locations were changed. People
exchanged informations about blockages and went to different places,
hard to spot fastly for the police.
Two Korean Activists
Ederic Eder recounts how he remembers the first large protests, which were by
and large organized by SMS, the EDSA21 protests in Manila in 2001.
My personal experience during EDSA2 was, I was going home and sud-
denly received a forwarded message that said that those who were then
acting as impeachement judges, were having to open an envelope that
people believed was containing evidence against Estrada [the president,
O.L.]. The text message was calling on people. That was in the night
of January 16th 2001. And then I received that message many times.
When people were already gathering at the EDSA you could see ev-
eryone was texting, everyone holding mobile phones. And there were
times when the network was down due to the volume of text messages
sent. So, those are mostly calls, slogans, and then people were updating
their friends, “where are you?” and “let’s go!” So invitations to join
the rally and even jokes. People love jokes, even now. There were a lot
of Erab [nickname of the president, O.L.] jokes then. I started to send
text messages, saying: “Erab will be the first president to go down by
text messages. Congratulations to all of us”.
Eder / Manila
Al Alegre, who works for the foundation of media alternatives in Manila, em-
phasizes the role of mobile media in EDSA2, but is a bit more cautious:
1 EDSA, Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, is the name of the longest highway in Manila.
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In EDSA2, because it was very much urban based and a strong partic-
ipation of the youth, strong penetration of these sectors, the young and
urban, SMS was used to coordinate a lot of stuff. I really would not go
as far as admitting the hype that cellphones stopped the president, but
it was part of the repertoire of actions how technology was used, to fuel
the social movements.
Alegre / Manila
Vincente Rafael discusses the ’power of txting’ in regard to the Philippines. He,
too, comes to the conclusion that the circulation itself is the key ingredient of ‘txt
power’:
The power of texting has less to do with the capacity to elicit interpre-
tation and stir public debate than it does with compelling others to
keep messages in circulation. Receiving a message, one responds by re-
peating it. The message is forwarded to others who are expected to do
the same. In this way, the message returns, mechanically augmented
but semantically unaltered. They crowd one’s phone mailbox just as
those who believed in the truth of the call they received crowded the
streets of Metro Manila. (Rafael 2003, 409)
Friends send messages to friends, who then send messages to friends. Social
networks emerge and manifest themselves in body presence over the use of address
books. Thus, redundancies exists, messages are received many times. But no
address book is identical to the other. Each node can contribute to the growth
or the protests.
At the 2008 G8 summit in Japan, activists used both a distributed dissemination
model, and a centralized point, which would resend the news:
Last year we had the G8 summit and a big demonstration. At that
time, SMS and email by mobile phone was very useful: which direction
to go, in real time, where the police is and those things. For the event
communication it was very helpful. Everybody had access to the central
office and then the central office compiled the information and spread
it.
Yasuda / Tokyo
Returning to the protests against the Republican National Convention 2008
in New York, a sophisticated messaging system was set up, called “TXTmob”,
which would distribute messages according to subscriptions.
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The communications collective had their own team of scouts, which was
actually a fairly common tactic for them. They would have scouts with
radios to communicate with each other and phones to talk to a main
dispatch who would then use TXTmob to send messages out. And
actually I am not sure if they used TXTmob or Twitter, I think they
used TXTmob, because they were lots of groups so they divided the
city up into regions and also various sorts of tactics. So there were
messages based on regions and tactics, you would not have to subscribe
to everything.
Goldberg / NYC
While this is again a centralized approach, it goes even further as it divides the
communication into geographic sectors of the protest. This approach then faced
harsh repression and the members of the communication collective were charged
with felony: they were too exposed and too central.
During the RNC, the communications collective there got raided and
charged with felony and incitement to a riot. Just as a side note. I
think the only thing that they were doing was actually TXTmob.
Goldberg / NYC
5.2 Layers of Distributed Action
Without tapping as part of an ongoing investigation (see 8.2), or disturbing the
cells, or blocking traffic (see 7.4), surveillance only be always late vis-a`-vis the
dynamics of distributed actions coordinated by social networks of mobile phone
address books. To block the net is possible, once access to the cells is at hands,
but this as well means a disruption of any other cell phone communications: that
of economy as well as that of the police itself.
There is an advance of distributed structures to let protest emerge at some
unknown locality. Structurally, surveillance is late in detecting distributed action.
These protest structures are only powerful for some amount of time and only if
they rearrange and reemerge somewhere else again. Coming and going, they
fluctuate.
Mobile media is therefore contributing to an unplanned emergence of structures,
which manifests itself temporarily by way of body presence on the streets, and
might either be halted and shutdown by authorities if it stays in the light too
long; or it may disappear fast enough, only to appear again elsewhere.
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Daniel Kahn-Gillmor reports from New York about a planned protest action,
where surveillance was most likely involved to shutdown the protests once they
occurred:
In 2003 I was protesting one of the Carlyle’s group offices in NYC.
They had a troop out to meet us like we were gonna be, uhm, I don’t
know, there was a handful of people who were about to block the doors
of that building, but that was the most extreme, the vast majority of
people had banners and were gonna go to work later in the morning.
And they arrested all of us. There was no way that with that level of
response that there was not surveillance involved in the planning and
organization of the meeting to show up with the group that they had for
a totally unannounced action. Something had gone on, whether this was
a disproportional response based on “let’s test out some tactics before
the RNC comes in town next year”, or whether they thought that we
were much more organized than we were. A lot of us were locked up
and held for the day without reason.
Kahn Gillmor / NYC
The limits of collective actions are determined by the degree they are planned,
one might deduce. But there are other examples, as Legume reports.
For secret things, like actions where we need to surprise, we don’t talk
about that on the cell phones, or use SMS and not even in the mailing
lists, because we think even we have a non-commercial mail service,
most of the activists are using windows which is not a secure OS.
Legume / Sa˜o Paulo
A self-limitation in the ability to communicate can secure the success of protests
that rely on the effect of a surprise.
Mobile Protest Media Can De-Individualize and Sediment
It is interesting how the individualizing powers of mobile media are countered
during protests. The device, its personal use, its attachment to one body is
not changed as such. But the trajectory to individualize is countered by the
dynamics of distributed action: my argument is that while it does not specifically
facilitate collective actions, it does not disrupt de-individualization processes in
the performance of dissent. The trajectory to individualize is overwritten by the
manifestations of bodies on the streets.
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In all instances, for the protagonists involved such a partaking goes beyond
only a temporal appearance within a mass of protesters, as the experience to be
part of a collective action that is not orchestrated from above empowers individ-
uals in their agency of performing dissent. This counter-practice leaves traces of
counter-knowledge that can be re-activated. Such an inscription of distributed
action into the bodies of the partakers, can be understood as an alteration of
quantity (the masses on the streets) into quality (the repeated experience on the
individual level). Processes of subjectivations are triggered by repeated experi-
ences of dissenting agency. Mobile protest media then is a political technology
of empowerment, on the level of performance of dissenting practices, not only
on the level of independence from the state or loosening traditional ties for the
individual. As the repetition of performed dissent and movements sediments into
the body, the subjectivity encounters counter-truths. While the performance of
dissent faces a technology of individualization, the physical layer of protests over-
writes this trajectory during the course the actions take.
This points to a further aspect: the co-presence of the mobile and the body.
Where the tele-connectedness enables a diffuse coordination of bottom-up pro-
cesses over distance, the presence of the body materializes this tele-connectedness
on the physical layer. As the two layers are discriminated (signs and material),
they supplement each other. What the body perceives on the street reaches other
bodies through the address book and centralized infrastructure. And what mobile
media targets as an individual is a fragment within the collective performance of
dissent. The centralization of infrastructure does therefore not interfere with the
distributed action. Each layer’s modality is independent from the other.
In the next chapter, I shall return to the discussion of the apparatuses of security
and the ways to limit governmentality and individual agency by what one may
call neo-sovereignty. With this, a differentiation of governmental rule by mobile
media is envisioned that bridges the field of surveillance.
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6
Surveillance
People that are being wiretapped have no way to ask the police about it.
Right now as the informations are in digital, the telephone companies
or internet provider are accessed by the police. The wiretapped person
will never be informed about it. The first time will be in court. There
are very vague information about how many wiretappings and what for.
Yasuda / Tokyo
For most of the interviewees, surveillance is a targeted operation with the aim
to repress and mute, to silence and to produce fear. It can be a prerequisite for
investigation, or even direct repression. It can be an operation over a long time
gathering informations about oppositional activities.
Surveillance and repression walk hand in hand and that leads to fear
and paranoia. The paranoia of being followed all the time.
M / Sa˜o Paulo
In most cases, it is seen in a direct relation with the activities that activists
are involved with. Many accounts on cell phone wiretapping were delivered, all
point to a targeted and also expensive operation, one which cannot be done on
the whole population.
Surveillance is about controlling personal information, monitoring it,
the metaphor of the panopticon: you might be observed but you never
know, so you internalize the surveillance. All the time paranoid, because
you might be monitored all the time, that is probably the worst aspect
of it. The idea that you have to control yourself on what you do in terms
of how nasty that could be to the people that have the power to stop you
doing it. And there is another stage, we have encryption, anonymity
proxies etc, but the bigger enemy might be paranoia, which is a meta
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level on self monitoring, how much you have to monitor yourself about
the others not to monitor you. There is a risk of blocking the necessary
flow of information here.
Anonymous2 / Madrid
Targeted, specific surveillance, ad-hoc and tactical, needs to be differentiated
from the strategic surveillance schemes, which target up to the whole population
by means of massive interception, like data retention schemes.
We don’t write anything about politics in SMS.
Non Collective / Manila
Of course, there is a connection: once an event is triggered from mass surveil-
lance, the surveillance infrastructure can be queried for more information. Tar-
geted surveillance and strategic surveillance become harder and harder to sepa-
rate, as one supplements the other.
This chapter is about strategic surveillance, as conceptualized and discussed in
surveillance studies; most prominently the field of surveillance studies from the
perspective of social sciences. In the next chapter, a deeper discussion of data
retention and other strategic political technologies takes place. Therefore, this
chapter’s idea is to introduce the larger subject of surveillance, while at the same
time comparing to the next chapter, the difference to my framing of surveillance.
The main body of literature on surveillance is about the big picture, thus many
scholars speak of a ’surveillance society’. A term that I do not find particularly
useful, because it totalizes surveillance. I also do not find the divide between com-
mercial and state surveillance helpful, as the amalgamation of public and commer-
cial spheres makes it nearly impossible to separate the two; except for analytical
reasons. The outsourcing of ‘security services’ and IT to private companies is a
common governance task in most countries. Maybe an effect of deregulation, it
also shows the operational or modal structure of securitization.1 A fitting exam-
ple is the outsourcing of tasks of surveillance in Germany’s Lower-Saxony, where
police hired a company to send silent SMS (or ‘pings’) to suspect’s phones.2
1 On the development of the private ‘security’ sector in the US, see Marquis (2003). On the
concept of securitization, see the next chapter.
2 “Die niedersa¨chsische Polizei la¨sst Verda¨chtige per ‘stiller SMS’ u¨berwachen. So weit,
so bekannt. Neu ist allerdings, dass die Beho¨rden eine private Firma fu¨r diese Mo-
bilfunku¨berwachung engagiert haben”, (It is well known that Lower Saxony’s po-
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Activism nowadays is becoming difficult, there is state surveillance, and
private. You can never tell what will happen to you, everytime you can
be beaten up by the police. Or the government thinks you are talking
too much on that thing, they can treat you badly. Things are like that,
because we are passing a time, it is not fully democratic. And at the
same time we are taking our chances.
Swapan / Dhaka, Bangladesh
6.1 What is Surveillance?
I refer to David Lyon’s standard work on the “Surveillance Society” (2001) for a
collection of aspects of surveillance: David Lyon in his introduction to “Surveil-
lance Society” suggests that “all societies that are dependent on communication
and information technologies for administrative and control processes are surveil-
lance societies” (Lyon 2001, 1). Surveillance societies, according to this concept,
are the other side of the coin of information societies: surveillance and information
are mutually inclusive. Surveillance, he continues a page later while discussing
digitalization, “is any collection and processing of personal data, whether identi-
fiable or not, for the purposes of influencing or managing those whose data have
been garnered.” Surveillance is part of a managerial program: not only about
collecting data, but in a managerial way to use this data on programs and action
plans on the surveilled. Lyon states that “surveillance capacities are used to sort
and shift populations, to categorize and to classify, to enhance the life chances
of some and to retard those of others” (2001, 4). Thus, surveillance is a discrim-
inating political technology that consists of both care and control, and “is now
a generalized social phenomenon in the sense that institutionalized monitoring
is routinely practised by a range of agencies including, but as well going well
beyond, the state” (2001, 30). Lyon refers particularly to risk management:
Everyday governance in contemporary societies tilts towards the man-
agement of risks and especially risks associated with obtaining com-
pliance or containing threatening behavior. Surveillance is the means
lice does surveillance on suspects with the use of silent SMS. But it is a new sit-
uation that authorities have hired a private company to operate this mobile phone
surveillance. [ Translation O.L.]), Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung, Mirjam Hauck, 27 February
2012, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/digital/ueberwachung-per-stiller-sms-niedersachsen-
jagt-verbrecher-mittels-eines-privaten-dienstleisters-1.1295001 (accessed 4 March 2012).
About ‘Silent SMS’ see section 8.2.
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whereby knowledge is produced for administering populations in re-
lation to risk. [...] In a quest for security, all institutions in whatever
sector seek to minimize risk by finding out as much as possible about
as many factors as possible. (2001, 6)
Finally, Lyon emphasizes that surveillance is enmeshed in a “social orchestra-
tion” of compliance and active, productive engagement with surveillance by large
parts of the population as being in the information loop is a necessity for social
participation (2001, 7).
What is convincing in Lyon’s account is the normality of surveillance as an op-
eration to govern. The notion of risk management of populations3 resonates with
the discussion of data retention in chapter 7. On the other hand, if surveillance
is a ubiquitous means, omnipresent in everyday life and central to governance, it
appears problematic to draw boundaries and mark the specificities of surveillance.
One criteria, Lyon suggests, is the digital double:
The problem of disappearing bodies is thus crucial to understanding
surveillance societies. It shows how surveillance systems have arisen
in an attempt to compensate for the disembodiment of many social re-
lationships. [...] contemporary surveillance practices tend overwhelm-
ingly to base themselves on abstractions rather than on embodied
persons. (2001, 26)
This hint towards the abstraction of surveillance with the production of digital
doubles and thus the disembodiment of social relations I will explore in the next
chapter. It is here, that the powers of digital surveillance are at work. In the mul-
tiple re-organizations of data entries and further the production of their relations;
no physical, embodied phenomena play a role here. A new realm has developed:
that of the digital doppelga¨nger and its very own algorithmic relations.
Four Strands of Surveillance Theory
Lyon (in accord with large parts of the literature on surveillance) suggests as a
scheme of typology of theory:
Four strands of surveillance theory may be distinguished, each pro-
foundly connected with classic conceptions of modernity. [...] Surveil-
3 On the ‘risk society’, see Beck (1992).
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lance may be understood in relation to the nation state, to bureau-
cracy, to what might be termed technological logic [...] and to political
economy. (2001, 109)
These categorizations are common macro sociological types. They mirror a prob-
lem that I see in surveillance studies by and large: they separate a sphere that is
interconnected and relational and suggest that each by its own have an explana-
tory capacity. In contrast, my intent is to understand surveillance in relation to
an analytics of rule that is neither state centric, nor of pure economic origin, nor
technology centered. Bureaucracy is a part of it, as well all other heterogeneous
factors. My impression, by separating these spheres, the outcome of a specific
aim or program is set in the foreground.
By dividing spheres which are enmeshed in reality, analytical separation dis-
rupts an analysis of how they work; of what rationalities they entail, what truths
they produce. In short: the effects of surveillance conglomerates are not fore-
seeable. Governing is always a risky operations per se. A typology as suggested
by Lyon (which only stands for the large body of work within surveillance stud-
ies) reproduces many assumptions which frame surveillance within a discourse
of modernity, which itself is a product of modernity. Here I see a problem with
many surveillance studies approaches. Modernity, as so often, is not very en-
lightening as an analytical term. I do not see what the explanatory gain is when
surveillance is described as a facet of modernity: “magnification of surveillance
capacities simply is one facet of modernity” (2001, 31).
And even more, in most surveillance studies literature I miss a genealogical ac-
count of subjectivity which enfolds and develops within rule. Power, it seems, in
most surveillance studies is external to subjects. Some ideas that subjects them-
selves are part of rule echo notions that individuals comply with surveillance, for
example to take part in social life. But it is exactly here where most surveil-
lance studies literature stops, at this crucial border that is itself a product of an
episteme of modernity: the idea of the autonomous subject, static, independent,
which at most faces problems by discipling surveillance in the pursuit of its life.
It is not conceived as both an effect and a site of production of power.
Allmer (2011) has chosen a different approach. He discusses the main body
of literature on surveillance by way of differentiating between a panoptic type
and a non-panoptic type. I do not share his assumption that surveillance studies
with a panoptic fringe understands surveillance as ‘negative’, whereas others see it
‘neutral’. Foucault’s genealogical work on the discipline society is not a ‘negative’
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account. Much more, it is an analysis of technologies of power.
What follows is a brief account of the surveillance studies discourse, informed
by the first wave of reflection that took place most prominently in the journal
Surveillance & Society.4
Surveillance Studies History
Surveillance has received much attention in academic research lately. Sociologists,
criminologists, historians, geographers, media scholars and other researchers have
tried to shed light on it. Surveillance studies emerged as an interdisciplinary re-
search field that has produced its own discourse on surveillance in the last decade.
But only recently have the implications and theoretical framings of the discourse
around surveillance begun to be discussed.5 The main strands of this debate are
focused around how to conceptualize changes of workplace, the logical place of
technology in surveillance, questions regarding post-9/11 governance in relation
to surveillance, and lately a rising demand for local accounts of surveillance.
In his historical reconstruction of the academic discourse on the ’surveillance
society’, David Murakami Wood (2009) focuses on a historical dynamic and then
problematizes a prevailing lack of contextualization and localization within this
discourse.
In order to tackle these questions the history of the term surveillance
society, both temporally and spatially, is examined in the four periods
of its development: the late 1960s and early 1970s; the mid-1980s to
early 1990s; from the mid-1990s until 2001; and from 2001 until now.
(Wood 2009, 181)
Paraphrasing Wood, the first period of conceptualizing the surveillance society
is characterized by, inter alia, the end of colonialism, the Vietnam war and the
beginning of the crisis of Fordist capitalism. In this dominantly US-centric view,
one of the most prominent surveillance dispositifs initiated was a new central
database. According to Wood, it is from here that surveillance studies took one
of its impulses. The fear of misuse by several agencies generated a “fear of the
state” (2009, 182), which reached its height at the Watergate affair.
From 1984 to the early 1990s the emerging neo-liberal regime of Thatcherism
and Reagonomics is seen as a driver for intensified surveillance at workplaces, as
4 It is an open access journal, see http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/.
5 See Kirstie Ball’s and Kevin D. Haggerty’s editorial “Doing Surveillance Studies” (2005).
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finance and consumer-management coupled with the miniaturization and mass
deployment of computing powers. Wood references Gary T. Marx as the initiator
of the “Big Brother” figure’s transposition from the famous novel (Orwell 1949) to
research through his article “The Surveillance Society: The Threat of 1984-style
Techniques” (1985).6
The Panopticon and the Database
The other powerful term that has accompanied thinking about the ‘surveillance
society’ and which still prevails today, is Foucault’s Panopticon. According to
Wood, scholars such as Oscar Gandy referred heavily on Foucault’s late 18th
century dispositif concept while analyzing the operations of databases. “Scholars
struggled with concepts, however, mainly those of how to theorize the database.”
(Wood 2009, 184)
In 1988, Australian IT consultant Roger Clarke introduced the term dataveil-
lance. It is noteworthy that Clarke, educated in computer sciences, does not deal
with Foucauldian concepts. Clarke clearly distinguishes between a systemic bor-
der of dataveillance and the bigger scope of surveillance. Although at core this is
a technology-centric approach, the reduction to systemic aspects of dataveillance
has its benefits.
Clarke defines dataveillance as “the systematic use of personal data systems
in the investigations or monitoring of the actions or communications of one or
more persons” (1988, 499). He then differentiates personal and mass dataveil-
lance. When suspicion has arisen, personal dataveillance becomes operational.
He concludes by saying “effective controls over the new and emerging techniques
of dataveillance will not be possible” (1988, 511).
Wood’s third epoch of conceptualizing the ‘surveillance society’ spans from
the early 1990s to 9/11 and is primarily concerned with the mass deployment
of CCTV-Systems in huge urban aggregations. A shift from the US to the UK
notably accompanies this movement. Clive Norris and others have discussed
the emergence of CCTV in public and private places (Norris and Armstrong
1999). Early traces of this emergence can be identified with the shift that the
military industrial complex took at the end of the Cold War by “seeking to find
new civilian markets and exploit governments in the risk society” (Wood 2009,
6 However, Marks (2005) found the earliest reference in a study by James Rule called “Pri-
vate Lives and Public Surveillance”.
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186). The immense popularity of CCTV as a field of research in surveillance
studies, I suggest, might be an echo from the CCTV’s symbolic value: the massive
deployment of highly visible technologies in the urban scape which easily resonates
well with the figure of the Big Brother.
Foucauldian concepts of discipling the subject have been connected to CCTV,
because CCTV works in both directions: cameras are connected to further infras-
tructure, for a processing of images, but the other direction is equally evident:
to induce normative and compliant behavior into subjectivities and to reduce
deviance.
The last (and current) phase Wood identifies, starts with the 9/11 terror at-
tacks. And it is here that he starts to question a global approach of surveillance
studies.7
Lyon, Ogura and Mattelart have been clear on the idea that there is a
‘globalization’ of surveillance. And certainly when societies other than
the places where Surveillance Studies academics are concentrated are
examined, one can see similar developments. But is this as simple as
Anglo-American conceptions spreading to other nations? (2009, 187)
The impact of a globalization of surveillance thus demands, contrary to in-
tuition, a precise framing of the analysis carried out. Otherwise, this is how I
understand Wood, mostly Western concepts are reproduced globally.
The Medium is Surveillance
It is in this tension of the question of locality and globalization where I suggest
that a perspective on surveillance via mobile media as a political rationality is
enlightening. The rather empty term ’surveillance society’ can be avoided by way
of a recurrence to the liberal paradox – the provision of freedom and its excess in
control – to understand that surveillance is not simply an effect of modernity, but
can be seen as a historical development that is an immanent part of liberal rule.
Mobile media as an individualizing political technology bridges the gap between
the local and the global as a medium for the production of the individual. And
as such, the individual as a Western concept is exported globally as a raw model
and is reconfigured according to local specifities. By way of this export, mobile
surveillance media as a material-semiotic conglomerate, couples and attaches to
7 For a recent history of the process how surveillance became a globalized governance
scheme, see Mattelart (2010).
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this trajectory. Mobile media is a global carrier of securitization. Mobile media
globalizes surveillances. To paraphrase and alter McLuhan (2003): the medium
is the surveillance.
6.2 Big Brother’s Effects on Surveillance Studies
Additionally, Western concepts are easily projected onto non-Western societies,
because they are influenced by strong images. The influence of literature, film
and other cultural artifacts on studies has been widely described and criticized.
Efforts were even made to turn this signifying force productively. Donna Haraway
has written on the construction of science, the tropes and figures used, and she
has pointed to the possibility of appropriations of such power techniques (1997;
1985).
Regarding surveillance studies, Peter Marks (2005) gives an overview of recent
utopian and dystopian films, that have been influential for the production of
popular imaginations of surveillance. But it is not enough to admit cultural
artifacts are influential. There is a need to understand which tropes influence and
structure surveillance studies in which ways, and what effects they produce: a
theory/concept of signification, that sheds light on the traffic these transpositions
produce in the signifying realm.
Here, only one trope is briefly discussed to provide an example for the prob-
lem. When Gary T. Marx introduced the figure “Big Brother” into the relatively
new surveillance discourse in 1985, it was already a questionable move to paint
such a dystopian picture for the sake of analyzing and understanding surveillance
issues. By now one cannot emphasize enough the misleading problems of this
transposition.
Once made, this transposition became hegemonic within the scholarly surveil-
lance discourse. This signifier connects seamlessly to all sorts of paranoia and
fear. It has become the universal trope within surveillance studies. The trope
“Big Brother” persistently pushes the imagination to some kind of totalitarian
surveillance of an all seeing eye, a centralized instances, which knows everything
about its targets.
The “Big Brother” trope unifies surveillance, control and the advent of a society
void of freedom for no clear analytical reason but its power as a figure in a narra-
tive. As long as it is prevailing and actively or latently structuring this discourse
any concept of ‘surveillance societies’ which is not critically emancipating itself
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from this burden is already fixed in its trajectory. Additionally, it reproduces an
understanding of subjects as static, passive – victims.
Agency, I argue, can be altered, redefined, but never annihilated by surveillance.
In a country under heavy surveillance, like South Korea, activists continue their
struggles, albeit surveillance is intense.
The police regularly collect information data to use as evidence, like
film. And they can use this to arrest you and persecute you in the
court. This is one aspect. Also they are eavesdropping on our cellphones
conversations, so we don’t decide anything via phones. Also they are
watching our internet activities. We have caught signs that they are
doing this. But there is basically nothing we can do about it. They are
also secretly collecting confidential information and accumulating this
against us.
Two Korean Activists
From the perspective of an analytics of rule, surveillance is a proof of the exis-
tence of some sort of freedom. In a state of total domination, surveillance would
lack its reason.
The kind of surveillant “seeing” in Orwell’s narrative equals total knowledge.
Such that the rationality and episteme of this “Big Brother” scheme are beyond a
comprehensible dimension: it is an secularized (evil) God. Orwell’s “Big Brother”
is invested with a super-human mind’s capacity to interpret situations and, most
importantly, language. Although semantic computational analysis has made sig-
nificant progress in the last years, it remains categorically a different regime of
interpretation, producing false positives and false negatives by its very own limits.
Maybe the word “surveillance” as such already implies such an overlooking
figure as it literally means ‘super vision’, the figure of a sovereign overseeing her
territory in totality and detail.
Orwell or Huxley?
A second famous dystopian novel, Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), I
argue with caution, is much more insightful. While 1984 portrays a repressive
regime and its society, Brave New World pushes the dystopia somewhere else.
The sovereign’s subjects are characterized as affirmative subjectivities: from fer-
tilization of the ovules to starvation, ‘human’ life here is a product of a massive
and ubiquitous biopolitical program. Inhabitants of this world of ‘happiness and
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joy’, where mourning and critical talk are commonly regarded as unethical, in-
corporate the values and practices of a regime void of discontent. Thus, the novel
is an eye-opener towards subjectivities involved in rule, in many ways this has
analogies with the concept of governmentality and the program of a self-governing
society.
Here, the expressions of discontent or dissent are not forbidden, as in 1984.
But they are not very useful either as the key political technology, affirmation,
renders them toothless within a distributed, dispersed and dissipated power that
is productive within all micro strains of sociability. Huxley offers a picture of
subjectivity, illustrated with architecture, leisure zones, industrial production and
scientific research, which places the possibility of dystopia away from surveillance-
technological developments and the model of the panopticon.
Huxley’s strength is to propose that without the governed subject’s commit-
ment, no regime can prevail. Brave New World emphasizes the historical con-
tingency of truth-production and thereby how values and ethics are shapeable,
changeable and adoptable. It can be read as an dystopian account of power rela-
tions, whose most prominent roots are in each and every person’s mind and body,
and as such offers a promising starting point for reflections on any past or present
regime, its sociality and its surveillance. The statement is that sociality is stable
if it can rely on immanent factors without expending much energy on repressive
measures, just like the idea of the conduct of conducts.
Nevertheless, Brave New World never achieved a prominent position in the
surveillance studies discourse that can compete with the figure of the “Big Brother”.
This is a hint towards the limited scope of how surveillance often is conceptual-
ized.
6.3 Surveillance and Location
I have a nephew who is teaching in the national defense college. He is
telling me: why are you using phones? It is so easy to track you. He
says, they have the equipment and put it in a car and they can get all
the cell numbers of the people at some place. He says things like this.
He is telling me not to use the cellphone.
Mina, Minerva, Joan, Julie / Manila
Returning to Wood’s history of surveillance studies, he asks, “when societies
other than the places where Surveillance Studies academics are concentrated are
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examined, one can see similar developments. But is this as simple as Anglo-
American conceptions spreading to other nations?” (Wood 2009, 187).
This skepticism towards global approaches in surveillance studies is of funda-
mental importance for the research field.8 While Wood takes the example of
Japan (Wood 2007) to show that different societies in different regions develop
different behaviors and practices towards surveillance, Minas Samatas (2005) re-
ports on specificities in post-authoritarian Greece:
Identifying four distinct surveillance periods in Greece’s post war history, Samatas
shows how different surveillance regimes accompanied the Greek people from 1950
until now. Due to the experience of authoritarian surveillance, especially older
Greek citizens “are generally unconcerned with forms of direct, physical watching
and monitoring of individuals”:
Part of the reason for this is cultural. In Greek language and cul-
ture, surveillance (parakolouthisi) refers to a natural activity in hu-
man affairs. It implies a situation of direct co-presence and the visual
observation of people, which is not perceived to be embarrassing or
threatening to social relationships. [...] This is in marked contrast
[...] to ‘filing’ (fakeloma), the recording and sorting of citizen’s infor-
mation in police files [...]. Direct experience of this type of draconian
control system has created heightened sensitivity to processes of ‘filing’
more generally. This sensitivity to surveillance as ‘filing’ as opposed
to watching continues to the present. (Samatas 2005, 188)
Taken only this one specific report into account that demonstrates a specific,
maybe even unique encounter with surveillance, the question arises as to how a
global surveillance society can be conceptualized.
In their Surveillance & Society editorial text for the issue “surveillance and
resistance” Luis A. Fernandez and Laura Huey also argue that surveillance studies
need to be to be situational, contextual, and historically specific, because “[r]ather
than categorize the different types of surveillance techniques, then, it is more
useful to enumerate the different types of actors who may engage in surveilling a
subject” (Fernandez and Huey 2009, 199).
Wood argues that the focus should be “on how particular places are constructed
in the encounter with surveillance, and to unpick the scalar elements of this story”
8 For an analog critique of the notion “global civil society” with reference to news media, see
Dencik (2012).
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as “surveillance operates and operates differently at different socio-spatial levels”
(2009, 189). Not only location, but also scale is a parameter in surveillance
analysis.
A Personal Account
I want to give a personal account. For three months in 2004, I had the opportunity
to work at the Delhi-based new media center Sarai.9 It was my first stay in India
and Asia.
India, as images in the mass media tell us, has become a central hub of ICT and
teleservices for the global market. This image purports a computerized service
society. From coding to call centers, the workforce is immense. During that time,
I also had my first laptop, which I had bought second-hand. The problem with
this machine was its battery, which was more of a weight than a resource of power.
I should have changed it before going to Delhi, but did not do so. Instead, I left
the battery at home, to reduce weight. It never came to my mind that power is
not ubiquitous and permanently available in Delhi.
As it turned out, even in the areas around Delhi University, where Sarai is
located, power cuts are a daily event. To counter this, a power generator fills the
gaps. But between supply and gap, short non-electrical mini-gaps still prevailed.
My laptop, not having any measure to survive these gaps, lost power up to ten
times a day - depending which power socket I was using, as some were backed up
with batteries themselves.10
If there is no properly functioning power supply, the complex and intercon-
nected infrastructure of computer-mediated surveillance only works, if at all, in
places where the reliability of the power supply is not (yet) an issue. This simple
example shows the problem of projecting conditions from ‘the West’ onto different
areas of the world.
From this brief history of surveillance studies and the problem of a global analy-
sis, underlined by this personal account, I want to come to an interesting critique
of the use of Discipline and Punish in surveillance studies.
9 See Geert Lovink’s report “Revisiting Sarai” for a portrait and discussion of this project
(Lovink 2008, 131-160) and their website http://www.sarai.net.
10 And of course, everyone wanted to plug her computer into such a socket of which there
were never enough.
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6.4 The Concept of Institutionalized Mediation
Foucault’s “Discipline and Punish” (1977) is the hallmark of reference for surveil-
lance studies. Wood reports that “for Surveillance Studies, Foucault is a founda-
tional thinker and his work on the development of the modern subject, in particu-
lar Surveillir et Punir [...] remains a touchstone for this nascent transdisciplinary
field” (Wood 2003, 235).
That this focus became a problem in the recent years is not ignored. In a
text from 2003, David Lyon agrees that the “older metaphor of ‘Big Brother’
or the panopticon, redolent of heavy handed social control, seem somehow less
relevant to an everyday world of telephone transactions, Internet surfing, street
level security, work monitoring, and so on” (Lyon 2003, 18).
To problematize the strong influence of Foucault’s genealogical account of the
discipline society within surveillance studies, Michalis Lianos has argued that “the
Foucauldian model of control, and consequently its explanatory power, refers to
the past and is not concerned with the emergence of the contemporary postindus-
trial subject”(Lianos 2003, 413). Lianos does not refer explicitly to governmen-
tality studies and an analytics of rule at all in his critique. But (maybe for that
reason) he proposes focusing on the contemporary mediations of cultural and so-
cial negotiations in his own way. He proposes that mediation of sociality has seen
a shift towards institutional control in a broad sense: from ATMs to web portals
to car-parkings, “we live through a multiple range of institutional activities that
monitor and verify conformity” (2003, 414). According to Lianos, this institu-
tional control is a “planned managerial activity corresponding to the complex
mode of organization of contemporary Western society” (2003, 415). With this
in mind, a dispositif like CCTV appears to be complex and multifunctional: it is
as much a repressive, disciplining surveillance technology, as it is about detective
surveillance, regulation of traffic flow, support for planning, accident-prevention
and much more.
More generally, institutional activities establish a regime of fixed and nonnego-
tiable conditions that mediate and fragment sociality. Lianos most interesting
argument is the power to fragment:
Institutional control is neither intersubjective nor group-based. On
the contrary, it is by definition impersonal in its origin and atomised
in its reception, because it is conceived and applied by an institution
as part of the homogeneous distribution of a certain activity. Between
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the institution and the user, there exists no interaction, except for a
managerial monitoring and feedback cycle.” (2003, 416; emphasis in
original)
And as such, he resumes, it focuses “on the organisation and the contextualisation
of what is often intended or even desired by a sovereign subject” (2003, 416).
Institutional control in this broad sense mediates sociality by directing and setting
the conditions of all that it mediates. I understand this concept is wide enough
to include money into this scheme, as it mediates sociality and is institutionally
controlled from production to distribution.
The individual is determined in her possible social action by these settings,
which exclude cultural negotiations and reduces sociality to a binary scheme of
access given/access denied.11 According to this concept control is situated in
the specific historical setting of managerial activity, which is structured by the
processual and resonating character that technology and the social together and
reciprocally produce.
In the outcome the subject is desubjectivated and objectivated as her opin-
ions or values are not of concern, it is about managerial problems and here this
dispositif is productive. It produces desocialisation by imposing non-negotiable
normativity, culminating in “the rapid disengagement of users from social belong-
ing” (Lianos 2003, 425).
We can best comprehend the transitions in control as part of the mas-
sive changes in the area of contemporary sociality and the broader
atrophy of the social universe. Besides putting an end to the long and
imaginative demonisation of control, this angle links the emergence of
institutional normativity to overarching social change. Thus, it is not
control that becomes desocialised, but sociality which institutionalises
itself; it is not surveillance which intensifies and spreads, but the de-
mand for systems and networks which propagates itself and favours
the fluid – albeit atomised – channeling of individuals. (Lianos 2003,
425)
Control and the social form a new paradigm themselves. They productively
engage in a new societal setting. I read “sociality which institutionalises itself”
as a deep interweaving of governmental rule and subjectivities. What Lionos calls
11 See also Deleuze (1992) .
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“institutions” covers all entities and actors that impose a pre-negotiated rule onto
subjects in wide areas of sociality. Institutions here are the different programs,
political technologies, and institutions in a proper sense, which regulate sociality
on a micro level, that effects and affects subjectivities.
If sociality institutionalizes itself, it does so as a dynamic that, indeed, follows
specific trajectories, but their outcome is not determined as such. There is no need
to follow Lianos’ view in its entirety and it is disputable whether this dynamic
should be called “atrophy of the social universe”.
Nevertheless, drawing on the institutionalization of sociality which in effect
favors atomized individuals over mediation of groups helps considerably in un-
derstanding that surveillance itself cannot be understood as an isolated practice,
but that it is embedded in a more complex web of mediations which structure so-
ciality. This structurally enmeshed aspect is of importance and often overlooked.
Lianos has shown this.
From here, two concepts of contemporary surveillance are introduced, which
are useful for a discussion of data retention.
6.5 Panspectron and Surveillant Assemblage
The concept of the panspectron, as introduced by Sandra Braman (2006b), res-
onates well with Lianos’ concept of institutionalized mediation. It refers to a
state of things where no surveillance subject is specifically invoked in order to
trigger an information collection process. Rather, information is collected about
everything and everyone all the time. An individual subject appears only when
a particular question needs to be answered, triggering data mining for particular
information within the mass already gathered, in order to precisely answer that
question. And while populations remain generally aware of the unmoved and in-
timidating presence of the panopticon, they tend to be unaware of the aggressive
efficiency of specific modes of information collection. Data retention exactly fits
into this conceptual frame, just as Passenger Name Records (PNR) and SWIFT
financial data. These are sustained and augmented without any specified trigger,
and therefore, potentially infinite.
A different, but again in large parts compatible approach towards surveillance
is the concept of the surveillant assemblage, as introduced by Kevin Haggerty
and Richard Ericson (2000). It refers to a multiplicity of heterogeneous objects,
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whose unity is solely functional. As an assemblage is always a “potentiality,” this
concept can be connected to the developing panspectron, which also resides in
the background as a formidable and ambivalent latency.
Paradoxically, the diversity of the assemblage is also its power: “As it is mul-
tiple, unstable, and lacks discernible boundaries or responsible governmental de-
partments, the surveillant assemblage cannot be dismantled by prohibiting a par-
ticularly unpalatable technology” (Haggerty and Ericson 2000, 609).
The main direction of the assemblage is to transform the body into virtual
bytes of information — data doubles. “And while such doubles ostensibly refer
back to particular individuals, they transcend a purely representational idiom.”
(Haggerty and Ericson 2000, 614) I will return to this very important notion
about the transcendence of representation, as this is achieved by the production
of a new knowledge-power axis. Discrimination and social sorting is amongst
the socio-political consequences that subjects may experience as concrete back-
references. Data retention is an example of a functional element of the assemblage
that might refer back to subjects. It is unpredictable, and possibly holds radical
consequences for the subject. But its internal logic points beyond representation
and operates within a realm of algorithmic abstraction.
The following passage stands transversal to the discussion so far, as it recounts
a larger history of engagement with surveillance problems in an activist and artist
scenario.
6.6 Interlude: Ricardo Dominguez on Transparent
Surveillance
Ricardo Dominguez, a professor at University of California San Diego and long
time activist/artist with digital technologies, recalled many of his experiences
and concepts when I interviewed him and asked about surveillance. In his long
answer, he touches many of the core aspects. Interestingly, paranoia and fear is
prominently placed in the center of his answer, and his ideas about how to contain
surveillance are enlightening.
Dominguez stands out from all other people interviewed in the sense that on
the one hand he situates himself within the fields of art as well as in the field of
activism, and on the other hand he is the only person I interviewed who engages
in practice and theory at the same time.
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His current appointment at UC San Diego led to the development of ‘border
disturbance technologies’ such as the Transborder Immigrant Tool.12
In an unconventional manner, I have decided to reproduce his long answer to
surveillance in full length, as it enfolds along a narrative of practice with different
groups and actions and develops a complex argument where I could not find a
satisfying way of shortening his analysis. It is almost an essay in itself.13
I began to think about surveillance in terms of its uses probably some-
where in the mid 90s. In the 80s you would do actions and the cops
would be there watching you. So, that was kind of self-evident surveil-
lance. But I think there was a theoretical fiction by William Bogart,
that came out sometime in the 90s, that is called “Simulations of surveil-
lance”. I found that text be quite useful in thinking this question, about
mass surveillance, distributed surveillance, the histories to the panopti-
con. But again, the question was in the same way that Baudrillard says
“surveillance is bad”, Virilio says “speed is a negative condition for our
society”. And Bogart certainly focuses on bringing surveillance to this
kind of negative space of society. One of the core elements in his story
is: what is simulation of surveillance? The story he tells is: Out West,
say in the spaces in the desert where I am from, there is a small town
that can not effort having police force slowing you down. So your are
driving for hours really fast. And you make a turn and suddenly there
is a cop car. So you have to slow down, watch yourself, and all that.
But you may not look and it is really a dead car, painted to look like a
cop car. Because the town can not afford having cops sitting there all
day long. There you create this kind of simulation that you are being
surveilled on a No-Fi level. It is that sort of agglutination of aggregation
of a panopticon. And you no longer have to create the prison, you only
have to create the dead object that evokes that condition of surveillance.
12 See http://bang.calit2.net/tag/transborder-immigrant-tool/.
13 As Dominguez refers to a couple of projects, groups and special terms in his discussion of
surveillance, I have added them to the glossary. Nonetheless for a better reading they are
listed here, too:
• Critical Art Ensemble (CAE)
• Department of Defense (DoD)
• Distributed denial of Service (DDoS)
• Electronic Civil Disobedience (ECD)
• Electronic Disturbance Theater (EDT)
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And the reason this question became important, at least to me, was the
emergence of the practice of Electronic Civil Disobedience. Since the
choice that we had to make when we initiated the direct practice, rather
than the conceptualization, was that should we seek that kind of history
of hacker and anonymity under a name. And certainly collective names
have been important in my history of CAE and EDT. But I felt that
we needed to do was to kind of disturb this simulation of surveillance
and that was to not be anonymous. To be wholly transparent. Because
this would fit in a clear way with the Civil Disobedience model, that we
were trying to teleport. It is the body, in the street, that signifies the
authentic condition. So how could the cops give us a beating if they
didn’t know who we were? It was a bit of internal struggle. A good
part of the group came from the tradition of the freedom of anonymity,
of having the technology itself speak rather than the person. But I felt
that we needed to say: I am Ricardo Dominguez, I live in Williams-
burg, here is my telephone number, if you have any problems with us
coming to your website next week where we do a virtual sit-in, please
contact us. I thought this would disturb this condition. And create a
counter simulation of surveillance on them. And that they would have
to participate in announcing “Hi, we are here”. We are the FBI or
the Department of Defense. So, they themselves could not specifically
hide, because it was a transparent game. And of course the question
of transparency is also very much kind of a tweak of the neoliberals to
cause all kinds of problematics. At that particular juncture I thought
it was important to seek out surveillance, to interpellate me: I am over
here officer, digitally. And I am not suggesting that it is the best thing
to do with life outside. But digitally, being targeted for surveillance,
because again it was a way. At least that was my gut feeling: not
to be concerned with surveillance. Because I was giving them all my
points, my telephone number etc. So, when the Mexican Government
where calling when we were at Ars Electronica doing “Swarm” in 98:
“We know were you are, we know what you are doing.” I said: “Of
course you do! I just posted it all online. It doesn’t take a deep intel-
ligence system to figure it out.” It was more transparency: to evoke
surveillance was to evoke those powers to have to manifest themselves.
Whereas if one is in some kind of paranoia, whether it is simulation of
surveillance or surveillance proper, through this kind of transparency
one is not concerned. In a certain sense one can see the activists of
the 70’s have been driven insane: they are watching us! Paranoia: you
are not sure. And it seemed to me that they are being paranoid about
being watched. So I said: if you are that bored: go, read my email!
That was kind of trying to disturb that kind of surveillance model and
create a minor simulation of transparency, which would disturb the ma-
jor simulation of surveillance. The major components of Echelon. We
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used to do virtual sit-ins against Echelon. So, this matrix, then traces
out, takes measure of this kind of social models of surveillance. And
to do it without any kind of fear, which I think is often the way how
surveillance is used. And so, that has been the model. For instance with
the Transborder Immigrant Tool, you get email all the time “you are a
traitor, you should be beaten”. But then once again: one allows a public
sphere. They might be anonymous, “White guy number 89 says”. But
then this brings out the different players in a way that is not a hidden
component of the fear or secrecy of surveillance. Surveillance is part
of the space of public fear. To create a disturbance in the discoursive
formation of surveillance, in the kind of technological effectiveness of
surveillance and cover and take measure of its different components. I
suppose the argument could be made now that we have a move from
transparency in toto to one of translucency which is to have a kind of
movement between transparency and opacity. Eduard De Glissant, the
Caribbean theorist, speaks about the politics of the opaque. Especially
around communities of resistance in the Third World. Certainly, if you
are a young Filipino fighting police abuse and you are doing Electronic
Civil Disobedience, I would recommend opaqueness. So, I am taking it
into account that I am a certain citizen of empire, established within
a certain circuit of civil rights, limited, but certainly elements, so, I
have a matrix of performativity which is much larger than other com-
munities. It is a privilege. So, when I speak to communities I do take
this into account. This performative matrix of transparency in relation
to surveillance and opaque politics have their space. In a certain sense
there is also to me this third paradigm of translucency, which is: if there
is major simulation and there is minor simulation in Deleuze’ notion of
“What is minor literature?”. And so, I feel that the work that ETD
does is one of minor simulations that riffs of between transparency and
translucency. Does this work? Is CED really working as practice? Well,
the Mexican government seems to feel it is working. So it creates this
possibility. Usually the feedback is quite critical. When we did the
action of “swarm” at Ars Electronica, nettime, with all these powerful
and important people, deep thinkers that we had learned a lot from,
said “no! activism is about communication and documentation.” So
this direct transparent action is kind of destroying a lot of the work
that has been done. And it is a paradigm that is not useful, is what
they said. Activists on the ground. There are cyber borders and you
are a Northern group moving into the South, once more, this kind of
post-colonial attitude. But on the other side, the Zapatistas called for
an intercontinental, intergalactic campaign. When they came and spoke
to us, they said it is fine. So, are there really these sort of conditions?
The hackers, like “hippies from hell”, at that time they were heard and
they said: “this is distributed denial of service, it is not digitally cor-
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rect.” And we said: “OK, so we are digitally incorrect in our process.”
“It is a useless technology” they would say, “ineffective in the process.”
But for us this uselessness and ineffectiveness was an affective politically
coordinated element. So, there was a lot of intercourse, the institutions
of power, the DoD, all of that, were also extremely angry and they were
saying “no”. So we were able to trace out the conditions of power, mi-
nor powers, majors powers all around this question, and those critiques
were very useful in implementing a larger scale performative matrix,
that disallowed the end of the practice, but also disturbed each of the
discourses and allowed perhaps a minor conceptual drift, that was un-
expected for each of them, which then let the Congress saying “ECD is
not cyber terrorism, is not cyber crime, is not anonymous cracking, it is
a teleportation of Civil Disobedience. Nothing less, nothing more.” It is
part of the practice of performative matrix of ECD at that point which
is to look at the kind of emerging hard definitions of cyber war, cyber
terrorism, cyber crime, and shifted from questions of infrastructure and
syntactical knowledge code to semantics. And semantics was a way to
reshift and teach a discourse. Wherein communities of power and mi-
nor communities of power had to deal with the semantic structure as
the primary shifter point, rather than the question of syntactical code
and infrastructure. Those were the things they said: it is stupid to
DDoS, it is illegal. And all of that. But that is not a landscape one can
negotiate pedagogically. And shift that power. So, with minor simula-
tion, transparency of surveillance one could then have that pedagogical
shift and certainly we saw it starting in Germany with the Deportation
Class Action and the legal outcome of that case. The law case said:
they went with the cyberterrorism/cyber crime model, the higher court
in Frankfurt said “No. It is one of public protests.” So, I think that
was an important discoursive shift.
Dominguez / San Diego
The prominent and most original point for the discussion here is to demand
that surveillance, which is mostly an opaque operation beyond feasibility, be-
comes visible, to demand it to come to light with the means of a “minor simu-
lation of transparency”. This is an answer to the problem of paranoia. It can
be tried, as Dominguez indicates, when the social position allows to do so. To
engage surveillance into a conversation can be achieved by demonstratively being
transparent in actions that provoke special attention to authorities. Doing this in
the digital realm converts the opaqueness of computer mediated actions into non-
digital phenomena: the call or the email that responds to the irritation caused
is a demonstration that surveillance exists. Simulations of surveillance cannot
react on such a call. The production of a vis-a`-vis situation with surveillance
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turns the general idea of surveillance upside down. The discursive shift changes
coordinates and suddenly new practices become part of the discussion, like vir-
tual sit-ins, which so far had been treat as hacking and terrorism. Now they are
legalized and protected under the right to assembly.
In the next chapter I take a step to try and understand data retention as a
political technology. Additionally, other occurrences that are part of the large
conglomerate of mobile media, within an analytics of rule, are introduced that
fall into what can be called neo-sovereignty. With this, I try to provide a different
approach towards mass surveillance, one which is situated within an analytics of
rule.
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Limiting Secured Freedom of Mobile
Media
We pay a lot of attention on surveillance, there are many situations
where people have to turn phones off and take out the battery. In both,
mobile and non-mobile, surveillance is a big issue.
MST Workers / Sa˜o Paulo
I have argued that the massive dissemination of mobile media affordable for
large parts of the population contributes to governmental rule. Governmental
rule, as I have laid out earlier on, coincides with the production of ’freedom’,
whose means are the apparatuses of security. Foucault is concise in that the
mechanism of security does not function on the axis of the sovereign-
subjects relationship, ensuring the total and as it were passive obe-
dience of individuals to their sovereign. They are connected to what
the physiocrats called natural processes, and which we could also call
elements of reality. (Foucault 2007, 65-66)
Apparatuses of security are productive, they “work, fabricate, organize, and
plan a milieu [...] in which circulation is carried out” (Foucault 2007, 21). Mobile
media technologies, its devices, its infrastructure, its economy are all results of the
organization of such a milieu, where, plain to see, circulation of communication
is carried out.
While such an understanding of (tele-)communication – as securing freedom –
is intuitive, the techniques, measures and technologies that reduce, limit, and
complicate circulations of speech and signs mark a different point of interrogation,
all the more when they appear after the population’s massive use of it.
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To limit mobile media through rule marks a tipping point of produced freedom.
It shows that the common reference to mobile media as an empowering technology,
as an facilitator of agency, needs to be framed within a play of modalities of rule.
Finally, this gives an occasion to understand mobile media as surveillance media
whose trajectory is to control the freedom produced,eventually turning into an
illiberal technology.
Examples of such instances are data retention schemes, mandatory registration
of SIM cards and blocking/jamming of cells of a mobile network. What these cases
all have in common is that the free circulation of signs is confronted with a political
technology of control that in different ways disrupts the flow or reformulates the
flow of signs.
All of them, in varying degrees, affect large groups, up to the whole population.
None of them is targeting specific individuals, although data retention creates
the possibility for this, as well as SIM card registration creates the possibility
to identify targets. Additionally each of these technologies has emerged after
the roll-out of mobile technologies, therefore, in a sense, they all answer to the
production of freedom by an apparatus of security; to an expression of liberal rule.
They mark the paradox of liberal rule, which has to intervene in the program of
a self-regulating society, although it shall not.
They overrule the liberal frame and establish a preventionist scheme (data re-
tention, and in a sense as well SIM card registration), they limit it as they dis-
criminate between those who are eligible and those who are non-eligible (SIM card
registration) or locally shut down the circulation of signs in its entirety (blocking
of cells). Each of the cases performs on a different field. The discrimination they
perform on is in the temporal (data retention), social (SIM card registration),
and the spatial (cell suspension).
Clearly, such instances share characteristics that acts of sovereignty have: the
state of emergency enacted by the Musharraf regime in Pakistan falls within
sovereign rule, as it revokes the constitution and thus liberal rights granted to
citizens are annulled. Media is banned, public gatherings are forbidden. Sovereign
acts abandon government that rationalizes economy; they contradict the paradigm
of self-regulating societies. But as well, there are specifics in each of these cases
that hint towards something else but ‘classic’ sovereign rule, as they operate
within the informational milieu (Terranova 2004).
By discussing each of these examples separately, I will try to identify, within
a framework of an analytics of government, what mode of rule they initiate and
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how this relates to the problem of securing freedom, to the production of freedom,
and to channeled action. To my understanding, all of them are different prob-
lematizations of a flow of signs, goods, and bodies. With different means, they
all work on the opposite end: restricting and controlling a circulation that liberal
rule had initialized. As “security [...] tries to work within reality, by getting the
components of reality to work in relation to each other, thank to and through a
series of analyses and specific arrangements”(Foucault 2007, 47), one may ask in
what way any of these three cases supplements security. All of them intervene
into the liberalized mobile media scheme. But before the discussion of the three
cases, I want to reconsider the term “sovereign rule” and why this is important.
7.1 Illiberal Government and the Surveillant As-
semblage
One might simply say: ‘There is all this liberalized technologies that float around,
everyone is using it. So, evidently, also the bad guys use it. That’s why state has
to intervene and secure the apparatuses of security against a wrong use.’ Although
on the surface, such a claim might not be wholly wrong, it lacks analysis in many
ways: first of all: who are the bad guys? And what is the state that intervenes?
There is no such thing as a sovereign that overlooks his territory. The state, and
this is one central claim of the Foucauldian framework, is not a homogeneous
entity. Addressing it at such does not help to understand the myriad of semiotic-
material conglomerates of rule.
Sovereignty usually becomes subsumed under the term ‘the law’ or the execution
of law. Foucault left open a thorough analysis of sovereignty in his late work in
regard to neo-liberal societies. He mentions the prevalence of three pillars of
power in contemporary rule, but by focusing on (neo-)liberal rule, one could get
the impression that rule is all about the production of (economic) freedom by
apparatuses of security and the production of the economic subject.1
1 In his lecture from April 4th 1979, Foucault returns to the problem of sovereignty vis-a`-
vis the homo economicus. He explains that the subject of right and the homo economicus
are irreducible, because the sovereign can only fail to oversee the totality of the economic
field. Therefore “the emergence of the notion of homo economicus represents a sort of
political challenge to the traditional, juridical conception, whether absolutist or not, of
the sovereign” (292-293). It is civil society that appears as the new frame of reference, or
“plane of reference” on which government will be executed. Thus, Foucault presents the
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This neglected point is what Sven Opitz refocuses on: the role of sovereignty
in governmental societies. He looks at the “re-inscription of sovereign logics of
power into governmentality as liberal practice” (Opitz 2010, 94). His focus is on a
new mode of sovereignty: securitization that “calls for direct interventions which
ignore the bounds of law and install a sovereign exception to liberal rule. Under
conditions of modern governmentality, the concept targets the point at which
liberal regulation—in the name of liberality—becomes illiberal.” (Opitz 2010,
101).2 What Opitz discusses therefore is a form of neo-sovereignty, one that
operates within governmental rule, but one “that renders the illiberal moment
of the security dispositif dominant, and thus functions as the decisive hinge that
allows the intersection of liberal and sovereign modes of power” (Opitz 2010, 101).
There is an important clarification one has to make here: because societies
of governmentality have become an object of study in broad and many ways,
one has to be aware that the production of self-governing subjectivities as its
base only follows the trajectory of outsourcing the risks of economic well-being
to the individual, leading to the redemption of concepts of solidarity for societal
relations. (Neo-)liberalism is for and most an economic programme that has
rendered economic thinking as a way to govern. It is important not to fall into
the trap of this episteme oneself. Disciplinary powers, as well as sovereignty in
the form of executing the law, have always sidelined governmental rule. Where
subjects of self-conduct failed, disciplinary measures and the execution of law
are necessary to avoid a void: the “enterprise society”(Foucault 2008, 147) must
comprise the whole population. What is more, the imperative of the market
decisively attacks all that is external and through its trajectory of “centrifugality”
(Foucault 2007, 45) increases its field of operation. Therefore the problem that
governmental rule faces throughout is its own economic enterprise: it is haunted
to finding the right balance as, first, it shall not intervene into the pursuit of its
governed and it must not interrupt the flow, because this causes high expenses,
and, second, if it intervenes too late, or at the wrong places, or with the wrong
programs, expenses are even higher.
“transactional reality” (297) through which liberal government integrates the subject of
right and the subject of economics, but leaves open how this new plane of reference relates
to sovereignty (Foucault 2008, 291-316). For a discussion of a shift within Foucault’s
work between “Society Must Be Defended” and the lectures of 1978 (“Security, Territory,
Population”), see Collier (2009).
2 The concept “securitization” was developed by the so called Copenhagen School. See Buzan,
Wæver, and de Wilde (1998) and C.A.S.E. Collective (2006).
136
Thus, it is the right balance of the three forms of power, that liberal rule is
always in the course of adjusting.
The “play of transactional freedom” in itself is immanently incapable of in-
tegrating all individuals. The idea of a self-regulating society that economical
rationalities prescribe, obviously has systemic deficits. First and foremost as it
is a totalization of economy over the idea of society. This is were the paradox of
liberal rule unfolds and securitization and other means of illiberality ‘blossom’.
Thus, one can speak of political technologies of neo-sovereignty, which are not
entirely or only in an indirect way connected to lawful action, and which are pur-
sued both within the governmental neo-liberal program, and in contradiction to
it, as such interventions are faced with the strategic problem not to halt circula-
tion. They are materialized expressions of the liberal paradox itself. “Government
must not form a counterpoint [...] between society and economic processes” (Fou-
cault 2008, 145). As society is conceived as within a regulatory principle by the
mechanisms of competition. Such an “enterprise society” is in need of its own
kind of sovereignty: its programs can be called securitization. They operate out-
side of lawful practice or at least in an (yet) undefined territory; a gray area,
where police, the army and the recent omnipresent ‘security services’ lay claim
on the execution of a sovereignty, which, and this is important, operates either in
addition or beyond juridical sovereignty.
7.2 Episteme and Modalities of Neo-Sovereignty
This neo-sovereignty sets up a boundary: that between the “level of the inter-
play of differential normalities” (Foucault 2007, 63), which defines the realm of
governmental rule, and what exceeds this differentiation to the degree that it
cannot be “normalized and needs to be confronted illiberally. Thus the erection
of a barrier, beyond which government can grant no latitude for freedom, cor-
relates with a discrimination of possible and impossible subject positions”(Opitz
2010, 104). The anormal is a correlation of differentiated boundaries; there is no
static anormal that triggers liberal or illiberal rule. As the technological measures
on both sides operate on statistical sizes I propose to understand both sides of
the barrier as a dynamical space and the boundary itself as moving. This is an
expression of a logic of risk, which cannot refer to an ‘ontological’ or ‘static’ epis-
teme, but is always in flux and addresses no concrete individuals, but statistical
normalizations.
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More to the point, I suggest that there is no, or not always, a “hinge” as
such, no clear switching point, but a rather field of statistical approximations
which lead to the invocation of illiberal rule. This episteme that produces the
truth for government is largely a calculated evaluation via algorithmicity and big
data; an error prone risk assessment reified as computational objectivity. For
example, when analyzing traffic data of communications ‘suspicious’ patterns of
association can be produced (Strandburg 2007). While these patterns as such can
be a result of many things, its simple emergence already causes suspicion. When
such weak ties become the operational base for rule, as it is objectified through
algorithmicity, the effects of rule face severe contingencies.
Eli Pariser calls the shaping of the future in the context of the ‘filter bubble’ that
the internet, he is arguing, is about to become, “algorithmic induction”, which
“can lead to a kind of information determinism, in which our past clickstreams
entirely decide our future” (Pariser 2011, 135). The problem he addresses is
called “overfitting” and leads to “a regression to the social norm” Pariser (2011,
128). In parallel, I suggest, this epistemic logic is inherent to algorithmicity in
neo-sovereign programs.
Seen from a broader scope, data retention fits well into the post-9/11 war on
terror instruments. The shift toward an omniscient surveillance-state has gener-
ally often been compared to scenarios familiar from the prophetic novel 1984 by
George Orwell (1949). But there are critical differences. The analogy had been
underscored by the historical concept of the panopticon, introduced by Bentham
(1995) and popularized by Foucault (1977). But where the panopticon draws its
power from the fact that the surveilled never know if they are surveilled, and
therefore internalize habits as if they were surveilled, the present situation, fos-
tered by ongoing modalities such as data retention, should more accurately be
referred to as panspectron or from a different aspect as surveillant assemblage, be-
cause everyone who is telecommunicating is always under surveillance, although,
and this is what I want to discuss further, this surveillance has its very own
characteristics.
So, the thing that around mobile phones the most shocked me was when
it was revealed that the US carriers where surveilling citizens without
warrants, AT&T and these things. That was a big knock. Not that I
was that surprised, but that was just so common. That really led me
to thinking that surveillance is more of a day to day problem.
Freitas / NYC
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It has strong effects how, or if, the ‘anormal’ is produced and identified to a
large degree, as the ‘threat’ is constructed in a relation between two differentiated
statistical approximations: the ‘positive’ liberal one, and the ‘negative’ illiberal
one. Thus, contingent decisions have to be made between these two in part
overlapping data sets. These contingent decisions are part of the algorithm, the
machinic operations at work. Matthew Fuller has termed the bits and pieces
about an individual in a database3 that produce new objects flecks of identity :
[I]t becomes possible to describe flecks of identity, in their existence
as standard objects, within databases as a primary compositional el-
ement within surveillance systems. This is what at its scalar levels
control sees, an informational token of conformity or infraction. An
element, cluster, or concatenation of data, flecks of identity – a num-
ber, a sample, a document, racial categorization – are features that
identify the bearer as belonging to particular scalar positions and re-
lations. [...] The citizen has a place, a speed, a set of functions as
a variable within a social, bodily, technical algorithm. (Fuller 2007,
148; emphasis in original)
Which flecks of identity are queried and how they are combined is perspectival
and depends on the security query done in the database. In the end, the subject
is flagged or not flagged. This binary event stands in a drastic disproportion to
the data processed. The operations that lead to this state are infinite and opaque.
“Gender, race and sexuality have been reduced to recombinable elements, disasso-
ciated from their subjects and recomposed on a plane of modulation.”(Terranova
2004, 35) Neo-sovereignty operates on a plane of modulation, which lacks the
nexus to the material that provided such elements in the first place.
A good fellow of me, whose father is a policemen, once told me that I
was filed and it was very detailed. Very many people are filed, and the
police likes to collect information about people, even people who have
committed no crime. They are always just adding. The files are getting
bigger and bigger, more and more detailed. And they collect from both:
analog and digital.
Ferna˜o / Sa˜o Paulo
3 About the database as a key form of the computer age that correlates the narrative as a key
form of the novel and the cinema in modern age, see Manovich (2001).
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Flagging Data Flecks
An example for such a ‘flag’ operation are ‘trouble maker databases’ that have
been produced in the recent years in different member states of the European
Union. The aim is ‘prevention and protection against serious threats for public
security’, as the delegations that discuss such matters repeat on and on.
For Germany, in 2009 a database has been set up called “violent offender sport”
(Gewaltta¨ter Sport).4
Although the file’s name suggests that it holds information on violent
offenders, many of its entries do not refer to individuals who have
been convicted of a crime but rather to people who have received a
ban or were subject to stop and search procedures at football matches.
(To¨pfer 2009)
The realization is opaque and contingent: the risk assessments done by individ-
ual police officers, who decide for the storage of personal data in the database,
which then is translated into objectivity by the very machinic operations. Once
fed into the database, one is nonnegotiably flagged. Illiberality blurs and blackens
out, where due law once was the standard procedure. Rule becomes a black box
for the governed.
Anyone whose data is stored in these databases might experience seri-
ous consequences: their freedom of movement might be curbed when
they are ordered to register in-person at their local police station on
a daily basis (e.g. for the duration of international football compe-
titions), when they are prohibited from leaving the country or when
they are visited by police at so-called “troublemaker addresses”, in
4 Within the European Union databases on specific subgroups of the population are numer-
ous. Some are interoperable, some are not. Some are accessible by national police, some
by federal police, some by secret services. Some store the data unlimited, some have of-
ficial deleting schedules. I will not discuss this labyrinth of control and surveillance in
toto, but only refer to the “troublemakers” databases, as it targets specifically football fans,
who by nature come in masses, and political demonstrators under the de-politicizing la-
bel “troublemakers”. For the general trajectory, I agree that “[s]ince the onset of the EU’s
response to the ‘war on terror’ the prime targets have been Muslim and migrants commu-
nities together with refugees and asylum-seekers. Now there is an emerging picture across
the EU that demonstrations and the democratic right to protest is among the next to be
targeted to enforce ‘internal security’” (Bunyan 2009).
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their homes or at work. Moreover, their patterns of movement might
be profiled and discreetly recorded at police checkpoints. (To¨pfer
2009)
On IGAST, a BKA operated database on ‘violent troublemakers who are active
internationally’ it is known that in June 2009 “information on 2,966 persons
was stored in this database. Only ten per cent of the entries refer to ‘potential
troublemakers’, (i.e. those who have been arrested or registered in the context of
violent protests against globalization in Germany or abroad). All other entries
are on contacts, witnesses or police informers.”(To¨pfer 2009)
In terms of deviance these flagged subjects are only in part illiberalized, they
are not expelled or excluded from governmental rule in toto: the calculus of gov-
ernmental neo-liberal rule only divides the individual, produces a dividuum as
Deleuze (1992) puts it. The digital doppelga¨nger is divided from the undivided
and undergoes a process of screening, where the ‘anormal’ is generated statistically
as a ‘contingently proven’ deviant subject position. In the logic of computational
policing, the outcome is a illiberalized but still governmental subject. It aims only
at a specific reductions of circulation, here the right of free movement or recurring
stop and search procedures; the production of deviance is under reconfiguration.
In this episteme, individuals are not classified according to psychological exam-
ination or for motivations which address the concrete person. Instead, flecks of
identity provide the means for a construction of a risk assessment whatever the
concrete and situated context has been (see also Castel 1991).
The Limit Figure and Prevention
The primary and traditional figure that organizes the boundaries of the ‘powers
of freedom’, that exerts the ‘petty’ states of exception, this has been pointed
out by Foucault already, is the police: “police is the permanent coup d’E´tat [
. . . ] that is exercised and functions in the name of and in terms of the
principles of its own rationality, without having to mold or model itself on the
otherwise given rules of justice” (Foucault 2007, 339). As, amongst others, it “acts
as a technology of the future, concentrating on practices of prevention that lie
beyond the codified criminal laws regulating the prosecution of offenders” (Opitz
2010, 107). Preventionism is an operation based on statistical knowledge for
the identification of future crimes and ‘dangerous behaviors’. The ‘troublemaker
database’ is a preventionist technology in that sense. By differentiating between
acceptable and unacceptable normalities in the statistical sense, technologies of
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prevention are invoked to identify subgroups of the population as causes to act
upon only potentially occurring events. The problem of the factual arrival of
an event is epistemically overwritten by its prediction and its algorithmically
evaluated probability.
Preventionism invested with algorithmic operations on data sets replace the
factual and the unwritten future events by claiming knowledge about the future.
They prescribe the future, produce actions in the present based on this pre-
scription and thus intervene into a present without a factual reason. They alter
possible events in the future. The pursuit of life is structured along pre-emptive
measures, generated by calculations on the doppelga¨nger, as “[t]races rather than
traditions are what connects body with places” (Lyon 2001, 19).
Ricardo Dominguez emphasizes relationality as the trajectory of commodity
surveillance.
The data body has now become not just important in its singularity,
but in its relationality. I think that dataveillance is part of evaluation
and acknowledgment that the individual is only a value in relation to
a larger database. It is a database of relationality to the commodity,
to the informatic. That is the zone of what tweets you look at, what
tweets you don’t. And also this question of friendship. This is a loose
term for social relationality. Those then become the markers of this new
2.0 economy, which will then either be one of filtration through kind of
internal commodity surveillance, the commodity itself surveils you.
Dominguez / San Diego
And in the same sense, but more in relation to activism and surveillance, Devin
Theriot-Orr states:
I think the government is actually fairly smart and they can identify
services people are using. And there are lots of moles and infiltrators
and people who are dressing as activists who are not really activists.
So, if I were in the government I would say: we need to be on that. But
in terms of threat models to us: relational dataveillance is the biggest.
Theriot-Orr / Seattle
This points toward the discussion of data derivates that Louise Amoore pro-
posed on the e-border systems that are being deployed in the UK: “a risk based
system that deploys processes of data mining and analytics in order to derive a
risk score or flag for individuals entering or exiting the UK” (2011, 25). At the
core of such system governs a calculus of relationality that has data derivatives as
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its objects. The point is that derivatives are a specific abstraction, “that is based
precisely on an absence, on what is not known, on the very basis of uncertainty”
such that
the processes of data integration, mining and analytics draw into as-
sociation an amalgam of disaggregated data, inferring across the gaps
to derive a lively and alert new form of data derivative – a flag, map
or score that will go on to live and act in the world. (Amoore 2011,
27)
In a parallelism to financial derivates, these data derivates are forms of corre-
lation which are not centered “on who we are, nor even on what our data says
about us, but on what can be imagined and inferred about who we might be –
on our very proclivities and potentialities” (Amoore 2011, 28). Data derivatives
thus make data actionable as projections. Just “[l]ike filmic projection, the gaps
between underlying data items are precisely what makes projected future of the
data derivative possible.” (Amoore 2011, 29)
This changes how decisions are made. In the case of the e-border program:
Where the association rules of a piece of software code infer ‘who’s
coming into the country’ and ‘why they’re coming’, they release into
the world a data derivative that intervenes retroactively in order to
have already decided the event. (Amoore 2011, 30)
Data derivatives thus are an abstraction from database entries, which operate
on a pre-emptive calculus of risk that use the concrete flecks for assignments of
the future. The data entries themselves serve as “a set of relations from which
the derivative can be written”(Amoore 2011, 37). By this, “specific temporalities
and norms of algorithmic techniques [...] rule out, render invisible, other potential
futures”(Amoore 2011, 38).
In a note sent out to the Police Cooperation Working Party of the EU on 27
February 2009 by the Council Presidency, an interesting proposal of such neo-
sovereign measures flashes up:
The German delegation then made an extraordinary proposal that
Member States should be allowed to ‘flag’ alerts on violent trouble-
makers even if: such alerts were incompatible with national law, be-
cause when there was a ‘hit’ the action taken would be in the re-
questing Member State – not in the Member State which lodged the
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data. This is saying that in a Member State where there is no legal
concept of a ‘violent troublemaker’ the police collect information and
intelligence on ‘violent troublemakers’ and put this onto the SIS then
allow the two Member States who have laws on ‘violent troublemak-
ers’ to access it and use it to take action (possible coercive) against
the individual(s). (Bunyan 2009)5
Although the German proposal was rejected, it shows the mentality vis-a`-vis law-
ful action in the control and surveillance discourse: here the idea is to stretch
the operational field of a database into territories, where this database is illegal.
As the place of action would be within the legal territory of this database, the
executive part as such would be lawful.
Sovereign power as the juridical and executive arm of the state, just as gov-
ernmentality, is under constant reconfiguration and pressure, because, like any
political technology as a semiotic-material conglomeration, it answers to effects
of governmental rule and problematizes it. “[P]roblematizing the security of self-
regulating spheres marks the tipping-point that makes it possible to navigate
the paradoxical relation of non-intervention and intervention within liberal rule.”
(Opitz 2010, 98) For the condition of the present sovereignty, one can observe the
effects of these operation where subjectivities that are predicted to be not gov-
ernmentizable can be excluded, expelled, tortured, denied the rule of law, denied
the principle of habeas corpus and many other phenomena that have emerged in
the recent years, often in the rhetorical combination with the ‘war on terror’. The
other modality of this neo-sovereignty is to define spheres of practice, which work
only on parts of the subject’s freedom, such as limitation of free movement.
The screening of the population via large databases is a technology of securi-
tization that operates in the logic of governmentality, as it takes the population
as its statistical base for knowledge production. By way of a change of modality
though, here illiberality is the outcome: the application of apparatuses of secu-
rity, as programs for the production of a milieu of circulation, can be rendered
instrumental for illiberality. Neo-sovereignty employs these technologies for the
production of illiberality, to shutdown circulation for those identified beyond the
threshold. This at the same time is an immanence and an excess of liberal rule:
the articulation of control, which supplements the apparatuses of security. There-
5 The two only member states that currently have such laws are Germany and Denmark.
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fore the ‘neo’ or new modality of sovereignty. It is molded into the liberal paradox
itself.
Also this is a difference to disciplinary power, which works on the deviant
subject on the level of the single, concrete individual, not deploying statistical
episteme for the production of its target.
After this consideration of the actualization of sovereignty in neo-liberal so-
cieties, what it targets (the possible threat) and by which means (production
of the doppelga¨nger), what it answers to (governmental freedom) and what its
regime of truth is (the database and algorithmicity), I will now return to the
three before mentioned interventions into mobile media’s circulation of signs: the
socially discriminated (registration of SIM cards), the spatial (blocking of cells),
and the temporal (data retention). The data retention discussion will be by far
the longest of the three, as it relates in many ways to the larger subject of con-
temporary surveillance.
7.3 Registration of SIM Cards
They are putting a name and face to every mobile phone. From the
government point of view to prevent frauds, mainly blackmailing. But
in fact regarding mobile phones it is about political control so they can
know where someone is, like with GPS.
Alpha / Mexico City
The mandatory registration of SIM cards for pre-paid phones after 9/11 is in
many countries generally invoked as an anti-terror ‘tool’.
This law intends to get information about every person that uses a
phone. When you buy a phone or make a contract, you have to give
your adress, what you need it for, give documents about your adress,
birth certificate. A lot of information that you need to give to the
private companies. These companies need to save this informations.
And they can save all conversations from mobile phones. So if the
police wants information, the companies have to pass it to them. This
law has passed in February this year. In necessary cases, the companies
can record phone calls. This is the national registry of cellular phone
users. The government says they do this to protect the population, but
it is about control.
Olinca / Mexico City
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This registration scheme, in the first instance, is a means of knowledge pro-
duction; not as a statistical tool (although applications are possible) on the pop-
ulation, but rather a classic index, a scheme to produce a legitimacy of mobile
phone subscriptions. Whereas prior to such schemes, anyone at any age could
obtain any number of SIM cards, the administrative scheme, for the first time,
introduces the possibilities to rule on the legitimacy.
But already the invocation of such a scheme excludes parts of the population.
It is a means of social sorting, because documents have to be provided. The
necessity to provide accepted, valid and legal documents excludes all refugees
and migrants without proper documents in the first place, but as well poorer
parts of the population, like street dwellers.
It was easy to get a mobile chip, but now you have to register. This is a
also for opening bank accounts and landlines, where you have to produce
all kinds of documents. So, you have to produce different documents
for different purposes. The permanent account number for tax payer is
okay for opening a bank account, but not for a phone registration. It is
also a measure against marginalized people, as the mobile phone acted
as an address, he had a number and could place stickers, but now it
has become difficult as you have to produce a proof of residence. This
is pre-Mumbay terror attacks, it is from the Delhi parliament attack in
2007.
Kumar / Delhi
Connecting the access to mobile phones to ordered residency is a highly artificial
measure, contradicting the very nature of mobile media, as the empowering part
of mobile media is precisely its independence from locality.6 The trajectory is
a correlation between registered citizens, invested with rights, and mobile media
use. As such it is an re-instantiation of the sovereign-governed relation in a field
that in its historic roll out was a society-homo economicus relation. That the
state and bureaucratic institutions now inscribes themselves into this field shifts,
the mobile media regime from solely economical factors to that of citizenry, or at
least residency. By differentiating and discriminating the population by criteria
as proper documents, it targets at social segregation by rule.
Mobile phones is a most fundamental thing, because when you do an
occupation, there are no landlines. But you need support on different
levels: political, every day, food. A land occupation is very precarious.
6 In contrast to a registration for landlines.
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When you do an occupation you need to build a lot of networks to
sustain the occupation on all different levels. The only way to do that
is via mobile phones.
Ferna˜o / Sa˜o Paulo
The technique itself re-enacts not only a segregation along social factors, but
can as well be understood as a translation of borders on a transversal level into the
interior of a country: a correlation of spacial borders to communication borders.7
The second illiberal prospect of mandatory registration shows some parallels
to data retention, as in addition to social sorting it produces the possibility of
illiberalization by setting up an agglomerated database which connects SIM card
data and personal data. The linking of these two distinct data sets provides firstly
a factual identity between the device and its user. Practices such as lending it
to friends for making a call or sharing one device within a community are being
delegitimized, they provoke irritation to this rule.
Txtpower has been opposing the registration of SIM cards, here in the
Philippines you can buy them still anonymously. Our members fear the
possibilty having our data compiled by the government. That could lead
to surveillance. There were campaigns, as well as against the national
ID system.
Eder / Manila
Prepaid Sim cards outnumber postpaid cards internationally by far.
The prepaid is dominant, 95 to 99%. It gives a certain level of anonymity,
especially in the current situation where human rights are deterriorat-
ing.
Alegre / Manila
Due to the unavailability of banking accounts for the majority of the world’s
population, cash paid telephony was a necessary condition for the huge success of
mobile phone use in poorer regions. In fact, without unregistered prepaid cards,
mobile phones would not play the communication role it is actually playing today
on a global scale. It is a seldom observed historical process to diminish the user
base of a technology after its massive roll out by inventing measures that exclude
many from its use. The prospects are high that this anti-liberal rollback produces
frictions with governmental rule, that may render them ineffective.
7 Some countries, e.g. Turkey, let foreign SIM cards function only for a limited time.
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Additionally, it criss-crosses mobile payment strategies. To be able to use the
mobile phone for the transfer of small amounts of money was an answer to the
lack of access to banking accounts for large parts of the population. One of the
reason banking accounts were inaccessible was lack of proper documents, most
importantly of residence. When the mobile phone could bridge this lack, as it
would be used as a mobile residency, a sort of mobile society by registration of
SIM cards gets rebound to a territory of a sovereignty. In this sense, this measure
is pure sovereignty: reterritorialzing a liberalized scheme, invoking a territory.
7.4 Blocking of Communication
There were many efforts to smuggle cell phones into the house of the
Chief Justice during his house arrest. And then they just set up phone
jammers around his house. In that sense, there was active jamming.
Theriot-Orr / Seattle
Mobile media invokes governmentalization of the population. The blocking of
communications then interrupts governmental rule by policing. As Opitz notes,
“the police is a limit-figure actualizing a sovereign relation: it is a spectral force
that contaminates the law in mundane governmental practice” (2010, 107), a
practice, which only post-factum is subject of juridical inquiry, if at all.
To block contents on the internet has become a usual practice for regimes. It
might be drastic, as in China, or as in Bangladesh, as Swapan reports:
The government announced last week that 84 porn websites will be
blocked, means that it will be investigated. They are surveilling and
finally notice this. There is a blog in bangla that was blocked, because
it published a picture of a war criminal and the blogger was blocked. It
could be accessed from outside the country. YouTube was blocked last
month. A talk between politicians was put there. People got to know
because of the blocking. I talked to the president of the ISP associations
and he said they are blocking, filtering, because the government tells us.
There are also sort of house to house raids. One blogger was arrested,
beaten severly. He left the countries and now lives in Sweden. Because
of the expression of his political views. So, there is much more than we
know happening.
Swapan / Dhaka, Bangladesh
The limitation of access to website is a common topic in the discourse of freedom
of speech. Less known is the political technology of blocking mobile cells, single
phones, or segments of a network.
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It is hard to analyze the reasons for suspicious symptoms of mobile phones:
there might be network problems in general, or other unintended ruptures. Fran-
cisco from Mexico City tells about different effects that he identifies with blocking
communications.
When we ring a phone, it sounds busy, and the next time it goes
through. They also block certain numbers, from my phone I can not
contact specific numbers, another thing, the phone does not ring for
hours and says that it is out of the area of coverage when it is inside.
In regard to messages, one thing is that when I send messages, it says
it is not sent, but the other person received it and the other way round.
Sometimes it says it was sent, but it never reached the recipient, also
message sometimes take two or three hours to reach.
Francisco / Mexico City
Whether this is intended or not remains opaque. But as many activists re-
ported about similar problems, one might accept the fact that targeted blocking
of communication is a reality for some activists.
In this section I want to focus on communication blockage that does not target
a specific phone, but a specific location during protests and demonstrations, such
as what Hamid Zaman refers to.8
At other times what happened was that the entire phone system would
be jammed for a few hours, we couldn’t send messages or even call
people. When something big would happen they didn’t want the infor-
mation to get out. I think several times for a few hours the networks
were blocked
Hamid Zaman / Lahore
The BART Case
To study mobile network shutdowns one does not need to look at Pakistan or
Egypt. San Francisco had a similar case. Here, a police-sovereign intervention of
this kind does not necessarily need to be invoked by police as such, as the case of
the metropolitan transit system in the San Francisco Bay area, known as BART,
shows.
On July 3, 2011 a transit police officer shot a man on the premises of BART9,
8 Here, he reports about one incident during a manifestation in Lahore.
9 “Man shot to death by BART officer identified”, Kevin Fagan, San Francisco
Chronicle, 8 July 2011, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/07/07/
BA9U1K7O2C.DTL (accessed 4 March 2012).
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which spurred protests. Some of which where planned online, so that “BART
officials decided to disable communications by powering down the mobile service
repeaters/microcells and the Wi-Fi routers in order to inhibit this planned on-line
coordination. The protest never happened, but all transit users suffered from the
loss of connectivity.”10 This shutdown of communications was criticized widely,
amongst others by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF). BART claimed that there had been a threat to public
safety, thus allowing them to shutdown connections. At that time, BART did not
have a policy for such an operation. A policy was only introduced after the fact.
The availability of mobile communication in the metropolitan transport system
was introduced after 9/11 “in response to popular demand from BART riders who
saw that New Yorkers had found cell phones to be invaluable to communicating
with authorities and loved ones in the midst of city-wide confusion.”11
In the BART case clearly “a form of government follows the logic of police if
it transcends the law by applying it. In the name of public order and security
the law is violated and, through this act, reestablished” (Opitz 2010, 107). The
reestablishment in the BART case was disputed by Civil Liberties Groups, which
led to a policy that made the suspension of communication legal for severe cases of
threats to public order. When such a situation appears, remains opaque. Protests
by their very nature try to disturb public order as a means to gain momentum
and public attention.
Police Interventions and Mobile Phone Blocking
Activists in general, during street struggles for social justice, or even in the prepa-
ration and organization of those, regularly face a situation, that is generically
referred to as a “police state”. Whereas “police” refers to very different entities
and different kinds, such as undercover, anti-terror units or intelligence units, de-
pending on the ‘tradition’ of sovereign rule in each specific area and the situation.
The logic itself though remains the same: a limit-figure enters the arena in a
different mode of relation towards the population, a mode of temporal, situation-
10 “Statement on San Francisco BART cellphone service shutdown”, EFF Austin, http:
//effaustin.org/2011/08/statement-on-san-francisco-bart-cellphone-service-shutdown/
(accessed 4 March 2012).
11 “Want Public Safety? Don’t Disable Cell Phones”, Eva Galperin (EFF), https://www.eff.
org/deeplinks/2011/08/want-public-safety-dont-disable-cell-phones (accessed 4 March
2012).
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bound sovereignty, which utilizes force and counter-communications means. These
operations are often not performed on the grounds of lawful activity. Activists in
such situations have no other option but to run a juridical case against the police
activities later on (and often win). The situation itself, though, is contaminated
via sovereign rule and the right of public gatherings and free speech repressed.
Blocking of mobile communications is a tactical measure to weaken the activist’s
potential of orderly collective actions. Mobile media seen from this angle high-
lights the costs of its use for activists: once integrated into the activist’s agency,
its unusability produces a lack that cannot be refilled ad-hoc.
Your are sitting down and police surrounds you, they are not seeing
you are texting. Before they take you with them you at least send a
message out. And that has helped us. It happened just one week ago.
We were at the landfill and a gang of Ghundars, Hooligans, they are
bought by the city authorities to basically surround us and beat us up,
were brought in to attack us. And we were working there with the
communities who are affected by the pollution. So the only thing I
could do was text and the text helped to get a lot of the press involved
so fast, that the press started to call senior authorities and the senior
authorities rushed in. So, it protected us to text.
Saldanha / Bangalore
In a recent and very singular comparative case analysis of the occasions in which
regimes disconnected infrastructures at large, the authors “demonstrate the im-
portance of understanding how information technologies have a role in political
responses and counter-insurgency tactics of many kinds of regimes” (Howard,
Agarwal, and Hussain 2011, 221), as it shows that “that there are a range of oc-
casions in which state power over digital networks is noticeably strong” although
turning off the networks in Egypt drew out the protesters to the streets (Howard
et al. 2011, 220), which demonstrates very drastically the failing of rule. While
their study remains a bit unclear12, it generally shows that almost all kinds of
state interference with digital networks happen in formal democracies as in so
called authoritarian or repressive regimes alike. This underlines that the differen-
tiation between different kinds of regimes for a study of governmentality at least,
is not that important on the level of formal rule.
The point here is: a political technology is temporarily annihilated in the stage
of neo-sovereign rule. But this does not mean it stops having a function. The
12 To count the 1995 blocking of ISPs in Germany amongst state interference in public access
to social media calls for a more precise distinction of digital media types.
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sudden breakdown of a resource which is deeply integrated into the activists’
practice targets the very agency of protest partakers. Additionally, it isolated
them, as it becomes hard to contact lawyers or medical aid.
Since WTO 2005 in Hong Kong, lots of my friends always suspect that
our mobile phones have been surveilled for many years already. Because
if something happened, people gathered to protest or assembly on the
street, our phones were cut off suddenly. Of course we hardly have
evidence that our phones have been surveilled.
Freddie / Hong Kong
7.5 Data Retention as Neo-Sovereign Data Produc-
tion
“The biggest use of wiretapping tools is not actually the capture of conversation
but something that is not really wiretapping at all: the capture of transactional
information.” (Landau 2010, 99) Susan Landau opens the theme by pointing to
the ambivalent status of data retention: not wiretapping, but done with such
tools.
The European Union Directive on Data Retention,13 though less than 10 pages
long, is invested with considerable authority. It directs the member states to
pass a law compelling each provider of telecommunications services to retain
traffic/location data for at least the past six, and at most, the last 24 months.
As stated in the first sentence of Article 1:
This Directive aims to harmonise Member States’ provisions concern-
ing the obligations of the providers of publicly available electronic
communications services or of public communications networks with
respect to the retention of certain data which are generated or pro-
cessed by them, in order to ensure that the data are available for
the purpose of the investigation, detection, and prosecution of serious
crime, as defined by each Member State in its national law. (European
Commission 2006, 56)
13 European Union Directive 2006/24/EC of March 2006 on the retention of data generated
or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communica-
tions services or of public communication networks and amending directive 2002/58/EC,
hereafter: 2006/24/EC.
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“Certain” data here means traffic/location data, and as defined here, is data
generated by or during an act of telecommunications with a mobile phone, a
landline, or via the Internet, minus the “content.” These inquiries around data
ask who, when, where, with whom, how long, and so forth — but do not ask
about the nature of the communication. The data generated during unsuccessful
acts of telecommunication is also similarly analyzed.
To protect the secrecy, people are encouraged to use the telephone. The
email is written down, so it is very easy to be surveilled, but voice phone
is only caught by wiretapping, which is rare.
Yasuda / Tokyo
To “harmonize” means to implement technical standards of retention, and to
do so for data access from anywhere in the EU.14 The data one profiler gets from
a member country shall technically be compatible with the data she obtains from
any other member state. Thus, corporations that provide such technologies are
forced to engage in standardization and interoperability.
Unquestionably, the directive rests on a differentiation between traffic/location
data and content data. The retention of all data generated during an act of
telecommunication assumedly does not fit with directive 2002/58/EC on data
processing and privacy of 12 July 2002, and other fundamental human rights.15
This differentiation between data that contains the structural components of
communication and data that relates to content is, first of all, technically inspired,
and thus indicates the possibility that the directive is produced with this technical
differentiation in mind. Traffic data consists only of the information needed to
technically initiate, sustain, and terminate an act of communication.
The relevant data is divided into the following subcategories:
• data necessary to trace and identify the source of a communication;
14 It is worth mentioning that this directive has passed as a so-called First Pillar directive using
the single market power of the European Union, and not as a Third Pillar directive pursuant
to the Union’s power fighting crimes. “Once the choice was made to go ahead with the
Directive as a First Pillar initiative, the Commission and the Council took the position that,
legally speaking, the Directive could not regulate police access to communications data.
Anything having to do with the police was strictly Third Pillar.” (Bignami 2007, 12)
15 If the actual implementation does so, and if it complies with national laws on privacy, is
not of concern here, and neither is the discourse on data retention and citizen rights. For
a historical discussion of data retention in Europe and Canada, see Warner 2005.
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• data necessary to identify the destination of a communication;
• data necessary to identify the date, time, and duration of a communication;
• data necessary to identify the type of communication;
• data necessary to identify the users’ communication equipment or what pur-
ports to be their equipment; and
• data necessary to identify the location of mobile communication equipment.
The term traffic data itself is problematic here. Article 6, sentence 2, of the
directive states: “No data revealing the content of the communication may be
retained pursuant to this directive.” But the person calling the crisis line is not
ordering pizza. There are undeniably semantic elements in the mass of so-called
traffic data. Data identifying the person calling the crisis line unavoidably reveals
content by virtue of the transaction data itself.
Data retention, as laid out by the European Union in its directive
2006/24/EC, seen from its angle of how it works, can be divided into two parts:
first, the collection of transactional communication data of the whole popula-
tion. Second, when such data becomes operational within police or secret service
investigations.
Data retention is a measure that is invoked without targeting concrete persons.
Thus it is a strategic surveillance scheme, not an ad-hoc, tactical one, like the
deployment of IMSI catchers.16
I have argued in Leistert (2008), that data retention of meta data changes
the ‘ontological’ state of such data: in the first place this data is ephemeral
and a necessity for tele-communications: it is operational data. By storing it,
operational, ephemeral data ontologically changes into second order information
as it now provides access to the history of telecommunication of individuals and
networks of people.
Retaining traffic data shifts the data regime from machinic to human, from
operational addressing to representational semantics. Computers process data
regardless of its meaning, as long as it is computable. Whereas human beings
16 IMSI catchers are tools that simulate a cell. The mobile logs into this trap, and connects
through the catcher to the real network. All communication to and from the phone then
can be tapped with the catcher. Why this is possible, see section 9.1.
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‘process’ symbols regardless of their technical viability, as long as they are mean-
ingful. These two distinct operational modes are synthesized here as data from
one mode is fed into the circuits of the other.
While transaction generated data is generated during a telecommunication act,
its signification outside the processing computers that belong to the telecommu-
nications infrastructure itself is produced by its retention, via standardized access
and, later, its reference to people’s names.
By retaining the data for the purpose of crime investigation, a significant shift
transforms the prior technically necessary data into data that now has a meaning
for humans, and so is strictly speaking content data. The process of retention
itself inherently supports the transformation of data. Now, it is archived on
some dedicated storage media in a dedicated storage form, easily accessible and
search-able.
Taking this shift seriously, one may speak here of new data and reject the notion
of the common identity of traffic data and retained data. The retained data has
no computational function anymore, but it is transformed into the realm of the
symbolic: It now represents the movements and telecommunication acts of people
whereas previously it was not placed in the register of representation at all.
For the shelter we don’t use mobile phones or landline. The shelter is
a secret place, so the meta data itself is a problem.
Raj and Kannan / Bangalore
As the traffic data is produced automatically by the communications technology
itself as a working necessity, the production of the profiler’s representational data
is done via copying transaction generated data into a database.
The police is trying to understand the organisations, e.g. which group
is led by whom. And that this group is close to this group. So they are
mapping the whole thing. The contents of email is not so important,
but it is much more interesting for them who is communicating with
whom.
Yasuda / Tokyo
This transformation of traffic and location data into content or representational
data cannot be described within the logic of the act of communication itself, as
this act is outperformed by machinic operations. The database containing former
meta data is a newly generated object, produced by specific algorithmic operations
and strategic settings.
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From a first view, this is in accordance with technologies of liberal rule, as
“knowing an object in such a way that it can be governed [...] requires the
invention of procedures of notation, ways of collection and presenting statistics,
the transportation of these to centers where calculations and judgments can be
made” (Miller and Rose 2008, 30). By way of collecting the meta-data of the
population, an object is made intelligible. In fact, it is produced. Data retention
can be seen as a productive endeavor, it not only allows access to transactional
communication data, but first of all, by intervening in the temporality of meta-
data, it makes it persist in time. Data retention thus is data production. It
harvests this data. Such cases, where data that is used for other purposes than
its initial use is called function creep. “[I]nformation gathered for one purpose
can easily be reconfigured for other uses, thanks to the ease of copying, storing,
searching, and transporting digital data” (Andrejevic 2007, 176; see also Winner
1977). In the case of data retention, the specificity of this function creep is that
the data initially was not even stored. In that sense, the process maybe better
termed “production creep”.
You see the impossibility that this data is used for anything reasonable.
London is one of the cities with the highest crime rate in Europe. The
means of the surveillance are mainly political, not practical, there were
lots of weird examples of surveillance when lots of the councils used the
terrorism act to use cameras to track pupils who didn’t go to school.
Startx / London
One as well should remember a general aspect of large technological material-
izations, as they
produce unexpected problems, are utilized for their own ends by those
who are supposed merely to operate them, are hampered by under-
funding, professional rivalries and the impossibility of producing the
technical conditions that would make them work – reliable statistics,
efficient communication systems, clear lines of command. (Miller and
Rose 2008, 71)
In a broader context, Lyon refers to deregulation as it
is contributing to the blurring of boundaries between sectors that han-
dle personal data. The technological availability factor works with not
only the desire of government and commercial corporations to increase
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their data handling scope and efficiency, but with the devolution of
government data processing to private organizations. (Lyon 2001, 51)
While this might mean that the systems do not work with the effectiveness
the policy makers have been looking for (in regard to the harmonization pillar),
a function creep might occur at many places before this data is transferred to
possible second use databases: 27 member states offer their police forces, se-
cret services and other agencies access to a distributed data base ecology, which
is administered by the telecommunication providers themselves – from Spain to
Romania and from Finland to Cyprus.
For Mexico, Blax reports about the common problem of a function creep of
data intercepted by surveillance:
Fraud is the most common use of surveillance in Mexico. There is
a whole industry of corrupt buerocrats, banks, and others that collect
your data and try to get money by doing fraud. Up to simulating the
voice of some of your relatives that then calls you and ask for money.
Blax / Oaxaca (Mx)
I was told similar stories in many other countries. The opaque collection of
personal data and data linking to persons empowers a diversity of legal and illegal
activities. Access to the data collections will never be controlled in such a way
that function creep becomes unlikely.
First Effect: Disciplining Users via Fear
The scheme already has direct effects on the level of retention/production, without
that the data is used for anything: specific groups of professionals, like journalists,
priests, and lawyers, whose work depends on confidentiality to their clients, have
expressed their concerns as they fear their work will be influenced, or even made
impossible, if they can no longer provide confidentiality.17 For a technology that
operates within a governmental society, this is a problem, as it must not intervene
into the economic activities of the subjects (for example the business of being a
lawyer).
In general, cautious individuals may change their communication behaviors,
may stop communicating with real or imagined, current or future targets of
surveillance. This is another level of direct intervention where a liberal appa-
ratus of security is rendered into illiberality: the production of fear, up to the
17 On the controversy about data retention in Germany, see Meister (2008).
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point where communication stops. In this field of operation, data retention is part
of disciplinary rule. It prescribes the individual to disintegrate from ‘dangerous’
or ‘suspicious’ subjects. The level of threshold is highly speculative, as the de-
cision to consider someone ‘suspicious’ cannot be made with direct reference to
that person, but through possible intepretations that this person, or better this
person’s digital double, might encounter in the modalities of securitization: a
discipline by imagination of an opaque assessment. The individual needs to make
a risk assessment towards her social network, discriminating amongst her friends
and contacts who might be a risk. The temporality plays a pivotal role: it is
simply pure speculation to anticipate a future investigation into an acquaintance.
“Expertise in all spheres of social practice is redoubled against the background of
a perpetual threat”, Mark Andrejevic writes in his analysis of post-9/11 policy
in the US (2007, 165).
This effect of “generalized chilling” posits “a maybe state. Here, a homogeneous
social body is produced by virtue of what lies outside of it” (Fuller 2007, 146).
Data retention on the level of its basic operation (collecting the data) already
is an invocation of an algorithmic neo-disciplinary rule, although it does not
limit communication as such. Here, it shares a common aspect of surveillance
technologies, the more if they are unsharp, broad, and rather unspecified: a
normalization effect.
Hannelore Bublitz refers to the mechanisms of control as a quantification of con-
trol mechanisms that alter into an automated structure, which leads to a coercion
to adjust to this conformity, that on the level of population “via the homogeniza-
tion, adjustment, and normalization of the plurality of masses provides normality
and security” (2010b, 162; translation O.L.).
In the context of CCTV this has been largely documented and debated. Surveil-
lance and dataveillance have direct effects on behavior of unspecified subjects.
The discipline modality urges the subjectivity to adjust in a self-regulating man-
ner. Normalization here is invoked via the instrument of fear.18 The neo-sovereign
fear is not caused by contents or behavior, but because it oversees the contacts,
the social network. Not actively, but in the sense of the panspectron.
18 Brian Massumi discusses fear as an instrument of rule in the post 9/11 events explicitly
by referring to the code warning system that is ubiquitously present throughout important
public places in the US (2005; see also 2009).
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Second Effect: the Materialized Unspecific Doubt
We are living in a democracy. But who knows about tomorrow?
Alface / Sa˜o Paulo
Understanding data retention as a technology of illiberality within the general
liberal scheme of mobile media or internet communication marks its specificity:
data retention does not block communication flows of the population. It does
not disturb productivity and circulation in the course of its operation. Much
more, it takes advantage of the flow of signs initiated by liberal rule. But while
data retention works on the whole population by default, it invokes a different
relation towards the population than liberal rule: the population now returns as
a risk. In a sense, data retention is the materialized doubt about civil society
as self-regulating. Illiberal governmentality invokes securitization, to secure its
apparatuses of security. As Andrejevic in the context of the Total Information
Awareness Office explains, and I argue the same can be said in terms of EU data
retention,
the data gathering process is a fishing expedition, designed to generate
suspects by sifting through the data and identifying potentially high-
risk individuals. Data gathered about the rest of the populace is
essential to the process: it helps set a baseline pattern of behavior
for investigators, one from which any evidence of deviance triggers
suspicion and further investigation. (Andrejevic 2007, 177)
It opens the possibility of statistical analysis of communication in regard to
differentiated normalities, as it offers the proliferation of social groups. To be
able to differentiate on a statistical level, i.e. to discriminate subsets, data reten-
tion provides necessary elements for neo-sovereign rule: based on patterns that
are algorithmically produced, the ground is laid for the machinic production of
suspects. The axis this algorithmicity works on is temporal, as traffic data is
collected over time. Of course, locational data is collected as well. Here the des-
ignated surveillance space is the European Union. This is rather natural, as it is
an EU directive. But the specification of the temporality needs to be addressed
by the directive specifically, 6 to 24 months.
As an example of the current realities of this directive, I refer to Poland: the
directive had passed parliament without much public discussion; now recent num-
bers show extreme use of this scheme as “in 2011, Polish authorities requested
users’ traffic data retained by telcos and ISPs over 1.85 million times—half a
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million times more than in 2010.” This figure can be seen as an effect of almost
unlimited use cases as the
law allows authorities to use the retained data in an almost limitless
range of scenarios, including petty civil offenses and minor criminal in-
vestigations. Moreover, Polish authorities—ranging from law enforce-
ment to intelligence agencies—can access the retained data without
independent oversight and at no cost. Rather than require authoriza-
tion from an independent judge, the law permits access to the data
through a simple written or oral request authorized by the head of
the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Polish intelligence agency
on anticorruption.19
It is this number, 1.85 million requests, which signifies the qualitative leap of
this technology. Although one instance remains the single user or surveilled cit-
izen, that, for whatever reasons, triggered a request. The other instance, and
this is both connected to the first and points way beyond, realizes itself within
1.85 million requests. This sea of relational data about who communicates with
whom equals other algorithmic technologies of rule, such as the troublemaker
database, in one trajectory: it provides the realities of algorithmic performative
neo-sovereign rule. It is this data that produces reality from which individuals
are deduced in the first place. Not a dragnet investigation in the strict sense, the
operations that are rationalizable by data retention still provide a new episteme
of rule. Such “an informational space is inherently immersive, excessive, and
dynamic: one cannot simply observe it, but becomes almost unwittingly over-
powered by it.” Terranova writes about the informational milieu which she sees
as the base of politics in the information age. And she continues: “it is not so
much a three-dimensional, perspectival space where subjects carry out actions
and relate to each other, but a field of displacements, mutations and movements
that do not support the actions of a subject, but decompose it, recompose it and
carry it along” (Terranova 2004, 37).
Data retention thus is a materialization of an excess that is nurtured by (amongst
other technologies) mobile media as it invokes a general mass surveillance media.
19 “European Data Retention Directive At Work: Polish Authorities Abuse Access to Users’
Data” by Katitza Rodriguez, EFF. See https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/04/european-
data-retention-directive-work-polish-authorities-abuse-access-data (accessed 12 April
2012).
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Third Effect: A New Knowledge - Power Axis
“As any intelligence operative knows, communication patterns are full of infor-
mation. From them one can discern organizational structure as well as behavioral
patterns.” (Landau 2010, 89)
IT is the solution. Because we have millions of millions of people. They
have central database and can connect everything. And later do data
mining. It is a solution for the fear they have. If there is a problem, they
can select on who is good and bad by only picking this abstract data,
without reflecting the feeling that you have. You can be happy or angry
when you do something. It is like when you take some information from
people with torture, you can not be sure if that is true, because people
under torture say anything.
Iokese / Madrid
Bowker and Star (1999) have written on classification, standardization and the
naturalization this entails in the follow up. They describe the International Clas-
sification of Diseases, show their genealogy, recount when diseases were included
or excluded from the scheme. In very general terms, they analyze an objecti-
vation of rather contingent decisions by different actors, which the classification
scheme produces. This ‘objectivation’ then serves as a rationality, a truth, that
more actors, institutions, and agents choose to justify their practice. The ICD
scheme serves as a black box: the heterogeneous motives, reasons and interests
that decide on a classification of a disease, or even if some symptoms are a disease,
are becoming invisible. On the other hand, the truth enacted by the scheme is
subject of consideration and is subject to changes, as well. “The shifting ecology
of relationships among the disciplines using the classification will necessarily be
reflected in the scheme itself. [...] these relationships must be resolved to make
a usable form, often obscuring power relationships in the process.” (Bowker and
Star 1999, 70)
While there are many differences between the ICD and a data retention scheme
on communication data, both share the effect that its outcome is indisputable
for the objects/subjects (the patients or the surveilled): both systems produce
a reality. And in both cases, the process of how this match between a record
in the scheme becomes a reality for the object is blurred: there is no informed
consent from users of mobile phones to collect the data. Just like the diagnosis of
a disease, whose existence had to be standardized in a scheme to become true, the
appearance of a user’s location data from 6 months ago provides an incontestable
161
Chapter 7. Limiting Secured Freedom of Mobile Media
truth, while its production is abstract and out of the hands: like an all overseeing
sovereign, data retention tells the truth over a territory and its subjects. Only
that these subjects are made up from flecks of identity.
Data retention thus addresses and reshapes the present of subjects by con-
fronting it with the subject’s past represented in the subjects’ doppelga¨nger. As
such, it algorithmically reverses time by disqualifying the present in favor of the
past. Communication done a year ago can now produce a deviant digital double of
the present. And further, in pre-emptive modulations of police work, predictions
about the future are easily computed.
Once a suspect that authorities are investigating is identified in the pool of data,
all contacts of that suspect are reconstructed over time; patterns, recurrences, lo-
cations, modes of communications. If this pool of data is analyzed within an
§129a investigation (see chapter 8), investigators have the right to claim all con-
tacts as suspects as well. This is where data retention suddenly turns productive
in a different sense as it generates suspects.
Production of statistical anomalies as a foundation of discrimination is the lib-
eral process reversed, as the aim is then not to work on these isolated subgroups
via governmental programs. The isolated subgroups are discriminated only to
be subjected to neo-sovereign measures. Whereas liberal statistical knowledge
genuinely starts from the assumption of a broad field of tolerable deviances as
statistically normal, and then defines a threshold beyond which it assumes prob-
lematic zones, data retention as a program turns this logic upside down. The
data is only and solely used by police and secret services to enhance means of
investigations. The effect is that only a very small proportion of retained data
directly relates to what the directive was introduced for: the fight against the
serious criminal (or better: communication acts that are triggered as relating to
serious crime), while billions of other data sets relate to untargeted communica-
tion acts.20 Data retention supplants the history of the individual “as a socio
20 This huge disproportion has severely alarmed privacy commissioners and civil rights or-
ganizations alike. The former mostly argue that the idea of proportionality is abandoned
with data retention. The latter fear that once the data is there, it will be used for other
projects as well, most prominently to chase users that are suspected by the cultural indus-
try to infringe copyrights. The value of this data collection, of course, is the next issue.
Data mining companies, that already hoard many datasets on large parts of the population
from commercial sources, like ChoicePoint or LexisNexis, would get access to a whole new
knowledge about behaviors and social relation. Just as an example: Blax reports that the
US company ChoicePoint was active in Mexico:
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algorithmic process. Flecks of identity are variables and events. From the per-
spectival scale of such systems, life is a trail of triggers and tokens: date, time,
location, status, speed, choice, amount, accomplices.” (Fuller 2007, 149).
The rationality of the database provides the defining sources to enforce the
liberal paradox of illiberality. It appears independent from personal or subjective
informed knowledge. This data is enacted as true, as a truth, because it provokes
practice and activity which grounds itself within the horizon established by these
political technologies of securitization. One might call this technique of rule
sovereign performative algorithmicity.
7.6 A Panspectron Supplements Liberal Technolo-
gies
The conservative Royal Academy of Engineering, in respect to huge increases of
surveillance practices by the state, addresses necessary conditions for the appli-
cation of surveillance technologies:
Reciprocity between subject and controller is essential to ensure that
data collection and surveillance technologies are used in a fair way.
Reciprocity is the establishment of two-way communication and gen-
uine dialogue, and is key to making surveillance acceptable to citizens.
(Royal Academy of Engineering 2007, 8)
In light of the operations undergoing permanently by a panspectron, such claims
seem anachronistic. Technology has widely left behind panoptical settings, which
on the phenomenal side are often visible (such as CCTV). A parallel in time
remains, though. The panopticon and the panspectron are historically at least
coinciding. Data retention of telecommunications data as well as ‘troublemaker’
databases, or the uncountable commercial data collecting entities, that track
Choicepoint purchased the data of the main photography identi-
fications, it is a electoral card. Choicepoint now has the adresses,
pictures, fingerprint, your signature... That was in 2003.
Blax / Oaxaca (Mx)
The Washington Post reporter Robert O‘Harrow documented in his book “No Place to Hide”
the amalgamation of government and commercial databases in the post-9/11 events in the
USA with a detailed description of the leading companies involved (2006).
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which websites one views and what book one buys, belong to an assemblage
of new emerging forms of control endemic to a networking society. Its power re-
sults from the wide acceptance and usage that electronic communications media
have gained in the last years.
Surveillance of mobile communication is nothing exceptional: data retention
served as an example for mass surveillance in this chapter. To make visible
social networks is one of its powers. Nathan Freitas tells this episode of a more
sophisticated communication circuit, which counters the surveillance on social
networks by constructing a different way to route the connections:
Finally I have done some work with Voip, Asterisk, Sip. Redirects and
call-ins that bounce you to another call, hide your phone number. It
is still emerging. We use that in Beijing. We had seventy people go
there, each person had a different phone number, virtual number that
they would call into. To check in. So you could not say that this person
and this person are calling the same people. I was able to provision 70
different phone numbers in different states and countries. So that no
one can be linked together.
Freitas / NYC
But this is a temporary set up. What remains is that calling someone produces
data far beyond the call. And while the call might be forgotten to have taken
place within a couple of days by the people who have spoken to one another, the
technical infrastructure implemented for data retention ensures that, for up to 24
months, it happened, regardless of whether or not any human being remembers
the cal, because the database does so upon query.
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Mobile Surveillance Media Case Study:
The §129a and the Case of the “Militant
Group” in Germany
We try to make sure the communication between our users is safe and
our server is safe. We try every day to make the system safe. We are
thinking about the importance to be protected against these measures.
The social movement in Mexico are very unprotected. They need to
learn from each other to gain more safety. Because as we can see, the
situation might become worse. In technical perspective a lot of servers
are unprotected, a lot of people use their mobiles without securing it.
People are sending very important information through mobile phones.
Names and places. They think that mobile phones are a very special
media, that no one can see the messages. It is very important I think
to make them conscious about it, a lot of very active people don’t know
anything about it.
Olinca / Mexico City
To provide an account on the contemporary general possibilities and practices of
authorities to investigate and do surveillance tasks with the help of telecommuni-
cation providers, the case of the German “Militante Gruppe” (MG) is insightful.
It offers a perspective on what law enforcement agencies (LEA) in practice do
and how their inner logic perpetuates these operations.
The material shown here originates from preliminary proceedings and had been
delivered to the courts by the investigating authorities themselves. This makes
them highly valuable in a specific sense: usually it is only possible to interpret
symptoms of surveillance or be faced with the consequences, whereas here a docu-
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mented account of such measures is available.1 What conclusions the authorities
drew from this material is not of first interest. Much more central here is what
kind of surveillance had been used, how data had been received, what data was
specifically produced to surveil and so forth. For the subject of cybersurveillance
only technical surveillance aimed at the telecommunication of the accused is rep-
resented here. Left out are all other kinds of surveillance, such as persona or
video camera surveillance, which was also conducted during the period. What is
more, details of eavesdropping operations of phone calls are ommitted. Suffice
to say that all calls to and from the accused’s mobile and fixed-line phones had
been intercepted, as well as those of relatives and friends. The number of those
affected by surveillance operations adds up to more than 200, even though there
were only three suspects.
The primary purpose of presenting this material is to demonstrate the weak-
ness of telecommunication infrastructure with regards to privacy. This example is
illustrative as no legal obstacles prevented the surveilling parties from their work
in any way due to the application of the anti-terror law §129a. These surveillance
operations are presented here on a level of documented evidence and demon-
strate, in a nutshell, the technical possibilities of telecommunication surveillance
unleashed.
In the context of an analytics of government, these practices relate to a neo-
sovereignty that rules from a distance, over infrastructures that governmentality
had laid out before.
8.1 Short Introduction: Section 129 of the German
Criminal Code
Some context is needed beforehand: in Germany, law enforcements’ legal means
for infiltrating, surveying and detaining political opponents after World War II
have been steadily extended since the 1970’s. The most prominent case is §129a
of the criminal code, dealing with terrorist organizations. Its older variant §129
deals with criminal organizations and actually predates the Federal Republic of
Germany. It was extensively used during the Nazi era for the persecution of
imagined or real opponents. Only a few years later, in the 1950s, hundreds of
1 The material documented here is provided by sources that prefer to remain anonymous.
These are extracts of scanned paper pages produced by LEAs. The court reference numbers
are GBA 2 BJs 58/06-2 and ST 45 / ST 14 – 140011/06.
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investigations against alleged communists and activists opposing the rearmament
of West Germany were performed applying this controversial paragraph. Subse-
quently §129a was introduced, covering terrorist organizations in the 1970s, and
after 9/11 §129b was introduced, dealing with foreign terrorist organizations.2
These laws basically strip suspects from every last bit of their (privacy) rights
and have been used effectively by LEAs most frequently to update their knowl-
edge on leftist activists. Hardly any of the numerous §129a investigations made it
to court. More than 95% are silently shut down, often after years of very intense
surveillance.3
The introduction of this paragraph in the 1970s was, amongst other means,
meant to deal with the Red Army Fraction (RAF) and the Revolutionary Cells
(RZ).4 Although these actors now belong to the past, the paragraph has continued
to see numerous applications to investigate leftist or social justice groups.5 The
application of §129(a,b) allows far-reaching surveillance not only of those under
suspicion, but also of those who have been in contact with those under suspicion,
even if only once. As the suspects are commonly engaged in a diversity of political
fields, the application of such an investigation produces a complex reproduction
2 An official English translation of the German criminal code incl. §129 can be found
at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch stgb/englisch stgb.html (accessed 4 March
2012). But the means provided are defined in the code of criminal procedure (Strafprozes-
sordnung (StPO)). Especially StPO §110a (surveillance of telephone and post), §100c
and §163 (long-ongoing observations), §110a, §110c (systematic deploying of undercover
agents and spies), and again §100c (surveillance of acoustics and images inside private
homes) give almost unrestricted powers to LEAs. An English translation of the StPO can be
found at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch stpo/index.html (accessed 4 March
2012).
3 The surveillance conducted under these paragraphs does not always seek to remain unno-
ticed. The suspects thus react to the investigations and provide the LEAs further insights
into their social net. Additionally, suspects reportedly have lost jobs and suffered as well
psychologically from investigations. As such this is highly problematic as this all happens
even before pre-trial confinement.
4 Both groups were using force to achieve political goals, the big difference is that the
RAF, whose founding generation is known as Baader-Meinhof-Group, went underground
whereas the RZ personnel had their normal day job while pursuing RZ activities ‘at night’.
Their genealogy can be traced back to the events of 1968, in part even until the protest
against the rearmament of West-Germany in 1955, which was a big debate at the time.
5 Right-wing groups are very rarely targets of §129(a,b) although violence originating from
right wing groups in Germany, especially against humans, including murder, continues
since Germany’s reunification.
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of the social net of many politically active people, regardless if they themselves
are suspects defined under the investigation or not. Sharing a flat, belonging
to the family or working at the same company is enough to become a target of
extensive surveillance once §129(a,b) is at work.
8.2 The MG Investigations
The MG investigations, into the alleged terrorist group known by these initials,
started in 2001 (with some pre-proceedings by the German secret service since
1998). Amongst the many different allegations were attacks on German military
equipment. The material shown here is from the so called “MG 1” investigation,
which started in 2001 and ended in 2008. Others are still pending, as there
have been numerous different investigations.6 The surveilled had been accused of
forming a terrorist group. None of the accused in this case have been sentenced
and the case has never become a regular court case.7 Additionally, on 11 March
2010, the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) ruled that the entire set of procedures
used by the LEAs in this case (MG1), had been unlawful and that the surveillance
conducted was not appropriate, as there was never enough reasonable suspicion.8
The data collected nonetheless remains in the police archives and has recently
been transferred to the Berlin criminal state police.
In the following passages, some details about the surveillance operations are
explained. They should be seen as examples from a myriad of others. The
documents covering this “MG1” investigation come to thousands.
Retained Meta Data of (Mobile)-Telephony
Figure 8.1 shows a typical request for information [Auskunftsersuchen], which re-
ports call data from 1.10.2006 to 31.3.2007 (only 3.10. to 19.10.2010 is shown here,
6 Details about the cases, their time lines and each investigation are published at http://
einstellung.so36.net (accessed 4 March 2012).
7 The blog of Anna Roth, partner of one suspect in these investigations, Andrej Holm, has
been blogging extensively about her life under total surveillance. Here, details are pub-
lished, partly in English: http://annalist.noblogs.org (accessed 4 March 2012).
8 The rule is online (German only): http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.
de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&sid=
52c1c2b856536c08dab95908724bccfd&nr=52160&pos=0&anz=1 (accessed 4 March
2012).
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but the duration of 5 months is mentioned in the upper left area) from one Mo-
bile Subscriber/Station Integrated Services Digital Network Number (MSISDN).9
Besides the number dialed, other information is printed: Mobile Country Code
(MCC)10 266 refers to Germany, Mobile Network Code (MNC)11 01 refers to
T-Mobile, the Mobile Switching Center (MSC)-ID12 is responsible for the end-
to-end connection, e.g. allowing hand-over requirements during the call. The
cell-ID references the actual cell where the phone was logged in, and on the far
right, geographical positions of this cell-ID are printed. Generally, all telephone
communication meta data to and from the mobile phones of the suspects had
been retained and provided to the authorities. These meta data include, amongst
other rather pure technical parameters, the phone numbers, the IMSI13 (if appli-
cable), duration of call, type of call (it differentiates between service call types),
and the geo-coordinates of the cell where the client was connected. This means
that during any communication over the phone, its geo-coordinates reveal the lo-
cation of the person that used this mobile. From a technical perspective the same
meta data is produced by both, successful and failed calls. Thus, unsuccessful
communication also provide value for the surveillance operations.
Locational Surveillance via Silent SMS
A surveillance tool used very intensely in these investigations by German LEAs
is silent SMS (also referred to as “Ping”). Besides eavesdropping on telephony,
silent SMS was used extensively to identify the person’s location and whether
the mobile phone was switched on or off.14 What is a silent SMS? A silent SMS
9 The MSISDN is a worldwide unique number for calling and use of a mobile phone. Usually,
every mobile set is matched with one number, but sets are present which support more than
one, mostly for different countries. Calling any of these numbers lets the same phone ring.
10 A code defined by the ITU to identify countries of mobile phones. It is a part of the IMSI.
11 A code to uniquely identify a mobile phone operator/carrier using the one of the common
mobile communications standards such as GSM.
12 The MSC is the primary service delivery node for GSM/CDMA, responsible for routing
voice calls and SMS as well as other services. The MSC sets up and releases the end-to-end
connection, handles mobility and hand-over requirements during the call and takes care of
charging and real time prepaid account monitoring.
13 IMSI is the International Mobile Subscriber Identity, a unique number which identifies a
Sim cards. Sim cards often link to the user’s name.
14 The latter usually leads to the assumption that if the accused switched her phone off, she
is suspicious of preparing or committing a crime.
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Figure 8.1: Example of meta data from mobile telephony retained by a telecommunications
provider
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Figure 8.2: The practice of sending silent SMS: “On predefined times (10:00h, 20:00h, 00:00h
- 4:00h) so called “Pings” (silent SMS) are being sent to the accused mobile phone
to evaluate if his phone – as recommended in various leftist scene publication gen-
erally during conspiratorial meetings and during committing a crime – is switched
off and thus hints towards conspiratorial behavior are given. Additionally, the de-
livery of a “ping” allows for identification of the cell, which the phone is logged in.
During observations, additional event-related “pings” have been sent” [Translation
O.L.]).
is sent to a mobile phone to obtain location data, the approximate whereabouts
of the device. A silent SMS does not notify the receiver of its emergence and
contains no content data; it is not perceivable to the user. But as it is an SMS
in the technical sense: it generates meta data, which then provides insights into
the whereabouts of the phone. Figure 8.2 explains one schedule of sending silent
SMS and the LEAs reasons for doing so. The number of silent SMS sent dur-
ing the whole investigation is in the range of tens of thousands. They were all
sent by the authorities themselves to generate connection data, which the LEAs
then requested in the form of an information request from the telecommunication
providers. The delay between request and reception of connection data varied
between one week and one month. Thus, silent SMS is a measure for long term
surveillance.
Figure 8.3 is an evaluation of hourly sent silent SMS to one mobile phone.
IMSI and IMEI
A common practice among activists is to change the SIM Card to obtain a new
number and thus a new profile. Figure 8.4 and figure 8.5 show that both the
SIM card related International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) and the device
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Figure 8.3: Evaluation of silent SMS sent to one mobile phone. “The evaluation of the hourly
sent (since 16.11.2006) PING’s to the mobile phone of XX showed that his phone
had been able to receive SMS generally. Nonetheless there have been time
frames where the sent PING’s did not arrive, which might mean that the phone
has been switched off. In part this can be explained by other surveillance mea-
sures taken. Other unsuccessful deliveries of PING’s cannot be explained until
today. As on the 20.11.2006 from 3:00 AM onwards until 08:16 AM no PING’s
could be delivered. Until now it has not been clarified why the mobile phone has
been switched off during this time” [Translation O.L.].
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Figure 8.4: A precise description of one single call, referencing the address of the public
phone booth that was used, duration of call, cell ID the mobile was logged into,
the geo-coordinates of this cell and the mobile phone’s IMSI and IMEI. “[From this
public phone] the mobile number of XX has been called. The call time was 36
seconds, when the connection started the mobile phone was logged into the cell
with the Cell-ID 65469 at the geo-coordinates 52’29’45 N / 13’25’42 O. IMSI and
IMEI from the called mobile phone were recorded.” [Translation O.L.]
related International Mobile (Station) Equipment Identity (IMEI)15 are trans-
mitted in the network and thus used by the authorities. The Location Area Cell
(LAC) denotes the whereabouts of the phone in a numerical code.
Changing sim cards doesn’t really do anything.
Freitas / NYC
Nathan Freitas’ skeptical view on changing SIM cards as a means to remain
anonymous is confirmed in that the IMEI, which is hard coded into the device, is
harvested by the authorities as well as the IMSI.
Evaluation of one Specific Call Data
Figure 8.6 evaluates one specific call, generated on a special day, on which a
militant action in Berlin took place. It is evaluated (via Google Maps) that the
average travel time from the crime site to the public phone booth, from where the
surveilled mobile phone was called, allows the possibility that the person using
the public phone also committed the crime.
15 IMEI is the International Mobile Station Equipment Identity, a 15-digits long, unique serial
number, which makes it possible to identify any GSM or UMTS client.
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Figure 8.5: IMSI and IMEI are part of the data sets provided by the telco.
Figure 8.6: “During the evaluation of connection data of the mobile phone used by XX and
registered under his name with the call number 0160 / XXXXXX (T-Mobile) it was
discovered that during the night of the crime at 02:38h [from this public phone]
the mobile number of XX has been called. The call time was 21 seconds, when
the connection started the mobile phone was logged into the cell with the Cell-
ID 65469 at the geo-coordinates 52’29’45 N / 13’25’42 O. According to Google
Maps it takes twelve minutes to travel the 6.7 km distance from the crime scene
at Ma¨rkisches Ufer to the public phone at Tegeler Strasse 38. At night time the
travel time should be under the specified twelve minutes.” [Translation O.L.]
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Figure 8.7: PGP-encrypted emails are not readable for the BKA.
Email Interception
As the accused subscribed to numerous of email lists, hundreds to thousands of
emails went straight to the authorities during 2001 and 2008. This is an easy
task for LEA, given the uncomplicated matter of getting access to email accounts
of service providers such as GMX or Yahoo!. Interestingly, as figure 8.7 reveals,
PGP encrypted emails could not be read. The email’s subject of course is plain
text, as well as its meta data. It states: “Four more PGP-encrypted emails have
been found, whose subjects refer to the event in Trier. Nothing can be said about
the contents of these e-mails.”
Cross-referencing of Eavesdropping and Cell Logs
Figure 8.8 shows how both the results of eavesdropping and data about a cell
a mobile phone is logged into are combined to evaluate one situation on one
particular evening. Figure 8.9 states the wide knowledge the surveilling parties
gathered about the suspects’ social network, their activities and what the sister of
one suspect said. Switching off one’s mobile phone is interpreted as conspiratorial
behavior.
The document provided here is actually written to get permission for a prolonga-
tion of the surveillance operations from a judge. With only very few modifications
it has been used over and over again to get these permissions from the same judge
over and over again. It references a combination of eavesdropping on telephone
calls and cell log data (obtained through silent SMS most likely).
8.3 Conclusions from the Documents
People don’t thing about the infrastructure and so dataveillance’ threat
is a threat that you can’t even necessarily imagine unless you spent
a decent amount of time to figure out how the technology actually
functions.
Kahn Gillmor / NYC
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Figure 8.8: Reference to a combination of eavesdropping on telephone calls and cell log data
(obtained through silent SMS most likely). “From eavesdropping operations it is
known that XX as well wanted to come to the pub Alois S. to meet with XX and
XX. This she told XX in a short phone call at 21:03h. According to the evaluation
of cells the mobile phone of XX was logged in, it was logged into the cell Lillie-
Henoch-Street at 23.00h and Lettestreet at 24:00h. Therefore it is reasonable that
XX and XX left the bar together and went to the apartment of XX.” [Translation
O.L.]
Figure 8.9: “Extensive information could be gathered by eavesdropping of telephone about
the contacts and the engagement of the accused in different interrelationships.
Specifically the contacts of the accused amongst themselves via telephone and
email could be proven and multiple personal meetings have been identified. Even
if the contents of the eavesdropping during the time of surveillance did not provide
details about a participation of the accused in the crimes, still, the results from the
eavesdropping operations in relation with the transmission of “Pings” to the mobile
phone of the accused XX and XX showed conspiratorial behavior (switching off
the mobile phone) on the occasion of a meeting of XX and XX on the 22.11.06.
Additionally, due to the joke of the sister of XX, it cannot be excluded that she
either knows about his brother committing such crimes or at least thinks it is pos-
sible.” [Translation O.L.]
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All the example documents given above regarding the surveillance operations
on the suspects point to the infrastructure as the source of interception. The
infrastructure offers a point of interception without much risk of detection. When
communication was encrypted client to client, its contents were secured against
this surveillance scheme, as figure 8.7 showed.
That location information was actively generated by sending a very high number
of silent SMS over a long duration, additionally points to the strategic importance
of the cellular network for LEAs. The location data on the whereabouts of the
suspects provided by the suspect’s mobile phone are sufficiently precise for the
LEAs to capture on an hourly, weekly or monthly basis. In a city like Berlin
mobile phone cells are densely rolled out. Thus, the location data which is as
exact as the functional radius of the cell, is quite precise. The location data
provided with silent SMS and cell log data generates a history of the suspect’s
travel route and whereabouts on an hourly frequency. Once the mobile phone
had been switched off (or the battery was empty), this triggered an alert for
the authorities and these time frames then were considered as a conspiratorial
behavior.
Switching off the phone actually is a common practice of activists to defend
themselves against surveillance.
Regarding mobile phone, if we have any action plan, and if we know the
issue is sensitive or the movement is in a sensitive moment, we would
not explicitely speak about it, and at the meeting, we take out all the
batteries of the mobile phones until the meeting is over.
Freddie / Hong Kong
But this practice directly triggered suspicion, and the LEAs in the documented
case argued that this practice is conspiratorial behavior, in order to get pro-
longations for their surveillance operations from the courts. The judge, appar-
ently, agreed and allowed the authorities to continue with a total surveillance
programme. There are many reasons why a mobile phone does not work. Battery
life is one. Or maybe the reason to switch it off is to have some privacy in the
old fashioned sense: to not get disturbed.
Comparing security considerations of the activists interviewed, and the practice
of the German LEA in the MG investigation show that no real measures, besides
email encryption and switching off phones, are readily available in keeping mobile
communications an effective and secure tool without risking the inherent support
of surveillance operations. The strong accounts provided by meta data about
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the social networks of the suspects (who called whom, and when and where) can
hardly be countered.
I don’t know about other countries, but in Japan the police is a very
strong organisation. They collect everything they can.
Yasuda / Tokyo
The nature of the relationship between resistance to surveillance and the an-
swers of surveillance practice, to these kinds of resistance practices, can be under-
stood as dialectical. Activists use code words, limit mobile phone use and even
use encryption. The surveillance practice thus turns to meta data analysis and
even produces them, as in the case of silent SMS. If resistance goes so far as to
dismiss the use of mobile telephony altogether by switching the phones off, LEAs’
surveillance practice answers by prolonging their surveillance activities with the
argument that it is suspicious if activists switch off their phones even though
there is no reliable evidence of criminal activity.
The relationship of resistance and surveillance can be seen as circular or spiral:
once one side re-empowers itself by technical measures, the other finds new ways
to gather information or better hide their activities. There is a limit here, of
course, which is the loss of agency: in a society that relies on telecommunication,
activism cannot dismiss its use completely. Avoiding or minimizing the use of
mobile phones can inhibit agency; similarly, too many security measures can
hamper the effectiveness of activism.
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9
Necessities for a Trusted Environment of
Telecommunication
Actually, the problem here is mainly the killing of activists and jour-
nalists. The son of a press freedom icon, the leader of the alternative
press during the Marcos years, his son was abducted two or three years
ago and not yet released. It is suspected that he died.
Eder / Manila
Maybe the danger of killing activists can be reduced if appropriate measures are
taken in the way how activists communicate. The technologies of communication
for this purpose need to be hardened, so that the many possible threats can be
made at least made more expensive. This chapter thus explores the possibilities
at hands to secure communication against eavesdropping, and dataveillance in
general. I aim to show that it has become increasingly hard to remain under the
radar as surveillance technologies have caught up to securing measures. Addi-
tionally, in the last years policies have been released which deliberately attack
trustful communications. These neo-sovereign measures, as mentioned in chapter
7, belong to a panspectron which surveils, collects and mines all kinds of data.
Targeted dataveillance has also increased and become a more and more common
tool in the arsenal of tools of LEAs, as chapter 8 has shown. The use of Trojan
software, which agencies install on target hosts, and which report activities and
copy the content of data storage devices, is another prominent case.1
1 Euphemistically called ‘remote forensics’, the intrusion into private computers of surveil-
lance targets by German LEAs has been widely criticized when the Chaos Communication
Club investigated the software. Besides the general question if such means are lawful, it
is unlikely that information gathered by state Trojan software can be used in courts at all,
as it alters the contents of the hard drives itself. Thus, it can only be used for spying. See
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In a book already published in 1998, a time when email and the web started to
take off very quickly, but were still in a nascent state, two well-known scholars of
cryptography, Susan Landau and Whitfield Diffie2 write that:
The potential impact on privacy is profound. Telecommunications are
intrinsically interceptable, and this interceptability has by and large
been enhanced by digital technology. Communications designed to be
sorted and switched by digital computers can be sorted and recorded
by digital computers. Common-channeled signaling, broadcast net-
works, and communication satellites facilitate interception on a grand
scale previously unknown. Laws will not change these facts. (Diffie
and Landau 1998, 226)
If “laws will not change these facts”, maybe technology itself could. Therefore,
a conceptual and in part technical discussion on how electronically mediated
communications can be hardened, i.e. made robust and more trustworthy to
their users, is necessary to investigate this.
Chapter 8 has shown that when privacy rights are outperformed by investigation
means, mobile media turns into surveillance media; it changes its modality. Both
in terms of contents, by machinic or human eavesdropping on the calls and SMS,
but also as a location tracker, which reports the whereabouts of the target. That
agencies go as far as to communicate with the mobile media device themselves,
by sending silent SMS, leads to the assumption that the device is actively used by
two parties, the target and the surveilling party; dual use, one might say. Like the
Trojan software, silent SMS go beyond a passive sniffing: they actively intervene
https://www.ccc.de/en/updates/2011/staatstrojaner (accessed 2 March 2012).
2 Diffie and his colleague Hellman were the first to propose an encryption algorithm where
the encryption and decryption keys are different, so that one can publish the encryption
key and keep the decryption key private. “Diffie and Hellman’s idea is based on complexity:
some mathematical problems are easy to compute but their inverse appears computation-
ally difficult. Integer multiplication and the inverse problem, factoring integers into their
prime factors, seem to be one such pair” (Landau 2010, 45). However, Diffie is most
prominent for the actual realization to establish an encrypted connection without the need
for the parties involved to have shared a secret beforehand. “Anyone can now send you
an encrypted message, and only you can decrypt it. [...] The DH [Diffie-Hellmann, O.L.]
protocol is a real nifty idea. It turns out that two people communicating over an insecure
line can agree on a secret key in such a way that both of them receive the same key without
divulging it to someone who is listening in on their conversation.” (Ferguson and Schneier
2003, 208-209)
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into the devices’ activities. Both thus cross a boundary, which on the one hand
makes them more prone to discovery. By using the company owned infrastructure
for sending SMS, the LEAs are becoming customers. Billing and all other business
procedures apply. The heterogeneous ensemble of telecom providers, a chain of
actors and machines, become part of the process.
On the other hand, both mark a tipping point of liberal rule, that signifies
that the activities of the agencies are taking advantage of a technology of gov-
ernmentality, while they do not interfere with the governmental scheme of mobile
media.
In general, all interviewees expressed their expectations about surveillance clearly
in that basically they would not expect privacy a strong part of their communi-
cation rights anymore.
I think that at a given moment we can be the subjects of surveillance.
Police has the interest and the resources to practice surveillance. And
there has been recently the creation of the cybernetic police on the
federal level. There is a similar entity also in Mexico City. It is also
well known there are private technical teams, hired as mercinaries, to
do these jobs. So, there is also a risk for us to be under surveillance.
Enrique / Mexico City
As there are no machines of liberation, it is decisive not to fall into the trap to
think that secure, trustworthy tele-communications means provide a solution for
many things. This I have tried to show in the previous chapters: that commu-
nication technologies are embedded in a larger set of governmental practices and
different modalities of rule. In this chapter, I do not intend to fall behind these
claims. Nonetheless, I argue, the diminishment of risk to exposure via surveil-
lance means can still facilitate a step towards independence from neo-sovereignty
programs; it can be a way to outperform state measures that use a governmen-
tal technology for sovereign purposes and, finally, reclaim mobile media in an
autonomous, self-governed mode.
The first step then is to discuss software as a product of societal relations,
that both reproduces patterns and trajectories of society, and can be seen as a
sediment of such relations.
Software is Part of Society
This hints towards agency not yet discussed: that the use of technologies goes
hand in hand with the way it is rolled out and designed. Most importantly, the
183
Chapter 9. Necessities for a Trusted Environment of Telecommunication
process of its production, its kinds of production, cannot be excluded from the
use it entails: where the GSM network is in general terms inaccessible to non-
commercial entities, at the same time it provides the most easy point of surveil-
lance. In contrast, the Internet, which is based on open standards and in large
parts open source software and protocols, provides access to tool fabrication for
non-commercial parties, such as the huge open source software community. This
has led to several software solutions that provide privacy and trustworthiness to
its users – of course within limits. Where source code is publicly accessible, it is
open for debate, followed by updates and bug fixing. Transparency in the pro-
duction of communication technologies can thus be seen as a powerful modality of
technology production that encounters the commercial paradigm of closed source:
non-disclosure agreements and many more obstacles make it impossible to review
closed source software.3 This does not necessarily mean that open source software
is always ‘more secure’. But the trajectory of transparency directly transports
security as a matter for the public.
With respect to the power of code as a regulating instance, and execution power
of what a society can and cannot do, Lessig (1999) points to this contested area
and argues that code has become the regulating principle of societies that rely
on networked computers. Code, he argues, can be seen as a new law, the law of
cyberspace. This makes those that produce it, if one follows the analogy, nothing
less than lawmakers. Grassmuck (2002) problematizes as well the order of law
and intellectual property in regard to software and recounts how free and open
software is mostly a collective process that subverts the analog regimes of artificial
scarcity that are applied on commercial, closed source software. He argues that
free and libre open source software, or FLOSS, is a puzzle piece for new societal
relations which aim at an open and public repository of knowledge.
An activist I interviewed in Madrid, who is involved in open source software
production and hacking, refers to the larger frame of software and technology in
this way:
There are always two sides, one is in relation to the external everyday
life world, which is traversed by power structures, commercial agencies.
It is to try to open some room to stop some trends on the streets
that are not fair or: we want social justice, to capture the whole idea.
Social justice is also about interpersonal relationships, not only super
3 In Leistert (2012) I discuss the difference of mobile devices that allow open source software
to run and give access to large parts of their operation system and those, which are sealed
and closed, up to the point that taking out the battery voids the warranty.
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powers. But in particular our goal is to work on the dimension of
technology. Part of the success of the movements is also the technology
in many aspects. When we communicate within an assembly, when we
organize as a network, we always use technologies. Language is a super
power technology. The space in the hacklab is technology as well, not
only bits and keyboards. And when you start thinking that technology
is power, both empowering power, not one that you use to oppress
others, suddenly it gets a dimension that covers almost everything and
be very effective if you are skillful. The intention would be to open free
spaces where people can control their technology and be empowered.
Once we have opened spaces, like free software, we also collaborate and
produce, and in particular inside social movements, in a context that is
already social and political in many other aspects, we contribute with
the technology and the skills we have.
Anonymous2 / Madrid
This shows that in groups, which are already sensitive towards power relations
and provide practices of solidarity, free and open software is not merely seen as
a gift, but as a political tool to change societal relations. This notion will return
in the discussion of self-controlled infrastructure.
Software is a Cultural Artifact
A slightly different approach, one that files software in the register of a cultural
continuum, reintegrating the reified software into a larger process, are code studies.
The programatic lexicon of code studies, edited by Fuller (2008) lists some of
the hegemonic concepts that are realized in software and discusses them from
a cultural studies/humanities perspective as digital objects. Such concepts are
‘algorithm’, ‘pixel’, ’interaction’, or ’function’. “Technologisation of the senses
and structuring of relations by technology is often carried out by naturalized
means; lessening our ability to understand and engage with such changes.” (Fuller
2008, 4). Code or software studies can be understood as an approach to de-
naturalize these means, and make it possible to engage with these changes.4
It depends on how we appropriate technology. If we were using more the
possibility to develop software that would facilitate the empowerment
of communities and that could be very important. The use of free
4 On the relation of performativity, repetition, language and code, see Winkler (2004, 226-
229).
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software and the appropriation of the technology would be responding
to the need of the communities.
Enrique / Mexico City
“Protocol” by Galloway (2004) argues in the same direction: Galloway focuses
on the regime that controls the conditions of information exchange between layers
and entities in a technical network. Less code studies, more digital architecture
studies, he also engages in a discussion about naturalized digital environments.
“Protocol is a technique for achieving voluntary regulation within a contingent
environment.” Galloway (2004, 7) And he specifies “protocol is a distributed
management system that allows control to exits within a heterogeneous material
milieu” Galloway (2004, 8). By tracing its genealogies, objects and actors, he
differentiates a larger field of heterogeneous forces that struggle within the im-
manent regime of protocol management.5
The societal and cultural approaches towards software show that mobile media
as a semiotic-material conglomerate enmeshed in a variety of governmental and
sovereign programs, as an element of rule, relies in part on how it is produced as a
technology in the stricter sense. This black-boxing is part of the power relations
it executes. Software thus can be seen as a thickened, condensed, executable
function that inherits many kinds of amalgamations from fields and areas that
are not easily traceable unless one reads and writes code.
Social Engineering
My concern is that the fights against surveillance in the abstract are
so denatured of their political context that they might not be entirely
convincing.
Kahn Gillmor / NYC
When this thickened powerful tool is in wide use, again cultural and societal
aspects re-inscribe themselves into code, in the way of passwords, that are chosen,
or in more general terms, what it is used for, what it facilitates. This ‘human
factor’, (to look a it from a technocentric perspective) very often remains the
weakest point in terms of security. The two classical reports about “controlling
the human element of security” are the two books presented by former hacker
5 I have discussed protocological power regimes in Leistert (2010), where I specifically refer
to wireless network topologies as sediments of societal relations.
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Mitnick (2002; 2005). Mitnick was sentenced for the intrusion into computer
systems of many different companies. In these books, he describes that his point
of departure in most cases was social engineering: gathering information about,
but most importantly directly from the persons who operated the machines or
had access to them.
In internal discipline we are also concerned about social engineering.
So, we try to avoid gossiping, that may expose sensitive information to
someone maybe listening. And in MTST we had trouble not with big
police but with local city police. So, gossiping may have gone bad and
local police may have made something with something they may have
heard of. And the police used that to sue people in the occupation.
Ferna˜o / Sa˜o Paulo
A lot of what is done with digital communication tools depends on factors that
are external to the machines. This depends, very much, on how it is used and in
what kind of situation. Thus, taking care in many non-technological ways is part
of a ‘good practice’, as Hijuchi from Tokyo states:
When I was abroad, when I cross the borders, surveillance is always a
problem, because I cross borders for political activities. Before I cross
the border, I always prepare many things, contact people. Because I
might be stopped at the border, especially when I prepare things before
crossing the border, it can be a problem. Maybe I go to China next
month to contact activists there. So I have to care a lot about this.
In the recent years surveillance of the so called civil society is getting
stronger here. E.g. the surveillance of many communities.
Hijuchi / Tokyo
Globalized Technologies Allow for Generalizations
The remaining part of this chapter’s discussion is about technical concepts that
enhance different aspects of privacy. While it remains open how applicable these
concepts are in concrete situations, this discussion aims at providing a glimpse
into the the techno-theoretical limits of both; surveillance and security.6
As this chapter does not focus on the very specific uses and practices, it is
possible to neglect the specificities of locations and universalize to some extent.
I share the assumption that
6 Security in the sense here refers to the provision of communication technology that does
not or only with high costs allow for interception, eavesdropping or other tapping mea-
sures.
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when a pattern of conduct (for example, the substantial enhancement
of individual and collective autonomy by wireless communication ca-
pability) repeats itself in several studies in several contexts, we con-
sider it plausible that the observation properly reflects the new realm
of social practice. (Castells, Fernandez-Arde`vol, Qiu, and Sey 2007,
3)
This new social practice can be confronted with the technological flaws in which
it is embedded. In a rather technocentric approach from the view of an engineer,
Landau (2010) treats these problems in this way:
It does not help to tell people to be secure. In order for their communi-
cations to be secure, security must be built into their communications
systems. It must be ubiquitous, from the phone to the central office
and from the transmission of a cell phone to its base station to the
communications infrastructure itself. (Landau 2010, 199)
While the technological reality is far from these demands of a high profile se-
curity architect, it is nevertheless encouraging to look at the possibilities.
To enusre that this discussion does not take place in a vacuum, in the next sec-
tion the general reasons why a secured telecommunication environment is impor-
tant are reconsidered. The argument is that the enfolding of a political discourse
benefits from a trusted, secured communication environment.
Re: What are Trusted Environments Good for?
A political discourse relies on certain levels of trust. Trust here stands for what is
often called ’privacy’. I do not relate to this term because it is confusing in many
ways: why, one could ask, is privacy so important for public matters? Trust seems
to be a more promising candidate as it covers a whole set of parameters which
together form a trustworthy communication environment.If we cannot trust that
the things we say will be not be used against us, our ability to continue candidly
saying what we think is weakened. An open discussion, namely one without fear,
is the basis for political discourse. Statements like this from Manila shows how a
lack of trust invokes modes of self censorship or cultural techniques of obfuscation:
We adjust. We change phones, although it is very expensive. E.g.
when there is a rally tomorrow, we say there is a festival tomorrow.
Mina, Minerva, Joan, Julie / Manila
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Trusted communication environments therefore, are precisely a foundation for a
’democratic society’.7
Whitfield Diffie and Susan Landau write that “the foundations of democracy
rests upon privacy” (Diffie and Landau 1998, 127) and they argue that:
Privacy is essential to political discourse. The fact is not immediately
obvious, because the most familiar political discourse is public. His-
tory records political speeches, broadsides, pamphlets, and manifestos,
not the quiet conversations among those who wrote them. Without
the opportunity to discuss politics in private, however, the finished
positions that appear in public might never be formulated. (Diffie
and Landau 1998, 127)
Further, they state that “change often begins most tentatively, and political
discussion often starts in private. Journalists need to operate in private when
cultivating sources. Attorneys cannot properly defend their clients if their com-
munications are not privileged.” (Diffie and Landau 1998, 149) Needless to say
that activists, who are amongst those seeking change towards social justice, are in
strong need of the same circumstances. The following sections look into the pieces
that together can build a trustworthy mobile media environment, but in general,
this is also the case for other digital networked infrastructures and devices.
9.1 Trust in Telecommunication 1: Securing Con-
tent
The general situation in telecommunication is different to ‘natural’ communica-
tion as the intermediary seldom is present or perceivable. It is mostly like a ghost,
whose presence is hidden. In regard to technical issues with telemediated com-
munication in general, this ‘ghost’ is possibly situated at any position; from the
microphone or keyboard of the device to the respective interfaces of the device(s)
the message is transmitted to.
There were a lot of issues, like viruses, that ghost net virus that was
reveiled recently was targeted at tibetan offices, essentially it would take
7 Something Ju¨rgen Habermas’ (1987) theory of communicative rationality does not reflect
on, as it rests on the assumption that such an environment is given as it enables an active
democracy and a critical public. But telemediated communications barely ensure these
conditions. Maybe his theory is outdated.
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over your drivers for your camera and microphone apparently. I have
the source. It looks like it could do it.
Freitas / NYC
And most likely anywhere in between: in the infrastructure .
In a retrospective overview on efforts of the last 10 years to secure digitally
mediated communications, Danezis and Gu¨rses (2010) diagnose that all efforts
so far have failed on a large scale. “Within their wider contexts privacy friendly
communications only support some specific privacy needs.” (2010, 12)
Although no ‘one size fits all’ solution has been created yet, in digital com-
munications, where privacy and trust cannot be established via social means,
as in face-to-face situations, mathematics can step in and provide trust on the
level of digitality. This is possible mainly due to two developments in the last
40 years: provision of non-patented and fee-free crypto algorithms, and a defeat
of the mainly US long-term policy to forbid the unauthorized dissemination of
cryptography. While it is true that “the centrality of mathematics to privacy
in the electronic environment [...] creates new privacy classes” (Braman 2006a,
131), today’s ‘commoners’ can rely on open source, non-patented tools. Plus,
encryption’s “use outside of government became legal in the United States only
after many years of political struggle”(Braman 2006a, 131). While the attempts
of different government bodies to regain control over encryption are numerous and
still prevail, the scene is set and it is hard to imagine that a reversal is possible.
“Widespread availability of cryptography was here to stay.” (Landau 2010, 2)
One of the best known cases of “encryption for the people” is Phil Zimmerman’s
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) software, whose source code in its very early state
was even printed and exported as a book to fall under the right of free speech and
in this way the control of weapon export law was circumvented.8 The best known
and most widely used crypto-applications (OpenSSL/GnuTLS) and OpenPGP
tools are available open source, at no cost and without patent infringements.
Four Criteria for Trusted Communication
From a purely logical point of view, there are four steps for a digitally transmitted
message sent from A to B that have to mastered: the message must not be altered,
8 MIT published PGP’s C source code as a book. The still informative preface by Phil Zim-
merman is on-line: http://www.philzimmermann.com/EN/essays/BookPreface.html (ac-
cessed 4 March 2012)
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one must be able to know who has sent it, it must not be read by third parties
and, the originator of the message must be able to deny having sent the message
(this last point is not very intuitive, and I will come back to it).9 This translates
into the security concepts of
• Integrity
• Authentication
• Confidentiality (or often named ‘Privacy’)
• Deniability
Whatever happens afterwards with this message, even in the case it becomes
public, does not alter these needs: these parameters are ways to empower the
user to decide herself about the further processing of the message. By application
of these measures, it becomes possible for users to set up a signaling path within
an infrastructure controlled by adversaries. They provide in totalitarian all that
is needed to communicate safely.10
Integrity
Integrity of a message is reached mathematically by generating a signature, which
provides a link between the output of a mathematical calculation done by the orig-
inator of the message (typically referred to as Alice) and the recipient (typically
referred to as Bob), who in the same way can calculate the signature and if the
content of a message was altered. In short, these Message Authentication Codes
are values that can be computed by both sides of the message. The attacker,
usually referred to as Eve, “cannot alter the message without Bob detecting it.”
(Housley and Polk 2001, 9)
The lack of such mechanism allows that Eve may intercept a SMS, cut out the
middle part of the contents (or replace it with something else), play it back, so
that Bob has no immediate way to find out about it. The same occurs with emails:
9 Anonymity is a special case that I leave out here. It is important socially from a se-
curity/safety perspective for one party to be able to anonymously create a confidential,
integrity-checked communication with a well-authenticated peer, for example the ‘whistle-
blower’ scenario.
10 This section here is about the content. The issue of the fact that communication between
A and B takes place, and the powers to surveil this, are discussed in 9.2.
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no mechanism ensures the integrity of an email. TCP/IP data transmission is
not safeguarded against this. Neither is Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP).
Prividing as no additional mechanism is implemented to perform on the in-
tegrity of a message, the integrity cannot be guaranteed. Telecommunication
infrastructure are forge-prone once an intermediary is settled between the send-
ing and receiving device. On the level of the established protocols alone there
is, unfortunately by default, no such safeguard. Only for single services, such as
email or jabber/xmpp, do easy to use enhancements exist. With the application
of an integrity check of a message, the content of the message is secured against
alteration of its contents.
Authentication
Authentication of a message in telecommunication is crucial, because as a tech-
nology of distance, all means that are usually available to authenticate someone
are not at hand. This starts with telephone calls if the caller’s voice is unknown.
Even more problematic is written communication, such as emails. Maybe the
style and use of some words is familiar in an email, but not at all, or enough
to be sure that the email was written by the person claiming to have done so.
One of the easiest hacking tasks is to spoof email addresses, a phenomena very
well known due to email spam, which often pretends to have been sent by a
friend or colleague by simply displaying their email-addresses in the from-field,
while the return-field differs and leads somewhere else. The protocol to send
email, SMTP, allows unauthenticated sending of emails, although more and more
providers are taking measures to restrict this.
SMS origins are also very easy technically alterable, as there is no dedicated
mechanism of authentication built into the SMS protocol. To give one example
how the SMS protocol allows the insertion of an alternative reply address. “
[D]uring message submission, the message originator has the capability to indi-
cate that message replies should be sent to an alternate reply address. This is
performed by inserting, in the submitted message, a dedicated information el-
ement containing the alternate reply address” (Le Bodic 2005, 107). But how
can a message be trusted if it is not clear who has sent it? The possible con-
sequences might be tragic. Regarding the case of activism, a message sent from
one manifestation to another saying that everything was alright, while in fact the
demonstration was halted by the police, may actually harm the whole planned
action. Daniel Kahn-Gillmor describes his worries:
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Another one of my concerns and this has to do with data autonomy and
communications autonomy is also the lack of authentication in a lot of
these things. And there is enough concern about infiltration by either
law enforcement provocateurs or by direct antagonists. Someone is
sending a message, saying “come on over here and rescue your buddy” is
like: what does it mean in a situation where you are not under pressure
and what does it mean when you are under pressure and time is the
essence? How does that work out? In many situations that I have seen
there has not been adaequate groundwork laid and this is coming from
an engineering standpoint. As somebody who has training as a software
developer. And a lot of the systems that I have seen I thought “oh oh”.
Kahn Gillmor / NYC
As with face-to-face communication, where the authentication of message and
mouth, so to say, is unproblematic, we intuitively expect the same for telecommu-
nication. But if it is not possible to authenticate a message, it is unauthenticated
and strictly speaking cannot be trusted.
This missing reference somehow has to be reintroduced into telecommunicated
messages, to regain authentication. Again, this can be done mathematically,
via the digital signature, which is calculated from Alice’s private key. As Bob
possesses Alice’s public key, he can mathematically prove that the message has
been signed by Alice, thus proving the authenticity of the message.11
Confidentiality
If we can encrypt the messages we are sending, this would be very
useful.
Mina, Minerva, Joan, Julie / Manila
Confidentiality is the most intuitive part, often confused with privacy. But all
four points listed here matter for privacy. Confidentiality has only a single goal: to
provide the means, that Eve cannot read the messages that Alice sends to Bob. In
a hostile communication environment, that is controlled by intermediaries (Eve),
any point in the infrastructure allows the opportunity to copy the communication
and analyze it. This can be done at various places, wherever the message passes.
11 There are in fact many more means to authenticate a user against a system or the other
way round, starting with password authentication, one-time authentication values, or even
such sophisticated systems as time-based implicit challenges. But for the discussion here,
they are not relevant.
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Encryption of messages is thus the technical answer to message eavesdropping.12
Many activists interviewed have expressed their familiarity with encryption, al-
though nearly none in the field of mobile media. Encryption of messages remains
a domain of email and chat.
Sometime ago, a collegue in San Cristobal asked to receive email only
encrypted. He said: even if you only say “Hello”. It is a period for 2 or
3 years now, that we try to encrypt emails. Between 1995 and 1998 we
made workshops about that, but by now people have forgotten about
it.
Olinca / Mexico City
There are very different methods for encryption, and its sub-necessities like key
generation, session-handling and so forth. This field is not be covered here. For
a very good overview on the mathematics involved, see Ferguson and Schneier
(2003), for how to apply this, see Schneier (1996) and Menezes, Oorschot, Van-
stone, and Rivest (1997). A good overview on actual software that enhances
confidentiality provides Acquisti, De Capitani di Vimercati, Gritzalis, and Lam-
brinoudakis (2007).
We use GPG for email. We use TLS for the website.
Yasuda / Tokyo
Often, an analogy is used to illustrate what encryption provides for confidentiality:
to compare unencrypted emails with postcards, which can be read by everyone
that transmits/transports it, and encrypted email with letters, which are sealed
in an envelope and thus not everyone can read.13
Iokese, a tech-savvy activist, lists the technologies of his practice to enhance
privacy of communication:
12 Encrypting communication in fact is an everyday operation performed by billions of online
customers to shops or banks that use Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS). But
it must be stated that more and more people in the IT security community regard the
certificate authority (CA) structure, which is used to authenticate the certificates for the
users, as heavily compromised. See Soghoian and Stamm (2011). Until now, there is no
viable solution to this severe problem.
13 This metaphor has a problem though: while an envelope can be opened without notice
by trained personnel, forced decryption of emails, if encrypted properly, is very machine
intense and thus too expensive for LEAs in general.
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Encryption: in email TLS/SSL, in Jabber OTR and SSL, and VPN to
access data. But I do not encrypt my emails by default, because 90%
don’t use email encryption.
Iokese / Madrid
Deniability
A rather counter-intuitive problem is deniability. It addresses the impossibility
to rescan the past acts of communication. Deniability offers the technological
possibility to deny having said this or that. Because even if the communication is
encrypted, deniability is not always given. Only a few encryption schemes actually
offer this feature by using a new encryption key, or new elements that seed the
encryption for each message. This is referred to as perfect forward secrecy (PFS).
It is most prominently a feature of Off-the-Record Messaging (OTR).
If Alice has already sent Bob a hundred messages encrypted with Bob’s public
key, and Bob’s private key falls into the hands of Eve, then Eve can decrypt all
hundred messages in retrospect, in the case that PFS is not part of the encryption
design. PFS technically ensures that if one message is decrypted by Eve, the past
and future ones are not affected. Thus, they can be denied by the sender. It has
a paralell to the transience of the spoken word.
Deniability in very strict terms does not count amongst the core principle’s of
a trusted digital communication. But to my understanding, this has historical
reasons, not so much logical ones, as it only became feasible in recent years. See
Borisov and Goldberg (2005) and Engel (2007) for details.
Example SMS: Simply Monitor Someone
There is a specific directive to the national telecommunications office.
They store all messages for 3 months and then they garbage it, but
recently they extended that to 6 months, or up to one year. They keep
it longer now. So they can go back to anything and track it down.
Mina, Minerva, Joan, Julie / Manila
To summarize: to become a trustworthy channel for activists, SMS, the service
used commonly by most of the interviewees’ groups, needs: authenticity to guar-
antee that the receiving party can be sure about the authenticity of the sender;
integrity to ensure that the message has not been altered; confidentiality to make
sure that no one else except the intended partakers can read the contents. And
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finally, deniability would ensure that even if the message has been compromised
in some way, this does not affect past or future SMS communication.
I try not to use my mobile for critical contents, I tend to use for that a
landline. I prefer to meet people. Once we organized 5000 people: we
got a call from the communities saying there is a public hearing and we
need your help to mobilise and they gave us two days time. We arrived
one day before the public hearing and we met with the key leaders.
So we thought this is simple, we just phone them. But they said: no
don’t do that, turn off your phone, I want you to go house to house,
mobiliZe them. It worked, next day there were 4000 people. If we had
done it through SMS, there would have been counter-mobilization. So
tactically, it was useful not to use it. It is so much easier for the police
to tap you than to go and stand and watch you.
Saldanha / Bangalore
Unfortunately, none of these criteria is met by SMS: it does not provide any
such mechanisms. There is a mild confusion about whether SMS transmission is
actually encrypted. Susan Landau states such a thing:
SMS messages are essentially broadcasts between the cell tower and
a cell phone. As such they are easy to intercept. The messages are
encrypted. However, the type of encryption, which varies with the
type of network, is not considered very secure. (Landau 2010, 178)
It is important to state that only the last node, between cell tower and cell
phone, might be weakly encrypted. Additionally, this is not a necessity to run a
cell, which leads to many cells that do not ask for encryption for the connection
to the phone.14
The other general issue with SMS, and in general with GSM, is a real tough
problem: there is no authentication.
The bigger security gap in GSM, however, was a known flaw that no
one had expected to be much of a problem. To simplify the authen-
tication of the user to the system, the GSM protocol did not require
the cell tower to authenticate itself to the cell phone. This allowed
fake towers to be set up and spoof phones in the network. (Landau
2010, 113)
14 “Hackers crack open mobile network”, BBC News, 31 December 2010. http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/technology-12094227 (accessed 21 March 2012).
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Due to this flaw, IMSI catchers could be developed. These are fake cells, pre-
tending to be the nearest cell to a mobile phone, and catching the phone by
letting the phone log in. Then they proxy the traffic to the next real cell, while
listening in on conversations, tracking the phone, or storing all data flows. As
the name suggests, they are essentially useful to surveil specific IMSI numbers,
i.e. only specific cell phones of suspects. For example, in the UK, IMSI Catch-
ers go under the name Datong Surveillance System: “The surveillance system has
been procured by the Metropolitan police from Leeds-based company Datong plc,
which counts the US Secret Service, the Ministry of Defence and regimes in the
Middle East among its customers. Strictly classified under government protocol
as ‘Listed X’, it can emit a signal over an area of up to an estimated 10 sq km,
forcing hundreds of mobile phones per minute to release their unique IMSI and
IMEI identity codes, which can be used to track a person’s movements in real
time.”15
Integrity of a SMS cannot be provided for either. No mechanisms are built-in
to check if the message has been altered:
A case in point is Venus Info Tech Inc., headquartered in the Zhong-
guancan area of Beijing. Like UTStarcom, it was founded by former
overseas Chinese students, and it has carved out a new market: SMS
surveillance. Venus was among the first in China to receive autho-
rization from the MPS [Ministry of Public Security, O.L.] to develop
a real-time surveillance system for SMS. Its main intention is the Cy-
bervision SMS filtering system, the first of its kind that uses filtering
algorithm from the Chinese Academy of Sciences “based on keywords
and combination of keywords” (Reporters without Borders). (Qiu
2009, 72)
Nathan Freitas echoes that in terms of content analysis, ‘authoritarian’ regimes
have invested in scanning technologies:
The real test is when you are in Iran, Burma or China. Basically it is
either SMS kind of level, or IP level, data packet inspection, keyword
watching on packets, or voice analysis with complexity increasing
Freitas / NYC
15 “Met police using surveillance system to monitor mobile phones”, Ryan Gallagher and
Rajeev Syal, Guardian.co.uk, 30 October 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/oct/
30/metropolitan-police-mobile-phone-surveillance (accessed 20 March 2012).
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To return to the infrastructural flaws, Susan Landau sums up what is left if the
architecture must be considered insecure:
In a system that is itself architected insecurely – for example, with
the potential for packet sniffers at routers throughout the infrastruc-
ture – two actions can substantially improve communication security.
End-to-end encryption will ensure security of the message content.
(Landau 2010, 199)
I return to the second “action”, securing the transaction data, in the next sec-
tion.
End-to-end encryption, if properly designed, can surpass the deficits of the
infrastructure, because it renders the communication path autonomous in terms of
security: a device to device privacy enhancing technology has the huge advantage
of being independent from all infrastructural constraints and thus independent
from the political regimes and their ability to access the infrastructure.
Sticking to the example of SMS: a client to client privacy enhancement soft-
ware16 has to be installed on each device independently.With this, only the service
itself gets secured.
If someone is using the Internet to communicate, their communica-
tions security is entirely dependent on the application’s security. Un-
less email and IM are encrypted or secured through a VPN, these
communications can be eavesdropped on. (Landau 2010, 179)
The downside of all these approaches is plain to see: as it needs an extra
effort, some extra skills, the user base for those tools is small. I agree that
the “[t]he public, while in principle wanting private communications, in practice
appears willing to make it private only if the system is simple to use, does not
affect the communication by slowing them down or degrading quality, and cheap”
(Landau 2010, 47). Privacy enhancing technologies are only successful if their
use and installations becomes a cultural technique as such, and is not perceived
as a tedious, or at worst a frustrating task. But for smaller special interest
groups, like activists, journalists, or human right advocates, privacy enhancing
end-to-end solutions are feasible and applicable, taking their risk of exposure into
16 Like, for example, TextSecure for Android phones, or CryptoSMS.org for J2ME phones.
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consideration. This statement is backed by all interviewees: the general necessity
to lay hands on one’s own devices and install privacy enhancing software is seen
as feasible.
Secured Channels are not Enough
On the other hand, as long as the means of communicating is not
controlled by the people who use it, I don’t think there is much chance
to get out of this problem that we constantly duck and hide, when we
communicate and basically try to find workarounds to put security in a
complete insecure model. Because constantly we rely on trusting what
is happening in between or we don’t give a shit. One of these two things.
Startx / London
What Startx is referring to resonates within the findings of Danezis and Wit-
tneben (2006), who have shown that while the communications between Alice and
Bob might be secured against surveillance, this model is not realistic enough as
it is highly probable that other members of their social network receive the same
information. Thus one should “consider that information leaks through third
parties” (2006, 13): “As it is often the case the innocent, who do not protect
themselves, are the first victims of surveillance, while hardened targets remain
elusive for a long time.” (2006, 14). Therefore, the powers of mass surveillance
as inhibited by data retention schemes, are only slowly recognized by security
researchers. This leads to the final question: what about the infrastructure of
communication? As Goldberg recalls: the massification of digital communica-
tions and especially its commercialization has changed practice and only a few
services are left that are popular and used by everyone:
One of the reasons I don’t share the idea of only using free software
is because the digital world doesn’t look like it did five years ago. The
Twitter example is one I am coming back to: at some point I decided
that for most of my communication it is more important that we have
insecure communication than that we have secured, but less accessful
communication. I use GPG with everybody that has it, but even with
people that were there at St. Paul and got handcuffed by the FBI, it is
still hard to make them use it. I can not not communicate with them.
Goldberg / NYC
This is seconded by a member of the Mexican infrastructure and service provider
Laneta, which has been hosting services for activists without commercial interest
since the 1990s:
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But now this has changed, there are now a lot of commercial, cheap
services. The political aspect of ICT is lost with this a little bit. They
have the feeling that they have all there needs resolved, but they lack
the political point of view about the tools. A lot of people use it, but
in terms of the commercial issue they are not thinking that this could
be a political issue.
Olinca / Mexico City
Daniel Kahn Gillmor does not want to give up the idea of control over commu-
nications, a claim mainly tech-savvy interviewees shared:
And then the other thing is the issue of control over communications.
As a free software developer I do think (despite my caveats) that there
is a potential for emancipatory change in a global communications net-
work; but it can only happen when people are actually in control of
their own communications. That is one of the reasons why free soft-
ware is important. Mobile phones in the communications world have
been our adversaries in this particular struggle. The idea of making
myself dependent on a machine that has so many layers of inaccessible
proprietary control is really unacceptable for me.
Kahn Gillmor / NYC
Some of the interviewees are engaged in setting up a parallel infrastructure
which operates independently from policy and law, thus access for lawful inter-
ception is not provided. This is covered in the next section.
9.2 Trust in Telecommunication 2: Securing Trans-
action Data
It is very simple to put: transaction data cannot be secured in a way taht content
data can be. Again Susan Landau states the point very nicely:
As for security of transactional information, it is worth recalling NSA’s
thoughts on the matter: if the message were “really uninterceptable”
then “the intended recipient, your own distant receiver, could not
pick it up.” In order for the message to be delivered, transactional
information must be easily and widely available along the nodes of its
route. (Landau 2010, 199)
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We moved to prepaid cellphones during the RNC and I did some re-
search and found out that they actually have software that would find
groups of phones that would only talk to each other on the premise
that it is a criminal enterprise or what have you. And that is done
automatically. That to me is dataveillance.
Goldberg / NYC
In the strict sense then, a way to secure transaction data is infeasible.17 But
if the point of view is shifted slightly, a different perspective proves different:
while in general terms this claim is true, it is not when the infrastructure itself is
secured and trustworthy. In that case, when no adversaries lurk within the nodes
to gather information, a way around the paradox of the necessity of transaction
data and its use by third parties is at hand.
There are two approaches to ensure that transaction data is not used by third
parties: either by strong policies that protect this sensitive data legally, or by an
autonomous network, run by actors who do not cooperate with commercial or
state agencies.
In the first case, which aims at larger networks, indeed a strong policy to pro-
tect transactional data can restrict unregulated transaction data surveillance, or
relational dataveillance, to some extent. To regulate this issue in general helps to
set up an ordered procedure how third parties get access. But legalizing eaves-
dropping on meta data, from which social networks can be reconstructed (who,
whom, when and where) is not convincing within the perspective of a trustworthy
network; not really much is gained. Regulation can even cause contrary effects on
the practice, as clearly laid down procedures minimize the risk of the surveilling
parties to run into legal problems at some stage. And the surveillance case about
the Berlin activists (chapter 8) has indeed provided convincing insights: even
though the authorities had operated with permits by judges for some years, the
whole operation was declared illegal years after the fact.
From a perspective that understands institutions and agencies as an ensemble
of heterogeneous semiotic-material conglomerations, a lawful interception policy
is just one more government program, whose application and practice will show
different effects than expected. To promote regulations is equal to asking the
state to solve problems. While this is a justified claim for policy scholars, it is
17 The only way to secure it indirectly in an unsecured network is to use the anonymising
software Tor. Anonymisers by nature interrupt transactional data processing, or at least
make it very hard. See http://tor.eff.org.
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not within an analytics of rule, where state centrism is not considered providing
many insights into how government and rule function. The focus on the practices
does not allow for a belief of the black box state: it is one thing what is written
down as law and policy, and another what agencies and actors actually do.
Anti-Sovereignty: Self-Governing Communication Infrastruc-
tures
But I think the way to escape the question with data retention for
example could be the idea to completely flatten the idea of what is
a service, and what is a user. Because the whole data retention idea
depends on that. That there is an ISP, an authority to be asked. But
if it’s not clear what is the service and what is the client side it will
be very hard to track this. And if you run your email server on your
mobile phone, it will be even harder practically to do anything about
it.
Startx / London
The second case, running an infrastructure of one’s own, offers an alternative
then, once the operators both take significant steps to secure it against attacks
and operate it with an ethics of non-cooperation with state agencies. This sounds
rather unusual, but in fact within activists and hacker communities alike, a com-
mons sense exists: that the state should not interfere with communication tech-
nologies. This has been expressed by most of the interviewees as well.
And this claim fits interestingly within governmental modality of rule, where the
state shall not intervene into the flow of things and signs. The difference then of
course is here, that none of the activists was referring to commercial players who
would organize the field of communication, as in the enterprise society. And this
difference is the tipping point where governmental rule has an open flank towards
self-determination and autonomous practice: the rejection of state interference
is a theme which also circulates in anarcho-syndicalist groups and peer-to-peer
production milieus, amongst others. This common sense can be traced back to the
demands of ownership over means of production and thus links to an old heritage
of work struggles. That neo-liberal rule shares this apprehension to some extent,
although under the rigidly different imperative of market forces, provides a point
of departure within governmental rule that points towards self-determination and
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control over communication means.18
Materialist Inquiries into Communication Infrastructure
What follows are detailed quotes from one interviewee, Startx, who has spent
many years on developing and maintaining non-commercial community wireless
networks in London. His account is very enlightening in the matter of autonomous
or self-governing infrastructure.
For me the idea to have control over your network is the first impor-
tant thing. Because if you have this control you are able to prevent
people from surveilling it. What I found fascinating in the last years
was the speed with which surveillance moved forward on the internet
or any kind of computer technology. If we see how this happened in
former levels, like surveillance of normal mail, or landline telephones,
we have seen a huge leap forward in surveillance in any kind of com-
puter technology in the last three years. If you see the data retention
laws, if you see the questions about encryption: we have to remember
that in Britain the law actually could force you to reveal your encryp-
tion key to authorities. And what I found fascinating is how naturally
people accept these things. If you plug some computers together and
send some data over it, that is like we talking with each other. There
is nobody else involved. What would the people say if there was a law
saying: whenever I talk to you I need to call the police and ask to come
for a coffee to sit in between us and listen. But people naturally accept
it.
Startx / London
18 This is were the theory of the multitude connects to governmentality. Post-operaist theory
claims production as the central axiom of a theory of politics. “We need to discover the
means and forces of the production of social reality along with the subjectivities that an-
imate it.” (Negri and Hardt 2000, 22). By widely acknowledging Foucault’s importance
for a materialist analysis, Negri and Hardt state “what Foucault fails to grasp finally are
the real dynamics of production in a biopolitical society” (Negri and Hardt 2000, 28). And
of course, their reading of these “real dynamics” is contestable, too, as it resonates within
a larger frame of class struggles and contradictions – abstractions that are not present in
Foucauldian thought. At the core of this critic, it seems, are remnants of class relations and
state centrism induced by Marxism which prevailed in radical Italian thought, although
in a very special form, as the central passage these thinkers refer to is Marx’ note on the
“General Intellect”. Form here, many thoughts developed which understand commons
based knowledge as the driving force of emancipation. Nonetheless, the focus on the pro-
ductivity and historicity of subjectivities makes both theoretical lines allies in the analysis
of contemporary modes of production and social relations.
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This leads him to see the general question:
For me the question is generally: is there any chance in the future that
we get back to the idea that communicating via computer technology
is as normal as talking with each other. Or if we just give this up
and basically accept that everything we do via means of technology is
controlled by default. In that case I personally would just drop it and
that’s the reason why I want to replace the internet. Because personally
I don’t think there is a chance to get back the internet as a forum for
free information exchange.
Startx / London
And he frames it within the trajectory of the current internet development:
And now we go back to this basically cloud computing idea where ev-
erything is on the internet, out of control, somewhere far away, nothing
is localized anymore. The tendency will be: everything you boot up is
a kind of network boot, via DSL. And if you haven’t paid your rate,
you won’t boot anymore. This is a bit exaggerated, because basic ac-
cess will possibly be free of charge. But if you don’t play their rules,
you don’t boot. And one might not even be able to use the internet
anymore. Because you get your internet service from Google. So this
whole development goes back to something that would be very easy to
surveil.
Startx / London
Thus, for the future, he sees two parallel developments:
I think for the future there are two ways to handle global networking:
one would be what it looks like now, a very centralized approach, of peo-
ple offering services, and people using the services, and the users are
dependent on the people who offer it. And this dependency is commer-
cially interesting. And on the other hand is the question of the potential
of people using the computing devices they have and carry around, and
if they have access to the devices, and can control it. This would open
huge possibilities But there is also the social question if people actually
want that. If people are actually interested in the aspects.
Startx / London
And he explains that such a network of mobile device would offer different
services than the internet:
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This has nothing to do with the internet as it is anymore. It would be
a second network. It is just using by accident the same hardware and
the same software, and that also means that you have to change the
way you use it and understand it. The interesting thing is that people
actually started to do that: with file sharing, people actually do things
like that. This is still working on the current infrastructure. And people
are actually using that, but they are not aware of it.
Startx / London
The idea of a replacement came out of a learning process. Before this, the
internet was the reference to rebuild.
Also, I think we made a mistake, we tried to replace the internet partly
by offering the people the same services. Like saying: you could do
exactly the same internet, by just doing it differently. But I don’t think
it works in that way. The network structure I described will have to use
completely different ways of offering services. And of communicating.
To reproduce the same client server-network is not how it will work.
Startx / London
An ad-hoc decentralized mobile network supports and reflects the problems
learned about the ongoing centralization of the internet. It can work without
a central figure, like a system administrator, who has access to all data. This
central node is non-existent in such a topology:
The advantage of the mesh network is that you don’t need any au-
thority in the middle to create the network, you don’t need anybody to
maintain an access point, or decide how the network looks like. The dis-
advantage is that with current software technology, the routing protocol
is relatively unstable, and complicated if it is a big network.
Startx / London
The instability is mainly caused by the routing protocol, which has scaling
issues.19 Thus, a mesh network is always limited in size.
We experimented with different network topologies to create local wire-
less networks. The two network possibilities are either you have a star
shaped network, with an access point where people are connected to,
one hub in the middle. The alternative is to have a mesh topology,
everybody is connected with everybody in the network, as far as you
19 I discuss the differences of protocols for mesh networks with a focus on the B.A.T.M.A.N.
protocol in regard to autonomy of networking in Leistert (2010).
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are in reach. You can actually route all data as far as the mesh reaches.
Startx / London
Startx sums up what such a network means to him:
So one of my motivations of having this idea of autonomous computing
is: can we use long distance networking plus having everything under
our control and that as a way to escape surveillance. I wouldn’t neces-
sarily limit this on surveillance, there are lots of other things like the
issue of intellectual property or simply access, the question of who has
control to the network, who controls who is in and who is out. It is not
only about control, but if you are actually able to communicate with
others in the future. For me, this is the big motivation to do it.
Startx / London
James Stevens, who was one of the first activists who started community wire-
less networking in London (and thus, globally), gives a detailed account about
Consume, the initiative that represents these efforts (and of which Startx as well
is part):
The tactic we used with Consume was: short circuit the Telecom lo-
cal loop which governs how people connect to each other, even to their
neighbors. You can short circuit that need by providing a connection.
Next: make your switch. That’s a kind of double meaning kind of state-
ment. Change your behavior, but also practically building a switch. To
enable that change of behavior. And three: consume the net, which
alerts to a ferocity, which did follow a huge ballooning of file sharing
interest between 2002 and 2005. So that was fun. We were self pro-
viding. We are continuing to question the dominance of the corporate
media with alternatives, not always practical, but they have legs. Up to
the point were we are now and there we have a kind of modest network,
I suppose, by some standards, 50 nodes facilitating about 250 people
being connected all the time. I’d like to grow that. All experimental
attempts to bridge out from corporate hegemony. Because it is not a
commercial venture in any way, we are not limited by the expectations
of our users in the same way. It is also about empowerment. That
is part of it. It is been a worthwhile journey to this point, I think.
There has always been a request for autonomy, and then once you un-
derstand the mechanics of networks, then it is a philosophy that you
can promote other people to adopt. And how far up the system can you
propagate this idea. Consume is about that. It was an advocated free
network, we were hopeful that we were actually peering as a collective
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with a conventional service provider. As a network. And negotiating
our much needed internet connection. In exchange for access. Once
peering had been explained to us it seems that would be a worthwhile
ambition. There was a notion to try and use this wireless technology.
Broaden the access to the distribution of the internet we had. com-
mercial overhead. Now it is everywhere. There is a kind of ubiquity to
wireless LAN. There was an anxiety about openness. And freedom, to
some extent. You can’t always see the benefit in the short term of the
position you are holding. Hearing these peoples’ responses later on is
an encouragement to continue. It is our leisure exploring near future
technologies. That might have an effect on everybody else.
Stevens / London 20
In an article about the history of the project, together with second founder,
Julian Priest, he writes about the spread of the model: “The model was quickly
replicated elsewhere, especially in the States, and there is now a burgeoning
wireless freenetwork community around the world” (Priest and Stevens 2004,
125).
In Seattle I had the chance to interview another senior activist of community
wireless networks: Matt Westervelt. He recounts the moment of the first steps
when wireless networking routers were hacked for the first timeso that later on
open source firmware could be stored on the devices, which was a preliminary
step for many open source wireless networking protocol designs, now in use by
wireless communities around the globe:
Here we had like the most hardware hacking information than probably
in a lot of other places. The link system WRT stuff. We had read
that it was a Linux box and they were saying it. And somebody had
already strings on it running for some time. Well, if it is Linux and
it is from China, they probably did a bad job at it. So we started
taking a look. And we figured out that we could ping it. So we asked,
how could we get on this machine? We found a testing tool ttcp [a
utility program for measuring network throughput, O.L.], and we used
that to actually execute code on that machine, so we had a kind of a
complicated prospect at that time: you would type it in and you would
basically attach it to the web page and then run this Perl script and it
would create a reverse shell. It would actually upload code through this
testing tool, put a reverse shell onto the box and then log you into it
20 “Peering” refers to the process that internet providers amongst themselves do. In general,
these are negotiations about traffic flows. The protocol for this is Border Gateway Protocol
(BGP).
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through telnet. And from then there was like: Ah, now we are on the
box! We can do Linux stuff with the tools that are there. At that point
we couldn’t actually write firmware, so we put all the stuff on the Wiki
and other people came along and said: ah okay, now that you have got
the shell on the box, we know how to do this, and then getting firmware
was actually some other project. We were just happy to get the shell
on it. From then it was like fun stuff and then creating the distribution
for it. The name of the box was Linksys WRT 54g. OpenWRT and all
those sort of open projects I can actually trace back to a hacknight at
a cafe down the street. That was in 2001, maybe 2002. That was one
of the fun things we did here at hacklab.
Westervelt / Seattle
The second step in the history of open source wireless community networking
was to produce cheap antennas. Here, again Westervelt remembers:
People could get that: you take a Pringles can and you stick a wire
in it and now you get Wi-Fi [Wireless fidelity, O.L.] from far away.
And everyone has done it. And we thought, OK, let’s buy a bunch of
Pringles. At a hacknight we had maybe a hundred cans of Pringles and
we had a lot of stuff and got really sick from the chips. And we made
antennas and they are all kind of lousy, but it was fun.
Westervelt / Seattle
See 9.1 for a visual how-to for such an antenna. As with this antenna, the
costs to set up a community wireless network dropped to amounts that made it
feasible for low-income people as well. This model became, although not the best
performing, a reference object and gadget within these communities.
These most radical proposals and concrete attempts to build an infrastructure
from bottom-up for e.g. local message delivery have been a great success not only
in London and Seattle21, but in Berlin22, Barcelona (were eventually the network
turned into an official municipal giant mesh network), and other cities.23
To conclude: surveillance is an issue of the infrastructure. This appears solvable
from the perspective of autonomous communication infrastructures, at least on
a community or local network scale, as wireless devices can be merged into a
21 http://seattlewireless.net (accessed 4 March 2012).
22 http://freifunk.net (accessed 4 March 2012).
23 See http://global.freifunk.net for a (naturally incomplete) list (accessed 4 March 2012).
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Figure 9.1: The famous Pringles 2.4 GHz antenna. Photo by otakon86, Source: www.
flickr.com/photos/beakman/225399389/, Creative Commons BY NC SA li-
cense.
network themselves, where clients also act as routers.24 As much as network
traffic is local in fact, for example within one city, the reach of these networks is
big enough for many uses.
But in profound ways, these ideas are advanced concepts of network topology
and should be regarded as proofs of concept. They echo the history of the internet
in a certain sense: while the initial concept as a decentralized topology, and thus
a distributed concept of control has changed to a business of very few corpora-
tions25, radical developers, such as James Stevens and Startx, are envisioning a
return to decentralization or distributed systems even as a response to pressing
issues of surveillance or high prices for simple services, such as SMS. By setting
up wireless networks that cover large parts of big cities, based on protocols that
encourage distributed topologies, a bottom-up desire responds to rather irrational
costs for local mobile phone communication.
24 Dunbar-Hester (2009) discusses how activists negotiate FM and Wireless spectra use and
the engagement with DIY infrastructure technologies.
25 The discussion on net neutrality echoes the concentration of power in the internet domain
very well. To prioritize one kind of data over another one is the harshest intervention in
the history of the internet so far and sets forth a trend of commercial take-over.
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Autonomous Communication Means
One approach to reduce the spreading misuse of transactional data in unregu-
lated environments are strong privacy protecting policies. But this cannot solve
the problem at hand: the infrastructure remains in control by entities which, by
way of controlling it, can exercise power on its users; additionally, a regulated
surveillance scheme integrates surveillance into orderly rule and makes it a com-
mon practice. On the other hand, the radical approaches of a self-controlled,
non-commercial, autonomous infrastructure offer many prospects to the societal
dimension: no central instance decides about who can take part and who cannot.
No discrimination on the content of the data can be set in action, like traffic
shaping. Finally, meta-data cannot be collected and analyzed by a centralized
actor.
But there are clear limits, both in the technical and in the social dimension.
Technically one should consider these approaches at the most as community
projects. Maybe even proofs of concepts. They are not yet capable of offer-
ing a quality of service that is comparable to the ‘internet’. This seems a real
problem, as it remains to be seen if users are willing to decrease their network
expectations for a self-governed infrastructure.
Socially these approaches are challenging, because they rely on an activation
of users in a governmental sense: to conduct them to conduct themselves into
networked autonomy. The benefit of a lesser degree (I hesitate to write ‘no’) of
surveillance is an abstract good for most network users. The benefit, that traffic
cannot be discriminated on the base of its contents, like in commercial DSL,
where peer-to-peer protocols get less bandwidth than a stream from a commercial
content provider, can be more convincing. Sharing of data without interference
by state or commercial actors might be a popular feature.
Recalling the first part of this chapter, and combining it with the second, the
sum is ambivalent: although means are available to escape the surveillance scheme
in networks in general, one is automatically forced to enter into a mode of commu-
nication that might never be adopted by the masses. By fragmenting the physical
networks, also the entire sphere of communication gets more fragmented.
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Conclusion: Mobile Media Pushes the
Liberal Paradox
There is a group called Maxakal´ı. They are indigenous people that have
been in contact for 300 years, but remained monolingual, almost no
women speak Portuguese, only men. They are a poor community, very
little resources, on the northern boarder of Minas Gerais. The land
they have is poor and little, the forest has been destroyed. Their basic
material is clay. And plants. They have a ritual there where they build
clay mobile phones. And they use it to communicate with the spirits.
Although they don’t have mobile phones, through this ritual they ac-
knowledge the potential of agency that is in that kind of technology.
They are trying to relate to it through this ritual. This is real, not “as
if”.
Caminaghi / Campinas (Br)
The intention of this work was to show, that a discussion of mobile media as a
form of government, as part of governmental rule, contributes to an understanding
of how power relations are reshaped and invoked within a conglomerate, that can
be addressed as a political rationality. A rationality that invokes practices which
are guided by programs of government.
The discussion was informed by many diverse statements from an geographically
even more diverse set of experts, whose statements translate a discourse about
mobile media, and, specifically in its empowering mode, for protests, and, in its
surveillance mode, for a modification of sovereignty.
The easement of communication amongst the population fosters productivity,
and, as such, the roll-out and massification of mobile media is a technique of a
governmental scheme. It has become incredibly tedious to not be connected.
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Also, once you use the mobile, you can hardly get out of it.
Kumar / Delhi
This signifies that an understanding of mobile media can not neglect its en-
meshment into power relations: it conducts to a self-conduct of 24/7 connectivity.
The machinic space of mobile media provides an addressability, both socially and
technically. Parallel to the setting up of a postal delivery dispositif, this mobile
media dispositif connects very large parts of populations globally, and addresses
the individual at the proximity of its body.
I have suffered from surveillance. Communication is a kind of limita-
tion. You want freedom for a day. And if you have a phone, you don’t
have freedom because people can reach you, you can not loose yourself.
Anyone will find you. This is a problem. Everybody wants freedom,
but nobody wants to loose access.
Anonymous People from Ankur / Delhi
This liberal rule via mobile media triggers illiberal rule or neo-sovereign rule.
Here, the immanent paradox of liberal rule manifests itself: it needs to secure
its production of freedom, but at the same time these operations of security
not only provide a milieu of circulation, but intervene; thus, the paradox. The
production of freedom shall not intervene into the transit realities of rule, but does
so constantly. Invocations of data retention, blocking of communication, and a
mandatory registration of SIM cards can be seen as securitization techniques, that
are both, invoked by liberal rule and in contradiction to its imperative of the flow
of signs. Mobile media thus provokes the liberal paradox to the extend, that it
becomes regulated, bound to territory and scrutinized. I termed these operations
“neo-sovereignty” because these are reconfigurations of interventions in the style
of sovereign rule, but within a neo-liberal paradigm.
The machinic addressability, it seems, provokes these technologies of control,
as digital surveillance schemes are cheap, and provide the production of a new
kind of knowledge: about the population and the individual alike. An emergence
of algorithmicly produced digital objects, which do not represent the target, but
are a site of production of its double; a fragmented relational set of flecks. Rule,
which calculates its operational knowledge on these technologies, and decides
about measures and programs on such doubles, manages abstract data, which
lacks ontological resemblance about the governed.
Securitization techniques are taking advantage of mobile media. Data retention
is a technology of securitization with enormous powers, and today we can only
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understand the tip of this iceberg. Data retention is a gigantic illiberal mate-
rialization of a doubt: a doubt that is large enough to hold the whole mobile
population. Mobile media thus inscribes itself not only in governmental rule, but
changes rule in general. When it is invoked by securitization, one may speak
easily of mobile surveillance media.
On the other hand, mobile protest media supports in many ways the aims and
ambitions of protesters. New forms of distributed actions have emerged, that can
tactically overrule surveillance. But there are frictions between the collectivity of
performing dissent and the powers of an individualizing technology.
There is also dialectic at work here. Surveillant capacities, programs and tech-
nologies adjust to the increased agency of protest groups, or likewise, the increased
mobility of populations. The trajectory of neo-liberal rule cannot but push for
technologies that ease and increase the flow of signs, goods, and people. In its
paradoxical fold, neoliberalism then invents illiberalizing programs and technolo-
gies.
In the context of the social repression here in Oaxaca, after the repres-
sion of November 25th 2006, which was the most violent attack of the
federal police downtown, human rights activists were trained in the use
of mobile phones to try to contain the surveillance because the surveil-
lance was declared as a permant reality. So, we can not fight it, we can
not stop it, but we can try to contain it and we have to life with it. The
use of the phone, not saying a lot, not saying delicate parts of your life.
Blax / Oaxaca (Mx)
An interesting example for such an excess of illiberality, and a signifier of what
is on the horizon of mobile surveillance media, is a product1 recently acquired
by the Metropolitan police in London. The product’s capacities are explained
in a sales leaflet (see figure 10.1). “Geotime” promises a new operationability of
real-time mobile media surveillance:
The Metropolitan police has bought Geotime, a security program
used by the US military, which traces and displays individual’s move-
ments and communications with other people on a three-dimensional
graphic. It can be used to collate information gathered from social net-
working sites, satellite navigation equipment, mobile phones, financial
1 http://www.geotime.com/Product/GeoTime-(1).aspx
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transactions, and IP network logs.2
Whatever difficulties this product in reality may encounter, and if it works like
it is portrayed, is not of concern (it would require empirical research). The dis-
positif it represents in the fantasy of a sale’s brochure allows for a speculation:
mobile media’s political rationality itself is under negotiation, under rearrange-
ment and constantly under pressure. It is not a solid floor. Media technologies
themselves co-develop with political rationalities and vice versa. In this interplay,
different strategic ensembles produces historical frames, but each time frame is
under tension, provided it unfolds within the liberal paradox.
A Development Model of Media in Relation to Rule
Finally, there is a speculation possible, which targets a development model of
media, that I want to touch briefly: one can look at this articulation of mate-
rial/technology out of a discontent (like Startx stated: about the development
the internet has taken) from an angle that Hartmut Winkler proposes:
If the development of media rests on desires [needs], and these are
themselves co-determined by the state of history/media history, then
discourse, before it brings into existence the next step of media tech-
nology, first of all seems to produce something else: some negativity,
a discontent, some kind of deficit, a system tension, this very ’de-
sire’ [need], which is a prerequisite for the very next step of media
development.3 (2004, 142; translation O.L.)
Recalling the heavy instrumentalization of mobile media for neo-sovereignty, the
system tension is apparent: what initially was announced as liberation, more and
more turns into illiberation, an actual threat for the user.
This negativity appears to emerge unintentional, at the back of dis-
course; and if at the same time it is the motor of development, it is
2 “Police buy software to map suspects’ digital movements”, Ryan Gallagher and Rajeev
Syal, guardian.co.uk, 11 May 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/may/11/police-
software-maps-digital-movements (accessed 20 March 2012).
3 “Wenn die Medienentwicklung sich auf Bedu¨rfnisse stu¨tzt und diese vom jeweiligen Stand
der Geschichte/Mediengeschichte mitbestimmt werden, dann scheint der Diskurs, bevor er
die na¨chste Stufe der Medientechnik hervorbringt, zuna¨chst etwas anderes zu produzieren:
Ein Negatives, eine Unzufriedenheit, eine Art Defizit, eine Systemspannung, jenes ’Bedu¨rf-
nis’ eben, das Voraussetzung fu¨r den jeweils na¨chsten Schritt der Medienentwicklung ist.”
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less important what a discourse produces positively, than what it does
not produce; what is left open and impossible to state [say] under cur-
rent conditions of media.4 (Winkler 2004, 142; emphasis in original;
translation O.L.)
What has become impossible to utter in mobile media envirnments are statements
that rely on privacy, and what has become impossible to hide, are one’s social
relations and location. A historical phase is over: that little historical window of
liberalized (or anti-sovereign) mobile media which emergeed between the massive
roll out of mobile media and its excess in illiberalization through measures of
securitization. The window of opportunity for mobile media to operate freely
from the state is closed. In this sense, the joint efforts by Startx and others in
the field of alternative networking infrastructure echo that “the development of
technology in this sense plays shots.”5 (Winkler 2004, 142; translation O.L.)
The autonomous network solutions, whicht Startx referred to, are designed
explicitly to connect mobile media not via GSM, but wireless LAN. Telephony
via wireless LAN is a popular service, as it is much cheaper than telephony via
GSM, and it can rely on infrastructure which is not controlled by large commercial
players. One of the Korean anonymous activists pointed to internet telephony:
When you talk about mobile communication, I think it is very broad. So
you have cell phones, laptops, mobile internet, but personally I don’t
like it a lot. I don’t have a cellular phone myself, I have an internet
phone, a wireless phone, which works were there is wireless LAN.
Two Korean Activists
He showed me his phone: it looked like a cell phone, but would work only via
internet connectivity. For Seoul a clever solution, as the city is completely covered
by wireless LAN.
4 ”Dieses Negative scheint ungewollt, d.h. im Ru¨cken des Diskurses zu entstehen; wenn es
gleichzeitig der Motor der Entwicklung ist, wa¨re weniger wichtig, was der Diskurs pro-
duziert als was er nicht produziert, was offen und unter den gegebenen Medienbedingun-
gen unsagbar bleibt.”
5 “Die Technikentwicklung spielt insofern immer u¨ber Bande.”
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Figure 10.1: From a sales leaflet of a ‘real time’ surveillance-software acquired by UK
police. On the y-axis, time is represented. Each node represents a per-
son. Source: geotime.com
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A
Empirical Research about Protests:
Ethical Considerations
Research about a presumingly progressive use of mobile media technologies and
its ambivalences in regard to surveillance and repression can produce a fair body
of knowledge without empirical inquiries. But there is a natural limit then: it
remains speculative in big parts. Whatever sources of information are used, they
are never able to give an account of concrete, situated practices. A lot can be
done without interviewing people, of course.
When I started to conceptualize my research, it was of importance for me not
only to do theory, to reflect on other research, to develop my own theoretical
puzzle pieces, but also to do empirical research, better said: qualitative research
that mirrors discourse. I was never satisfied with the speculative nature of a lot of
work on media practice in general and about the specific use of telecommunication
and mobile media in the context of social movements and individuals fighting for
social justice.
When it comes to social movements though, the situation is complicated. Em-
pirical research here encounters by nature difficulties and often remains ambiva-
lent. Questions of trust, of goals, of ethical conduct are arising. Why should
people within social movements talk to researchers? What do they gain? Spend-
ing precious time with some researcher whose intentions remain mostly vague for
the interviewee is not the most appealing activity.
One of the reasons for this reluctant attitude is fear of repression. A lot of my
interviewees or their acquaintances have faced or are facing repression, or simply
know about the possibility thereof.
To make plausible what the ethical problems for a research in this field are, it
is instructive to give an example: the social movements on the Philippines are
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strong and impressive. And they are working in a very hostile environment. All
of a sudden people are going missing, are found dead, are being harassed, or are
facing threats. Especially those that are publicly addressing human rights issues
and corruption are living a dangerous life. I talked about this with Jun Cruz
Reyes, a well known Philippine writer.
My writing is about the hypocrisy in the Philippines. It is about power
relations. The Philippines is a third world country. The establishment
is very much insecure about their position in power. The president has
given order to eradicate insurgency activities by 2010, I assume I am
part of the deadline also. Anyway I am still saying nasty things.
Cruz Reyes / Manila
We met on the campus of the University of the Philippines. It was only very
recently that he had been harassed by most certainly the military. He decided,
as long as this was “hot”, not to stay at home, but to live on the university
campus, where he felt more secure. Although not participating in a political
group in a strict sense, Reyes has a network of people to support him – including
journalists. The mobile phone then played a key role to mobilize this network for
support. Very fast and effectively Reyes could organize press conferences about
the harassment and make it public.
Just two weeks ago, I gave a press conference, because I had been
harassed by the military for what reason I do not know. I guess it
is about my writings. And I was surprised: media people, newspaper,
internet, radio came there. I also heard that my readers are complaining
as well. I used my personal phone to call three or four of my media
friends, and they spread it further. It was even a holiday, over the
weekend.
Cruz Reyes / Manila
As Reyes is publicly scandalizing the practice of counter-insurgency politics and
police/military action on the Philippines as a method to silence critical voices,
for him it is not counterproductive to talk to a German researcher about it.
Filtering Statements
In general, I am confident that my interview partners all had well considered
what to say or what better not to say in the interviews. During transcription
though, it appeared to me that numerous statements should not be published.
Some statements did not contribute to the subject of this research, others were
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sensitive enough to possibly cause troubles. Of course this is a thin line: it re-
mains a speculation if it would cause trouble. My guideline to decide whether a
statement is unproblematic or not never became completely transparent to my-
self. Guided by long years of media activism practice that was focused amongst
other things on security of telecommunication for social movements, I decided not
to use roughly 20% of all statements I collected. I even omitted their transcription
to forget about them myself. Otherwise I would re-encounter these statements
every time I reviewed my material. The decision not to use them would otherwise
be questioned again and again: an exhausting process. From the standpoint of a
researcher this loss of material is bitter. Some of my interviewees also asked me
to review all statements once they were written down prior to allow me to use
them. This made it a tedious process to build a base of usable material.1
The central questions that needs further reflection for this research in regard to
benefits and dangers for the interviewees therefore are:
• What is this research for?
• For whose benefit is it done?
• What are the (mostly uncontrollable) possible side effects?
These questions are addressed in the following paragraphs.
What is this Research for?
In many if not most cases academic research rests in academia – for many and
various reasons. If a general statement about this can be made at all (and I
only touch this question briefly here), it targets the specialization of academic
knowledge production. As most things in modern life, it is a specialized task
by highly specialized individuals within a specialized community. It is for this
reason hard for a researcher to produce repercussions in the non-academic world.
For some researchers this setting does not cause problems; some might not even
regard this as a deficit of their work. And for sure, not every research directly
addresses issues in this sense. But this research wants to produce knowledge that
is applicable both inside and outside academia and both in different ways.
1 One interviewee did not respond to my transcript. Thus, I did not use the interview.
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Regarding academia, one can try to weave a work that takes part in contem-
porary theoretical and empirical discourses on the research’s subject and related
fields, visit conferences on related subjects and get into a dialogue with researchers
that work in the same areas.2
Regarding the non-academic world, the case is different and surprisingly much
more complicated in a lot of ways. The borders one builds by writing an academic
work often make it hard for non-specialists to follow terminological pathways.
While my general idea from the beginning was to contribute with this reflection
to the activities of the interviewees, the ethical urge had been drastically raised
and been concretized after the 50 interviews I did. The impressive knowledge and
experiences that have been expressed and that I was able to collect should not
remain isolated in few academic libraries – it should find its way back. I hope that
in this or that way it does find its way back and offers a reflection and insights
into the work of activists from a specific perspective that comes from outside. The
knowledge reproduced here is original and as empirical research it is combined
with theoretical and discursive reflections, leading to a synthesis and hopefully a
constructive critique. The outcome – this is my hope – can be informative for any
groups that are working towards social justice with means of mobile media.
Language
Writing in English was not an easy, but most coherent decision: it still remains
the only viable way to have a possible reach beyond most language borders. My
research travel made me realize how problematic the general assumption about
English as a world language is. It is by far a higher class language in a lot
of countries, especially in post-colonial countries with a Commonwealth history.
Speaking English is speaking to those that have learned it because of access to
education, if not higher education. And then one speaks the language of the
colonizers.
English, like any other language, transports concepts, mindsets, values, and be-
lief systems. These come from Western, Christian culture. Furthermore, English,
because of its imperial history and contemporary function in a global capitalist
economy, is not the most preferred language in social movements outside native
English speaking regions. I encountered harsh reservations against it, mostly in
2 This work remains before all a PhD thesis. Therefore it has a mandatory format, it has to
meet criteria such as plausibility in argumentation, identifiable methodologies, as well as
length considerations, which all I hope to have achieved.
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Latin America. Therefore the ability to speak English was not automatically lead-
ing to actually speaking it. And also, what one is able to say in English differs
widely from what one is able to says in one’s everyday language like Kannada,3
for a variety of reasons. This starts with the term ‘surveillance’ itself which lacks
proper translation in many languages. Missing vocabularies are only one prob-
lem. Speaking the language of former rulers (in the case of India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh, but also the Philippines) is also a different emotional experience than
speaking the common regional language.
For all interviews I did with people that did not want to conduct it in English,
translators carefully tried to transpose all statements into English. By choosing
translators which in most cases had a comparable background, i.e. having been
social and/or political activists themselves or having been close to those who are,
I tried to make sure that the contexts of the activities that the interviewees were
reporting about did not get lost. Otherwise I would not have been able to trust
the translations to the extend necessary for this work. I still feel indebted to
everyone who translated.4
The method of translation was bound by the method of interviewing: a guided
interview follows the interviewee to some extent, without forgetting its goals.
Therefore it was not a simple matter of translating the question and then the
answer, but also sustaining a lively conduct. The artificial breaks caused by
translations are dangerous moments during interviews as one side then is excluded
and easily looses track. A help is to keep eye contact with the interviewee even
without understanding a word she says.
In a lot of interview situations, I encountered another dimension of language
issues: English in India is something very different to English on the Philippines
or in the US. This leads to English words which emerge only in one region or
country. Accents and intermingling of English with regional languages sometimes
gave me a hard time to understand. In many cases, though, I could resolve issues
during rehearsal and transcription. Sometimes I had to contact people during
transcription by email to make sure I got it right. And in very few cases, I am
still unsure. These passages are left out of the work.
3 Kannada is one of the dominant languages in the Indian state of Karnataka of which Ban-
galore is the state capital. It is spoken by around 38 million people.
4 Thank you: Olivia (Sa˜o Paulo), Minerva (Mexico City), Akiko, Kaori, Hajime (Tokyo), and
Dinesh (Bangalore). Due to the nature of the Lawyers’ Movement, there was no urgent
need for Urdu, Sindhi or any other translation in Pakistan. Everyone I interviewed in
Pakistan spoke fluently English.
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While some interviewees spoke very eloquently, others did not. This is still
present in the statements. For a better reading experience, I slightly intervened
into the words during transcription. These minor interventions though did not
change more than interjections or repetitions. As with any audio transcription,
punctuation was a decision during writing.
Dissemination
Related to the issue of language is the issue of dissemination. The traditional
way of publication as a book has its known limits in practical reach. It is unlikely
that my research would be present anywhere else but in very few academic or
institutional libraries. The high costs of book production in relation to the fi-
nancial means of most of the actors whose activities are addressed here are really
standing apart.
But there is a way around: the production of an electronic document in parallel
that can be disseminated online. Although internet connectivity is not ubiquitous
and having such a document on the screen definitely not a pleasure in comparison
to having it on paper, it allows for the interested to have a look and decide if a
print out (in whole or in parts) is worth the effort.
Possible Side Effects
The possible side effects of this research are foremost only possible side effects.
They belong to the same realm as one theme of this research: surveillance. But
nonetheless they are worth mentioning. This naturally is a speculation.
The relevance of safety measures is related to the subject’s societal environment
and position. Many interviewees are underprivileged and vulnerable. Therefore
the danger of repression is nothing that can be generalized very well. It depends
on the local situation. Possible side effects stated here remain in abstract.
There remains the possibility that statements given here are offering hints or
contributing directly to open files of authorities, military or other potent antago-
nists of the interviewees or their initiatives and movements. Because communica-
tion methods, tactics and strategies, experiences and stories of successful or non
successful struggle aided by telecommunication means are referenced throughout
this work, it is always possible that some important hint is given that might be
used in a counter strategic way or even direct repression. On the other hand, as
I describe the surveillance practice of Law Enforcement Agencies, this is also a
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contribution to transparency in a very opaque field.
Safeguards
As already mentioned, I have sorted out statements not suitable for publication.
Besides this, the following measurements for the safety were taken:
Gatekeeper
In many cases, my contacts to the interviewed people were made possible by lo-
cals, which offered to help me. These actors are traditionally called “gatekeepers”.
They are local people trusted by local people. They accompanied me to the inter-
view places, sometimes translated, and sometimes even offered their hospitality
by letting me stay at their places. These people made sure that I got to know
local contexts and understood better the accounts given. They often provided me
with further reading material or hints where specific places would be that have
been places of struggles. This was an important contribution to safeguard myself
and the interviewees: myself, as otherwise I would have gone lost easily in places
like Mexico City, and my interviewees, as the contacts had a sensitive mind on
what might not be suitable for publication. They did not intervene into the inter-
views as such, but afterwards often explained what they had noticed during the
interviews. As they were not the persons giving accounts, they had enough dis-
tance to be sensitive for such things, whereas the interviewees themselves in their
sometimes very detailed and long answers tended to forget about the interview
situation.
Anonymity, Pseudonymity
I offered every interviewee anonymity or pseudonymity. Many took advantage of
this. While it is of course more coherent to be able to reference every interviewee
by full name, the offer for anonymity had to be made, otherwise some interviews
would not have taken place at all. Mostly in Latin America and the Philippines
people took advantage of this. I do not indicate where a pseudonym is used or a
real name. Often, of course, it is evident.
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B
Overview of Interviews
When and where the interviews took place and informations about my travel
itinerary are listed here.
But first, a note about the reasons, why I interviewed these specific actors and
not others:
I had developed criteria that guided the process to find interviewees: first, all
interviewees should in any way understand their work and that of their groups
or organizations as aiming towards social justice. Social justice here entails such
things like fights for land to grow food, access to knowledge and information, free
public transportation, free housing, free speech, emancipation of minorities. It is
clear that each of these topics would need a proper framing. I neglect this here.
My intention is basic: all interviewees target a more just distribution of signs,
goods, and services, one which is not or not only based on the mechanisms of the
market.
Second, political parties and unions or other hierarchical organizations are not
part of the discussion (MST is an exception, though). This has to do with a hy-
pothesis that to understand mobile protest media, hierarchy obfuscates its power
vectors more than non-hierarchical forms of organizations.
Third, my aim to show how mobile media reconfigures many societal fields
globally, in very different cultures and regions, made it necessary to interview
activists from different areas of the world. Of course, not all regions are present.
For example, no African country.
Fourth, the network of people one is part of helped to find interview partners.
It took a year to prepare the travel and organize bits and pieces.
Fifth, I was not particularly interested to interview technologists amongst the
protesters. Although I decisively searched to interview some free software de-
velopers, that count themselves as part of a protest movement, as they would
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No. Place Arrival Interview
01 Sa˜o Paulo 24.7. 04-09
02 Campinas 3.8. 10
03 New York City 7.8. 11-13
04 Seattle 15.8. 14-15
05 Mexico City 25.8. 16-19
06 Oaxaca 2.9. 21
05 Mexico City 4.9. 20
07 Tokyo 8.9. 22-28
08 Manila 27.9. 29-33
09 Bangalore 8.10. 34-38
10 Delhi 17.10. 39
11 Lahore 20.10. 41-47
12 Delhi 31.10. 40-41
Table B.1: Travel itinerary 2009. The 6 interviews conducted in Europe are not listed.
provide an important expert angle on technologies – to gather insights into a dis-
course about protest and surveillance, it would have been problematic to address
technology experts prominently. Thus, the largest part of the interviewees is not
active in technology development and can be considered as users of mobile media.
Sixth, while the dynamics of technology development are hilarious, and, for
example, ‘smart phones’ are deployed massively in many countries, I did not fo-
cus on ‘cutting edge’ media technologies. Telephony and SMS are the services
discussed here most prominently.
The 50 interviews conducted for this research were all audio recorded on site.
I used a MP3 recording device, afterwards I transfered the files onto my lap-
top. Table B.1 shows the itinerary of the main research travel I did. Before the
main travel, I visited London for interviews, and afterwards I visited Madrid for
interviews.
Table B.2 to B.5 give a brief overview of the interviews taken and used in this
research. Groups and memberships stated are not exhaustive. Not all reports
of mobile media practice automatically refer to the affiliations mentioned in the
tables. It is very common amongst some of the interviewed people to engage
temporarily in other groups or to engage in temporal campaigns. Nonetheless,
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this table represents a general overview. I have added a column Translated which
shows where I needed support of translators, otherwise it was conducted in En-
glish. Place of Activities is occasionally only vaguely stated as some interviewees
have a wide outreach with their activities as they are engaged in technical issues
of activist communication. Therefore the mentioned places of activities are not
always very precise, but nonetheless give an impression. Active with refers to
present and past. Information in curly brackets signifies affiliations which played
only a small or no role in the interview, although they might play a decent role
in the interviewee’s overall activities. Some interviews are group interviews, from
two to four people. Where appropriate I separated the cited sentences and ref-
erenced them with individuals, but mostly I did not differentiate the speakers in
such cases. For acronyms of groups, please refer to the glossary.
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No. Name Date Place of
Interview
Place of
Activities
Active with Trans-
lated
01 James Steven 6.4. London London Consume n
02 StartX 6.4. London London Consume n
03 Yossarian 6.4. London London Indymedia London n
04 Alface 29.7. Sa˜o Paulo Sa˜o Paulo CMI, Forum Centro
Vivo
y
05 Legume 29.7. Sa˜o Paulo Sa˜o Paulo MPL, {Passa
Palavra}
n
06 Bispo &
Christoph
30.7 Sa˜o Paulo Sa˜o Paulo Cooper Glicerio y
07 Three MST
Worker
31.7. Sa˜o Paulo Sa˜o Paulo MST y
08 M 1.8. Sa˜o Paulo Sa˜o Paulo MPL, {Punk
Movement}
y
09 Ferna˜o 2.8. Sa˜o Paulo Sa˜o Paulo Sarava, MTST y
10 Francisco
Caminaghi
6.4. Campinas Campinas {Radio Muda,
Sarava}
y
11 Jon Goldberg 7.8. NYC USA {Jews against the
Occupation}, I
Witness Video,
n
12 Daniel Kahn
Gillmor
11.8. NYC USA Mayfirst / People
Link, Tachanka
n
Table B.2: Interviews 1 to 12 at a glance, year of conduct is 2009.
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No. Name Date Place of
Interview
Place of
Activities
Active with Trans-
lated
13 Nathan
Freitas
12.8. NYC USA, Tibet,
China
Free Tibet and
Anti-Censorship
initiatives
n
14 Matt
Westervelt
24.8. Seattle Seattle Wireless Seattle n
15 Devin
Theriot-Orr
24.8. Seattle USA,
Pakistan
Lawyers’
Movement
n
16 Anonymous 28.8. Mexico
City
Chiapas,
Guatemala
Independent
grassroots media
n
17 Enrique 29.8. Mexico
City
Mexico City Laneta y
18 Olinca 1.9. Mexico
City
Mexico City Laneta y
19 Alpha 1.9. Mexico
City
Mexico City {Radio} y
20 Francisco
Cerezo
4.9. Mexico
City
Mexico City Comite´ Cerezo,
Revuelta
y
21 Blax 3.9. Oaxaca Oaxaca Indymedia
Oaxaca, Video
production
n
22 Yasudo
Yukihiro
19.9. Tokyo Japan Labornet Japan,
Champon,
{MediR}, No G8
2008
y
23 Ahmed
Mahmoud
22.9. Tokyo Bangladesh The Voice
Bangladesh
n
24 Two Korean
Activists
25.9. Tokyo Seoul Korean media
activist network,
Yongsan
Candlelight
Media Center
y
Table B.3: Interviews 13 to 24 at a glance, year of conduct is 2009.
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No. Name or
Pseudonym
Date Place of
Interview
Place of
Activities
Active with Trans-
lated
25 Freddie 25.9. Tokyo Hong Kong Hong Kong
independent
media
n
26 Hosaia Yuki 25.9. Tokyo Japan No G8 2008 y
27 Higuchi Takuro 26.9. Tokyo Japan No G8 2008
Infotour
y
28 Matsumoto
Hajime
26.9. Tokyo Tokyo Shiroto no ran,
community
activism
y
29 Randy Nobleza 1.10. Manila Manila Indymedia
Manila
n
30 Jun Cruz Reyes 2.10. Manila Manila Writer against
Corruption
n
31 Non-Collective 2.10. Manila Manila Food not
Bombs,
discussion
group
n
32 Ederic Eder 3.10. Manila Philippines TXTPower n
33 Joan, Julie,
Mina, Minerva
3.10. Manila Philippines Sinagbayan,
Linangan ng
kulturang
pilipino
n
34 Ma¯nasa-
Saro¯vara¯
14.10. Bangalore India Diverse Non
Violent Direct
Actions
n
35 Christy Raj,
Kannan
15.10. Bangalore Bangalore LesBIT,
Sangama
y
36 Akkai 16.10. Bangalore Bangalore Sangama y
Table B.4: Interviews 25 to 36 at a glance, year of conduct is 2009.
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No. Name Date Place of
Interview
Place of
Activities
Active with Trans-
lated
37 Al Alegre 16.10. Bangalore Philippines Foundation of
media
alternatives
n
38 Leo Saldanha 17.10. Bangalore India ESG n
39 Madhuresh
Kumar
19.10. Delhi India Delhi Solidarity
Group, NAPM
n
40 Ankur People 3.11. Delhi Delhi Ankur y
41 Vijayan 3.11. Delhi Delhi Delhi Forum n
42 Mohammad
Azhar Siddique
21.10. Lahore Lahore Lawyers’
Movement
n
43 Ahmeed Salemi 25.10. Lahore Lahore SAC n
44 Abeer Hamid 25.10. Lahore Lahore SAC n
45 Hamid Zaman 27.10. Lahore Lahore CCP n
46 Sakham Kahn 27.10. Lahore Lahore CCP n
47 Asad Jamal 28.10. Lahore Lahore Lawyers’
Movement
n
48 Anonymous2 3.12. Madrid Spain Hacktivism n
49 Iokese 4.12. Madrid Spain Hamlab /
Hacklab Madrid
n
50 Ricardo
Dominguez
4.12. Madrid Border-
lands
EDT,
B.A.N.G.lab
n
Table B.5: Interviews 37 to 50 at a glance, year of conduct is 2009.
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C
Index: Groups and Initiatives of the
Interviewees
The main trajectory here is not to research social movements, initiatives and
groups themselves. Nonetheless, it is still helpful to give an account of the inter-
viewees’ activities. Otherwise the accounts about their mobile media use would
often lack context.
What follows are descriptions that dominently are provided by the interviewees
themselves. I left out the groups and initiatives which do not play a role for the
mobile media practice the interviewees spoke about. As often, the accounts given
did then refer to other activities which developed parallel to the main engage-
ments and activities, but not within the main group of the interviewees. Where
necessary, I added further explanation. The general goal is to keep it brief. It is
not primarily intended to be read in one part, but as a reference to look up. As I
hesitate to categorize the groups by categories, they are ordered by country and
then alphabetically.
Additionally it is important to note that some interviewees are not present in
the following list, as they either did not count themselves part of steady group or
movement or they did not refer to a group strong enough for me to indicate the
relevance to name it.
C.1 Brazil
CMI and Forum Centro Vivo (Sa˜o Paulo)
We do a lot of communication. That’s why I am part of Indymedia,
CMI. I am mostly engaged with social movements here in the center,
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downtown. Which means my involvement is with the squatters, hous-
ing movement, the garbage collectors, who do recycling, with informal
street vendors, street dwellers. Everything that is poor. All that is a
outcast. And we have a forum, called Forum Centro Vivo and in this
forum we try to work together. Because every movement has its own
focus. The idea is to have a common agenda. And you have people
from universities working together with social movements. And a lot of
NGOs, from the church to whatever.
Alface / Sa˜o Paulo
The Brazilian Indymedia is called CMI. Many of my interviewees from Brazil
count it as a major source of information about activities and grassroots move-
ments in Brazil.
Since last year with the state government, we are mostly involved with
evictions. Of course there are a few possibilities to occupy something,
but very few here in the center.
Alface / Sa˜o Paulo
Occupations and squatting in Sa˜o Paulo are also the background of MTST and
the two interviewees Ferna˜o and M.
Cooper Glicero (Sa˜o Paulo)
The Cooper Glicero is an effort of self-organization from poor city dwellers and
trash collectors to raise their standard of living and to organize themselves.
The activities involves strengthening the struggle of the collectors,
organising the collectors, so that they can claim collectively the ac-
knowledgement of their job. And claim rights, be acknowledged by
government and society.
Christoph and Bispo / Sa˜o Paulo
As the workers are spending their work day throughout the city, they are relying
on mobile phones to have internal communication in case of emergency situations
or aggressive behavior towards colleagues by authorities.
Movimente Passa Livre (Sa˜o Paulo)
From the free transportation movement, we think we have to change
the idea what a city is. We think the city is a right, and not only a
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thing to consume, but something to have access to. We fight that others
have the right to use the city. To use and to change the city. We use
the same concepts as David Harvey has for the city. So we fight for
a different city that is more participative for the people. The public
transportation in Brazil is very low quality and we fight to get a better
public transportation, but not only that: we think the city discussion
is very important, too.
Legume / Sa˜o Paulo
David Harvey is a geographer coming from a Marxist tradition, who is an
important point of reference for numerous anti-gentrification activists and people
who are trying to prevent urban space from being privatized.
For public transportation we have so many things: we made mani-
festations in the streets, we do work in secondary schools, we made a
discussion about transports in the schools with teenagers. We let the
people think about the importance of transport and their own life. We
have some activists that do workshops and discussions that try to go
deeper in discussion, more deeper thinking about city, and we have
these discussions in communities away from the centre, in suburbia,
about transport and about the problems of these communities. And
we have articulations with different social movements, like MST and
MTST,
Legume / Sa˜o Paulo
M is focusing on the involvement of the youth in the free transportation move-
ment.
The Free Pass Movement comes from a dissatisfaction, mainly from
students in the public high school system. These students were dissat-
isfied that the student unions were used by parties. Basically it startet
by 14 to 18 year old people, influenced by popular revolts against par-
ties, e.g. Trotzkists. And they reclaimed autonomy, self-organisation,
this kind of claims. When the movement started in 2005, it was from
dissatisfaction from the organised left in Brazil, and also because on
the other hand there was this problem that cities were growing larger
and especially youth wouldn’t have access to cinemas and such things
that would happen in the city, football games. As they were obliged
to have access, there was nothing to be done in the neighbourhood. In
short, the Free Pass Movement defines itself as an autonomous, non-
party, and horizontal social movement for public free and good qualtity
public transportation. We believe it is a right to the city, it should not
be paid for. Therefore we have good connections to the homeless move-
ment and the landless movement. Our main actions usually happen
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when the fares go up, then we can gather more people. It is a national
movement, demonstration happen nationwide. And when the fare has
gone up, we have been able to gather some 5000 people.
M / Sa˜o Paulo
Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (Brazil)
MST is a huge organization with branches all over Brazil. It has a lot of power as
it can mobilize hundred thousands of people. It is hierarchically organized, has
paid workers, and even an alternative MST University. MST positively refers to
the Cuban model. This makes it the most traditional leftist political movement
in this research.
MST has national congresses every five years, since the movement
was founded in 1984. Every five years there are goals defined, some
are permanent. 1. the fight for land. 2. the fight for land reform.
3. the fight for social transformation. Every five years, new things
arrive, then we adjust to these specific historical moments. Fight for
social transformation: MST comes in a context of prior struggles. Land
is a major issue here, through the concentration of landownership in
Brazil. Therefore we believe that the struggle for deconcentration of
landownership implies the deconcentration in many other power fields.
MST Workers / Sa˜o Paulo
MST is organized in specific branches, whereas the fight for land and land
reform is its dominant part. The worker here recount the activities in all their
diversities, up to international relations.
The movement has different work divisions. First, access to production,
that involves mode of production, use of toxic stuff. 2nd is education.
MST has always worked on education. MST says we want to break the
case for land and education. Knowledge and school are as concentrated
in Brazil as land. This agenda has become more complex in the history
of MST. Education know means working in literacy for every age, a
sector for political education, small children and a programme for access
to university. Another activity is communication, that exists since the
beginning of the movements, where we already had a news bulletin.
Two main needs for internal communications. MST is the first national
land issue movement, a pioneer in landmovement, for its geographical
scope. For internal and external communications, we have different
media: news bulletins, community radio, the website, pamphlets. More
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sectors are: in every sector is a discussion of models. So, in the health
sector, we discuss what is a good health care for the workers. Gender is a
new sector that is very important, because sexism is another issue, that
we could have a long interview about here. It exists less than 10 years.
We have achieved that in any space of discussion the movement is always
represented by one male and one female. That is an encouragement
for woman to come out and speak. Another important sector is the
youth sector, where we try to put youth as political beings with specific
needs, the goal is to provide youth with the means not to leave the
countryside and go to the city. That happens often. Activities: in
the struggle of land, the main thing has always been land occupation,
but there have also always been other activities. Demonstrations in
capital cities, in government bodies relating to land issues. We also
work together with other movements, MST is engaged in a broad range
of political issues, many fronts where MST is engaged. Within that is
the sector of international relations, not only land issue movements in
Latin America. The global one is “V´ıa Campesina”. Another sector is
culture: we discuss what is the model of popular culture and how to
build this model, not just spread regular common widespread bourgois
culture. Theater, film and video.
MST Workers / Sa˜o Paulo
Movimento dos Trabalhadores e Trabalhadoras Sem Teto (Brazil)
MTST emerged out of MST and out of the analysis that the city, the urban, is
an important place of struggles.
It started from a perception within MST that they needed to act in the
city from their analysis of the movement. They realized in the late 90’s
that there would be no revolution without action in the cities. They
could not disregard cities. Because 85% of the Brazilian population
live in cities. Then there was a big discussion within MST, as this idea
was evolving, what should bring the activists together: Is it the city and
work or is it housing and city? There was a division with two movements
then, one called the MTD, the movement of the unemployed workers,
and the other one is MTST, the roofless workers movement. MTD is
much more of a branch of MST, more closely connected, and although
there are people within MTST which are actually part of the MST or-
ganisational structure, MTST is a much more independent movement.
During this period from 97 to 2001/2 the movement had some very
potent occupations, Anita Origori with 5000 people in one building.
But most important was the occupation of an empty land plot that was
owned by Volkswagen. This got the support from German Volkswa-
gen workers. That happened in Lula’s first year in his city, where his
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union is important. That is were his political career began. But back
then we were still in a frame of mind that came from MST. In 2004,
when I got in contact with MTST, there was a brief occuption in the
city of Sa˜o Paulo, important because of the location. It was evicted
by the government fast. By then the movement existed in three states:
Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo. But this was a critical
moment, the movement almost died because of obstacles we faced in
organising people and bringing people together, at least in Sa˜o Paulo.
But it was also a turning point for the movement. In 2005 we had this
occupation in another central spot in Sa˜o Paulo. This is when I think
we broke with this frame of mind which was the countryside view on the
city. So we then became an actual grassroots city movement. So this
occupation in Taho, was very interesting: it brought to the attention
of many different movements in Sa˜o Paulo, especially the south of Sa˜o
Paulo. The occupation was almost in Campo Limpo, a district that
is the entrance to the south of the city. So this occupation was very
visible for the people in the area. Many people got in touch, went in
and went out. New people made contact. That was very interesting.
Besides the Hip Hop movement, also the theatre people linked up and
got interested. Also from the University of Sa˜o Paulo people were en-
gaged in that. That was a break with the point of view. This was a
real urban occupation. When MST was thinking about MTST, they
thought about the periphery of the city. But this occupation brought
it in other contexts, building a bridge. This was entirely urban. We
dealt with a different set of problems and solutions. We had to deal
with the problem of churches in their power in some communities. In
one community the catholic priest would be a partner with drug sellers.
So, very complex situations regarding the powers in this community.
Ferna˜o / Sa˜o Paulo
C.2 India
Ankur (Delhi)
Ankur differs from others in this work. It can be described as an alternative
education program. When I met several members of very different ages, I soon
realized that it is hard to understand their principles and goals without having
a broader knowledge on India. Ankur provides different media labs1 in working
class settlements that are set up and grown over the years without official permis-
sions. These settlements are targeted by the municipality and other authorities
1 This is a collaboration with Delhi based Sarai. See http://sarai.net.
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frequently and are regularly shutdown with force by bulldozers.
Taking photographs, doing interviews, logging. Logging the particular
circumstances of specific places. We use the mobile phones for docu-
mentary purposes. The mobile phone is a kind of instrument that we
can take our time as a archive. We go somewhere, take it it to archive.
If a locality takes this kind of archiving, so what is this kind of archiv-
ing? A person took 400 photographs a year of a particular locality. So,
we collect photographs and try to understand what has changed in this
year, what does it say about the locality and the person. It could be the
meetingplace, the house, anything. Everybody lives intellectual life and
wants to archive it. It could be the tea stall, the hair cutting saloon. It
is all working class settlements we are talking about.
Anonymous People from Ankur / Delhi
I interviewed a couple of Ankur people mainly to get a picture of what mobile
media means in their educational program. Ankur had been active and present
during the brutal shutdown of one of the biggest of such settlements in Delhi.2
They documented the proceeding and especially the residents’ reactions. By ap-
proaching mobile media first of all as a way of personal, emotional and intellectual
expression, Ankur researches with modest means the usage of mobile phones as
an amplifier of critical situations. The idea is that young people who learn to ex-
press themselves with means such as a mobile phone are in a much better position
to express their needs.
Delhi Forum
The Delhi Forum has not a topic of its own on the agenda, but tries to facilitate
the expression of other groups fights. It takes advantage of the centralization of
India, where Delhi is the central power hub.
I basically participate here in Delhi as a coordinator of the Delhi Forum.
This has a simple mandate: to support the people’s struggles across
the country. Being positioned in Delhi, the capital, means campaign
support, legal support. Delhi is the centre as the parliament is here,
the constitutional court is here. Delhi has that kind of extra influence
2 “Nangla Maanchi was one of the largest settlements on the bank of the river Yamuna,
transformed from a fly ash deposit into a lively settlement by its inhabitants. Nangla
was demolished in 2006 to make way for the new Riverfront, and some of the settlers
have been relocated to Ghevra on the far North of the city.” See: http://www.sarai.net/
practices/cybermohalla/generative-contexts/locality-labs.
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over the rest of the country. Delhi Forum has played a key role in
terms of lobbying and legal matters. We also do basic support for social
movements when they come to Delhi to do demonstrations. We support
them, running around for them and organise stuff, also when they are
coming to Delhi some of them stay here as a second home. So that they
function from here. We coordinate a lot of the national level actions.
NAPM, National Forest Workers Forum, National Fish Workers Forum,
... There are different kinds of organisations, many anti-displacement
movements, indigenous movements. Women’s movement support as
well. Delhi Forum has never had to be the key organiser for the women,
but does support them too. We also are in a great network about gender
and women rights issues.
Vijayan / Delhi
Delhi Solidarity Group
In a similar way like the Delhi Forum, the Delhi Solidarity Group produces sites
of protest for organizations that are from others parts of India.
Here in Delhi I am part of a group called Delhi Solidarity Group.
Which tries to support solidarity support in form of organising press
conferences, demonstrations, providing advocacy campaign, some pub-
lications and do fact finding missions, for movements across the country.
Those who call upon us. As part of the Delhi Solidarity Group we also
try to organise discussion programs for the members, so that we can
ourselves learn and keep in touch with what is happening. In terms
of the history or in terms of knowing what positions different actors
are taking. So we try to engage on different levels, one is mainly as a
solidarity group and also actively being part of some movements. So,
for me I am much engaged with “Save Narmada”, which is against a big
damn being build in a central part of India.
Kumar / Delhi
Environmental Support Group (Bangalore)
The ESG is working with local communities about their life conditions in reference
to environmental problems. They have an agenda of research to conduct fact
finding missions.
I can define us as a research and campaign group. And we are about
13 years old now. We use the resources that we have to advantage com-
munities. To leverage their issues. We try to critique law and policy in
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particular. Often times we file investigations. All this helps us to work
with learning communities in a far more deeper way. We apply this
knowledge in a variety of educational programs and we adress school
children, college students, teachers, judges. So we work at multiple lay-
ers of education. In Bangalore we have been the lead in organising and
mobilising a wide range of criticism and responses in terms of technol-
ogy and environment. Right now we are mobilising people on the issue
of the metro destroying the city, its green area. That is one issue which
is predominently urban. Also we are a campaign group, holding press
conferences. Most of the city’s waste is dumped from a bridge. We have
been fighting for the last six years to get the landfill shutdown. So there
is a serious violation of human rights. We are working with communi-
ties about power plants, dams, mining projects and any type of issues
they are concerned about. We are also not a funded organisation. We
earn our money through research and educational programmes. Which
subsidises our campaigns.
Saldanha / Bangalore
National Alliance of People’s Movements (India)
This large umbrella organization of many social movements in India tries to bring
the many different issues and problems together that in a large country such as
India are otherwise distributed around the country.
My association is with National Alliance of People’s Movement. Which
is an umbrella organisation for many movements struggling, mainly for
the conservation of the national resources and it is against the corporate
and state take over of the national resources, land, water, air. On one
hand also on the issues of labour, culture. There is a big thing on the
right to work and the right to information. So there is a big movement
under this alliance and who work on different issues, mainly those for
the marginalised communities.
Kumar / Delhi
Sangama, LesBIT (Bangalore)
We are doing community support for sexual minorities.
Raj and Kannan / Bangalore
Akkai gives a more detailed picture about the practice of this in Bangalore.
If any violation happens against a sexual minority, if the crisis is there,
we take it as a campaign. The Hijras were forced and taken to the police
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station and they were charged a case against them. Sangana has its own
crisis team to negotiate with the police. When we receive a phone call
about this, we all gather in front of the police station. So then starting
to protest. Demanding to release those people. To take down the batton
charge against them (this is a beating up charge). Often we do things
as a campaign. We also communicate internationally. Taking that issue
as a campaign and alerted people. People were very sympathised. That
kind of sympathy came from the public. So, then the local people and
the political parties demanded to give descend jobs to Hijras. So after
that, it was a local change here in Bangalore. But there are more things.
We go for the gay lesbian marriage.
Akkai / Bangalore
Hijras are a minority group in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh often called
“third gender”. They situate themselves neither as males nor females. By doing
so they are actively gender-troubling the traditional society and question clas-
sic gender roles. They face severe discrimination by the male dominated police
forces. Sangama also supports sex workers in their struggles for rights, campaigns
against forced marriages, and organizes shelter places for young queer, gay, les-
bian or intersexual people who are trying to escape from their families and local
communities and be able to live the way how they feel without harassment.
C.3 Japan
No G8 2008 Japan
When the G8 summit in summer 2008 took place on the island of Hokkaido¯ ac-
tivists set up a protest infrastructure, an independent media center and organized
demonstrations. This followed the examples of the 1999 Seattle WTO protests,
which was a starting point for a new protest movement against economic global-
ization.
Before last year we already knew that at our town the G8 summit
will be held. After getting to know that, we looked to learn at other
countries. We made press work to get people to act against the G8
summit. So we set up three or four organisation groups, setting up
a camping ground, a media centre and to support NGOs. So our staff
seperated into these fields. At that time I was interested in independent
media, I wanted get to know the situation, so I joined a group to set up
a media centre.
Hosaia / Tokyo
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Apart from Yuki Hosaia, Yasudo Yukihiro and Higuchi Takuro are interviewees
from this group.
Shiroto No Ran (Tokyo)
Shiroto No Ran is a group from Tokyo: it focuses on neighborhood and community
based mutual aid, by operating several second hand stores in an economically
declining area of Tokyo. It got famous through humorist activities, such as a
candidate campaign for Matsumoto Hajime as Mayor of Tokyo. But this was only
a hack: because a mayor candidate is allowed to organize public meetings during
campaigning, Shiroto No Ran used this loophole to organize open gatherings with
music, beer drinking and public debates in places where this is usually strictly
forbidden.
Sometimes we organise demonstrations. Very local based motives. Like
a anti-rent demo, or a reclaim the bike demo, or a pro smoking demo,
where people come together to smoke together on the street, which is
forbidden. My group is called “shiroto no ran” that can be translated
to “amateur riot”.
Matsumoto / Tokyo
C.4 Mexico
Comite´ Cerezo (Mexico City)
The Comite´ Cerezo is based in Mexico City and is supporting political prisoners
in Mexico. The four Cerezo brothers, of whom my interviewee is one, had faced
severe repression, because their parents are both living underground in an armed
struggle. The brothers of Francisco are imprisoned. I was interested to interview
Francisco because he is living under total surveillance. Every move he makes is
followed as the authorities think he might contact his parents.
I am human rights activist, part of the comitee, permantly under threat,
like twelve threats already. Involved in different things, like security for
political activists
Francisco / Mexico City
There is a trimestrial publication called Revuelta, which publishes political ar-
ticles related directly or indirectly to the cases for seven years now.3
3 See http://www.comitecerezo.org.
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First of all we do documentation about the situation of political pris-
oners, also workshops for human rights groups regarding security.
Francisco / Mexico City
Security for human rights groups as for example good practices of mobile me-
dia use and the application of privacy enhancing technologies are amongst these
workshops.
Laneta (Mexico City)
One of the first alternative electronic communication organizations, Laneta4 has
in many years of work collected experiences about how activists understand and
use digital communication means.
La Neta is an organization that was born in 1992, it tried since the be-
ginning to offer to other civil society organization communication tools.
At that time it was the communication through computers. It was the
first intention to enable communications between organization because
the organizations were in very difficult period. At that time, the fed-
eral government tried to control very tightly not only politically but
also financially. So there was a big movement in Mexico from South
to North, but communication means were not enough. They needed a
special form to communicate fast and cheap. That was our first objec-
tive. Then Laneta built a special service for these organizations, so we
have our first server. We started in a very practical sense. Then, we
joined APC. In this way we put together different Mexican and organi-
zations from other countries. Especially in terms of social movements,
or projects, at that time the internet was not very popular. Then the
Zapatisa movement came and Laneta was a virtual space for that. In
some special periods we had more than a 1000 organization that worked
through Laneta. I joined in 1996, in that period Laneta gave a lot of
internet and training workshops, maybe 200, for organizations not only
in the cities, but also rural, Oaxaca, Chiapas. With this possibility peo-
ple could put a lot of information in the internet. At this time, we were
the only option for these people. Maybe it is important to say that we
were the first server outside universities in 1992. At that time it was
only a communication service for other organizations.
Olinca / Mexico City
APC is the “Association for Progressive Communications”, a global umbrella
organization with around 50 members in 35 countries.5 The second interviewee
4 See http://www.laneta.apc.org.
5 See http://www.apc.org.
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from Laneta explains the range of groups that use Laneta’s communication ser-
vices.
In general it is a plurality of various groups, from feminist groups,
groups that are working with children, indigenous organizations, stu-
dent movement, human right organizations. And that spectrum in-
cludes more leftist groups like some in solidarity with Cuba or related
to the Zapatista struggle. The common denominator is that these left-
ists groups have is social justice. These are the groups that are hosted
at LaNeta
Enrique / Mexico City
C.5 Pakistan
Concerned Citizen of Pakistan
CCP is mainly comprised of wealthy Lahore citizens that helped organize demon-
strations during the lawyer’s protests in Pakistan.
I am the president of this group that we call “society of concerned cit-
izens of Pakistan”, or CCP for short. We are two years old. We started
in Novembre 2007 after the Chief Justice was sacked. And we are just a
group of concerned citizens without any political affiliations who came
together to struggle for only one agenda, which was the restauration of
the constitution and the rule of law. This was the first time since the
70’s that such a movement existed, very long, for two years.
Hamid Zaman / Lahore
CCP is in part based on long acquaintances and neighborhood relations.
For the Lawyer’s movement we were part of the concerned citizens of
Pakistan. Which were few like-minded people that came together that
we knew from our highschool days. We all knew something had to be
done, we were not sure what we should do. The CCP were supportive
of the lawyer’s movements agenda, the restauration of the Chief Justice.
The objective was to go after courts, because we knew the dictator had
shown his real face by removing the Chief Justice.
Sakham Khan / Lahore
CCP were particular instrumental in explorations of mobile media use within
the protests.
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Lawyers’ Movement (Pakistan)
The Lawyers’ Movement in Pakistan was a reaction to Musharraf’s sacking of the
Chief Justice in 2007 including other measures to erase an independent jurisdic-
tion (see the case study in chapter 4 for details).
I interviewed two local lawyers that were very active in the protests, Asad Jamal
and Mohammad Siddique. Another lawyer was Devin Theriot-Orr. US citizen,
he spent the times of the lawyer’s movement in Lahore, working for the Human
Rights Commission Pakistan and supporting the protests.
The main activities were getting together, coming out in the streets, e.g.
right from the beginning lawyers decided to hold a protest march almost
on daily basis, and then it became a weekly affair. I was getting out
in most of them. One of the judges, after the imposition of emergency,
was served a notice to vacate the house. We spent three nights at his
place, raising slogans, showing solidarity. Then we were sending SMS
via mobile phones. And at one point of time, when people were started
getting arrested, we were holding secret meetings. One was held at my
place, and at other friends places. We were following the cases of those
who were getting arrested, we were going to the jail standing outside
there. On the 10th of decembre, the international human rights day,
for the first time after the imposition of emergency, after five weeks,
we got together in huge numbers at the high court. We spent two days
preparing at different secret places pamphlets, banners, sticks to hold
up the banners. The gathering must have been something like 4000
people. Mostly lawyers, but citizens as well. As well as political party
workers. Normally lawyers in those days came out with 1500, but that
day it was big. Lawyers was one group, obviously the predominant
group.
Asad Jamal / Lahore
Student Action Committee (Pakistan)
The SAC from LUMS University in Lahore developed an expertise in the use of
mobile media and online media during the lawyer’s protests. Additionally they
were in close contact with oversea students. The SAC worked as an information
distribution hub into different media technologies.
Soon after my arrival in Lahore, a bomb went off on an university campus in
Islamabad. The consequence was that all universities in the country were closed
during most of my stay. As students from private universities, such as Lahore
University of Management Sciences (LUMS), had played a crucial role in the
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protests, this closure made it hard for me to meet students and faculty members.
Nonetheless I managed to meet some and conduct two interviews with former
students, Abeer Hamid and Ahmed Salemi.
I was a student that time, we organised rallys, seminars to educate
people, long marches, strikes. And a big use of mobile phone. That was
the basic thing to mobilise the people.
Abeer Hamid / Lahore
C.6 Philippines
Linangan Ng Kulturang Pilipino (Manila)
Linangan ng kulturang pilipino is a culture research institute. It
deals about raising the level of nationalism of the filippino people, be-
cause the American colonialism, or imperialism shall we say, is very
much embedded in the filippinos mind: that the americans are good
people. But essentially what they did to this country for a hundred
years already is really plain exploitation, depravation and repression of
the people. That’s why we start to educate them about the situation.
To eradicate their colonial mentality, their feudal hang ups and also
the tendency to be individualists and not to care for their country and
countrymen. We do a lot of research and also a lot of education, and
also lecture series.
Mina, Minerva, Joan, Julie / Manila
Sinagbayan (Manila)
Sinagbayan means “art for the people”, it is cultural mass organisa-
tion. It is just one of the cultural organisation here in the Philippines
that is working for popularization of progressive arts and culture. So
we use different disciplines of art to educate the people, to popularize
progressive mass culture. We make theater productions, poetry read-
ings. Most of our productions are into the lifes of the poor people. How
we adress the issues of the people. It is always a collective effort, we
organise in schools and communities, we organise youth. We conduct
workshops, it is free for the communities. To enhance the skills of the
youth and serve their communities. And we conduct also education
discussions, it is like an alternative progressive education for the youth,
where we discuss issues, see how we analyse them in the context of the
Philippines struggle. To continue the struggle. We have been working
since 2000 and we organise the artists youth students, who study film
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and also artists to network them, so it is a way for them contribute in
the social movement and development of the country.
Mina, Minerva, Joan, Julie / Manila
TXTPower (Manila)
The people from the Philippines are SMS addicts. SMS is by far the most popular
telecommunication method on the South-East Asian archipelago. Due to the
extreme precarious economic situation of most of the Philippine people, the costs
for SMS play a critical role for all social activities. TXTPower is a consumer
organization that fights for cheap SMS services countrywide. They published a
manifesto “Texter’s unite! Stand up to the telecom monopolies” in 2001,6 which
addresses the plans of national telecom operators to raise charges for SMS.
Txtpower started in August 2000, that was a month after the second
people power revolt. At that time the mobile companies announced that
they are cutting off the free txting allocations. Before, for every 300
peso prepaid card you bought, you get 300 free txt messages. A group
of activists formed themselves into TXTpower. The group started a
boycot campaign for using txting one day. They wanted to excel some
pressure on the phonecompanies.
Eder / Manila
I interviewed Ederic Eder, a member of TXTPower, to gather more information
about the relevance of SMS for the struggles of activists and social movements.
The “second people power revolt” he refers to was an uprising against the corrupt
president Estrada, in which according to many partakers mobile media played a
crucial role for mobilization. This was in 2001. It is often described as the first
SMS revolution, for example by Rheingold (2002).
C.7 South Korea
Yongsan Candlelight Media Center (Seoul)
The Seoul based Yongsan Candlelight Media Center is set up in the neighborhood
of the tragic site of Yongsan, sometimes referred to as the “Yongsan Massacre”:
On January 20th 2009 a police raid on activists and tenants protesting their
6 It is reproduced here, see appendix E.1.
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eviction from a central building in Seoul caused the death of six people, most of
them being burned. This was followed by large protests, which then again were
facing heavy repression. The media center is situated within this neighborhood
as a meeting place, social place and media production place.7
We are not an organisation per se. We operate a media centre at
the yongsan tragedy site. What we do is basically that we keep an
eye on what the police is doing in regard to police violence. We also
have performances, concerts in support of the struggle, also we have
an exhibition space. We operate a cafe´ and also have an oral history
project.
Two Korean Activists
C.8 Spain
Hamlab (Madrid)
Iokese refers to the squat “Patio Maravillas”8 which was located in central Madrid
and which hosted the Hacklab, an autonomous laboratory for technological re-
search. This squat has been evicted on January 5th 2010. The Hacklab was a
center of activities for the development and deployment of mobile media tools,
such as a SMS emergency tool. Hack labs are spaces of tool and knowledge pro-
duction. DIY workshops and in general technology centered activities take place
here.
We fight on several levels. On the local level, we help the squat,
we help them during the time of the life and when the police comes.
We try to make a neighbourhood science place where everybody can
come. There is a lot of science experiments in this squatted house.
So, that’s the local plan. The other projects is trying to use our best
force showing the government that we have a new democratic system
that makes unnecessary parts of the institutions now. Because we, the
citizen, can decide everyday what we want. Citizen represents dignity
and a lot of things, so it is a nice word. We made some tools that show
people that it is possible to participate in direct actions that can change
the reality. Our best practice has been a Xmailer software used in the
development of the EU telecom package last year. We gained one more
year, because we stopped a vote. We send out more than 400.000 mails
7 See http://mbout.jinbo.net.
8 See http://defiendelo.patiomaravillas.net
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a day, giving the media the attention to this problem. The European
Parliament stopped the vote and now they have another year to put the
telecom package to work. So, we are not happy with the final result, but
it is better now. Another one is the Xvoiper, a software who helps the
people to call for free literally to the local phones of the EP members, to
explain them that they must vote. We made other tools, like Bluetotem,
a software to send bluetooth messages in a demonstration to everyone.
We had been collaborating with a lot of European networks to make
complaints and stop some problematic laws. Even we had some local
actions, like assaulting the building of the Sociedad General de Autores.
Iokese / Madrid
The Sociedad General de Autores is the collecting society for artists in Spain.
Same as German GEMA and American ASCAP, this organization is involved
with so called “anti-piracy” lobbying and policing. These are big player that are
interested in data retention schemes.
C.9 UK
Consume (London)
Consume is a community based wireless network project in London.9 Steven
James is one of the founding persons behind it. As it provides autonomous
wireless media infrastructure, it is one of the few projects that offers insights
into mobile media activism in possession of all means of productions. In section
9.2, Startx and James Stevens are explaining the motivations and activities.
C.10 USA
Anti Censorship Activists (New York City)
“Anti Censorship” here stands for the efforts of Nathan Freitas and his colleagues.
It does not refer to any specific larger Anti Censorship movement. Nathan and
his tech-savvy friends are active in supporting freedom speech in Tibet, Burma
and China with sophisticated mobile media technologies that secure these needs.
9 Its history is well documented online at http://dek.spc.org/julian/consume/.
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There is sort of a subgroup of technologists for work for causes that are
similar, that we all want to use the tools of technology for good. Good
is sort of loose. For open communication without censorship and with
privacy and anonymity when people want it or need it. We are doing a
lot of collaborations with different groups, so in support of students for
a free Tibet, or the “Free Tibet” campaign, so we work with them and
they are activists who perform the action and then the technology folks
support it. There is no name, it is not formal, it is sort of this network
of people and friends, but if you look at it, we came out of the “Ruckus
society”. To make a noise. The Ruckus Society came out of Greenpeace
and Greenpeace had all this techniques for great protests and they said,
wow, we should take these techniques and teach other movements. How
can we take our knowledge and share it beyond Greenpeace. And so the
Ruckus Society was created. The work I do comes out of that tradition.
But the technology aspect is kind of a new thing and is doesn’t have a
name, it is loose.
Freitas / NYC
Freitas explains the two kinds of activities that this entails:
It is kind of two types of activities. One is support of direct action. So
someone is going to do a protest on a mountain or repell off of a building
with a banner. Or there is gonna be a large day of action. In that case
they do need a technology to support them in communications. So we
enable via textmessaging through live video streaming, through satellite
communication. We enable communication between the people in the
movement and also to the media. And to kind of a global audience.
So that’s usually around a day of convergence or protest day of action.
The second type of activity is more technology development, building
tools, training. A longer sighted kind of work. And this is where the
project I am working on with Android is focused and also other small
projects around this.
Freitas / NYC
The Android project is called “Guardian”. Secured communication tools for
the Android platform are deployed here, from encrypted chat clients to a port of
the anonymity software Tor.10
I Witness Video (New York City)
IWV has a very specific orientation in media production.
10 See https://guardianproject.info/.
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I am active with a group called “I witness video” which is a group that
documents police misconduct. Like Indymedia it started at the large
convergences, but also like Indymedia it has kind of a community focus.
Goldberg / NYC
The large convergences Goldberg refers to are counter summits during WTO,
G8 or G20 meetings.
“I witness video” is sort of the interesting one in all of this, because
they rely on technology more. It is different from Indymedia in that the
video collected is primarily for legal defense or to capture a particular
bad case of police brutality. But as a strategy more than being jour-
nalists. The big thing we do is we go to a demonstration, and we will
set up an office and we have people out there with video cameras in
teams, but then someone has to go back and log off all the information
into a database. There is a lot of technical video work to be done. And
they also have a team out there during critical mass in NYC. In NYC
you get arrested for critical mass these days. It happens once a month.
And also because we have been doing this sorts of work for years we
have developed both relationships and expertise that we then use for
instance when community groups want to start their own Cop Watch.
Many community groups have their own Cop Watch in their own neigh-
bourhood and so we do trainings and exchange information and so on.
Goldberg / NYC
Wireless Seattle
Wireless Seattle has a lot of things in common with London based Consume. I
have interviewed Matt Westervelt for historical reasons mainly. Seattle is nowa-
days de facto covered with a municipal wireless network. The urgent need for
self-made connectivity is long gone. But still, the experiences made to build an
autonomous network infrastructure from below, without any commercial inter-
ests, give insightful hints towards hacking media technologies. Matt Westervelt
gets extensively quoted in the second part of section 9.2.
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List of URLs
• http://2007.dissent.org.uk
• http://www.agp.org
• http://annalist.noblogs.org
• http://www.apc.org
• http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-12094227
• https://www.ccc.de/en/updates/2011/staatstrojaner
• http://www.comitecerezo.org
• http://defiendelo.patiomaravillas.net
• http://einstellung.so36.net
• https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/08/want-public-safety-dont-disable-cell-phones
• https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/04/european-data-retention-directive-work-
polish-authorities-abuse-access-data
• http://effaustin.org/2011/08/statement-on-san-francisco-bart-cellphone-service-
shutdown/
• http://freifunk.net
• http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch stgb/englisch stgb.html
• http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch stpo/index.html
• http://www.geotime.com/Product/GeoTime-(1).aspx
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• http://global.freifunk.net
• http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/may/11/police-software-maps-digital-movements
• http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/oct/30/metropolitan-police-mobile-phone-
surveillance
• https://guardianproject.info/
• http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=
bgh&Art=en&sid=52c1c2b856536c08dab95908724bccfd&nr=52160&pos=0&anz=
1
• http://www.laneta.apc.org
• http://mbout.jinbo.net
• http://www.mobileactive.org
• http://www.philzimmermann.com/EN/essays/BookPreface.html
• http://www.sarai.net
• http://seattlewireless.net
• http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/07/07/BA9U1K7O2C.
DTL
• http://www.sueddeutsche.de/digital/ueberwachung-per-stiller-sms-niedersachsen-
jagt-verbrecher-mittels-eines-privaten-dienstleisters-1.1295001
• http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/
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The Texter’s Manifesto
Texters’ Declaration
Texters unite! Stand up to the telecom monopolies!
We, cell phone subscribers of all ages and classes, inspired by our role as information
providers in People Power 2, conscious of our rights as consumers and citizens, and
believing that power lies at the hands of a united people, declare the following:
We are outraged over the plan of Globe Telecoms and Smart Communications to cut
their free text message (SMS) allocations for all subscribers. This is nothing but a bla-
tant profiteering scheme by monopolies in the Philippine telecommunications industry
whose greed for profits have become insatiable; We do not believe that these monopolies
are losing money. In its midyear 2001 report, Globe declared a total of P15.4 billion
in gross operating revenues, signifying a 84.6% increase from P8.4 billion for the same
period in 2000. Globe’s net income for the first quarter of the year is P1.07 billion.
(Source: Globe website)
For its part, Smart reversed its financial situation from a loss of nearly P1.9 billion in
the first half 2000 to a net income of P1.8 billion in the same period this year. For the
six months ended 30th June 2001, Smart had subscriber revenues of P12.3 billion, or
an 85.3% increase from revenues of P6.6 billion for the same period in 2000. (Source:
Smart website)
We are sick and tired of their promises of new equipment and network expansion efforts
when all we get are late text messages, dropped calls, generally lousy services, weak
signals, questionable accounting of calls and text messages and high fees. In fact,
majority of us who have prepaid accounts are forced to accept one-sided terms and
bereft of any protection from bad services.
Figure E.1: The Texter’s Manifesto, Manila.
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Its about time that Globe and Smart their promises.
We are frustrated that the government, instead of protecting the Filipino consumer,
seems to be coddling monopolies like Globe and Smart. The National Telecommuni-
cations Commission (NTC) has failed to protect public interest and has allowed these
companies, in the guise of deregulation, to engage in highly immoral and rapacious
monopolistic practices.
Now we ask the people, is this what we get for making the Philippines the text messaging
capital of the world? Is this what we consumers deserve for giving these monopolies
billions in annual profits? How audacious for Globe and Smart to threaten us with
higher rates if we do not agree to their scheme!
We are calling on the Filipino consumers to act now to protect our rights. We specifically
demand that:
1. Globe and Smart refrain from carrying out their free text message reduction scheme.
2. The NTC investigate and resolve persistent complaints of lousy services from Globe,
Smart and other telecommunication service providers in the country
3. The government reviews its telecommunications policy, especially the deregulation
of the market which has allowed monopolies like Smart and Globe to dictate on the
consumers.
Done on 27 Aug. 2001, Quezon City, Philippines.TXTPOWER
Anthony Ian Cruz, activist writer
Raymond Palatino, student leader
Sandra Araullo, athlete
Ruth Cervantes, radio broadcaster
Trixie Concepcion, environmentalist
Roland Tolentino, college professor
Emil Mercado, visual artist
Rey Asis, campus journalist
Gerry Kaimo, net-activist
Sign your name, forward to your friends, and send a copy of this manifesto to
txtpower[at]hotmail[dot]com.
Figure E.2: The Texter’s Manifesto, Manila. Continued
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Glossary and Abbreviations
ACLU American Civil Liberties Union. A non-profit US organization that en-
gages in the protections of citizen’s rights, like the freedom of speech. 152
Authentication in technological terms a mechanism that ensures on a mathe-
matical base the authenticity of the sender. 194
CAE Critical Art Ensemble. A group of artists/activists that try to shift the
discourse towards question of technology and society by using digital tech-
nologies, or biotechnology as practical ways of disturbing and intervening
into public discourse. 130
CCP Concerned Citizen of Pakistan. A group based in Lahore, mostly with
a wealthy background, that was formed to support the demands of the
lawyers. 72, 235
CMI Centro di Midia Independente. 232, 238
Confidentiality In digital communication technology, confidentiality means that
a message can not be read by an unintended party. 195
DDoS Distributed denial of service. From many distributed networked comput-
ers, a huge amount of requests to one server are sent; more than the server
can handle. This is leading to a denial of service at the targeted server,
rendering it inoperative. 130
Deniability To be able to deny a message in digital communication technology
translates into the guaranteed singularity of each encrypted message: even
if one message is deciphered by third parties, past and future ones are not.
197
DoD US Department of Defense. 130
ECD Electronic Civil Disobedience. An attempt to transpose civil disobedience
into the digital realm. A website is the place of a virtual sit-in, which is
manifested by reoccurring reloads of the page from many partakers. Special
software has been developed to reload the site automatically, thus it is
sometimes regarded as a distributed denial of service attack. 130
EDT Electronic Disturbance Theater. 130, 235
279
Glossary
EFF Electronic Frontier Foundation. A non-profit organization that engages in
the protection of citizen rights in the digital domain.. 152
ESG Environmental Support Group. 235
HTTPS HTTP secured with SSL. 196
IMEI International Mobile Station Equipment Identity is a 15-digits long, unique
serial number, which makes it possible to identify any GSM or UMTS client.
175
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity is a unique number which identifies
all SIM-cards. 173
Integrity in technological terms a mechanism that ensures on a mathematical
base the integrity of the message. Mostly that the content has not been
altered. 193
LAC Location Area Cell is the current cell a cell phone is logged in. 175
LEA Law Enforcement Agencies: an umbrella term for all governmental and non-
official governmental bodies from police to secret service. 167, 169, 171, 173,
183, 196
LUMS Lahore University of Management Sciences is a prestigious private Uni-
versity in Lahore, Pakistan. 76, 250
MCC Mobile Country Code. A code defined by the ITU that allocates a numerical
code for the country of the telecom provider of mobile phones. It is a part
of the IMSI. 171
MG Militant Group. A phantom-like group, or maybe more than one, of radi-
cal activists inhibiting force in their actions against the German state and
companies. No attacks on people are known. 167, 170
MNC Mobile Network Code. A code to uniquely identify a mobile phone opera-
tor/carrier using the one of the common mobile communications standards
such as GSM. 171
MPL Movimento Passe Livre. 232
280
MSC Mobile Switching Center. The primary service delivery node for GSM/CDMA,
responsible for routing voice calls and SMS as well as other services (such
as conference calls, FAX and circuit switched data). The MSC sets up
and releases the end-to-end connection, handles mobility and hand-over re-
quirements during the call and takes care of charging and real time pre-paid
account monitoring. 171
MSISDN Mobile Subscriber/Station Integrated Services Digital Network Num-
ber. A worldwide unique number for calling and use of a mobile phone.
Usually, every mobile set is matched with one number, but sets are present
which support more than one, mostly for different countries. Calling any of
these numbers let’s the same phone ring. 171
MST Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra. 232, 240
MTST Movimento dos Trabalhadores e Trabalhadoras Sem Teto. 232, 241
NACL National Action Committee of Lawyers. The main decision body of the
lawyers’ movement in Pakistan. 75, 88
NAPM National Alliance of People’s Movements. 235
OpenPGP Encryption and key management application a wide range of encryp-
tion and decryption purposes, often used for email or local file encryption.
192
OTR Off-the-Record Messaging is an encrypted messaging style that offers perfect
forward secrecy (PFS) and thus deniability. 197
PFS Perfect forward secrecy. 197
PGP Encryption application that historically made encryption available for com-
mon users. 192
PNR Passenger Name Records are the data sets that airlines collect about their
customers. Recent legislation in the European Union provides the retention
of this data at the US Department of Homeland Security with only very
weak anonymization and for more than a decade, including PNR of flights
within the EU. 128
281
Glossary
SAC The Student Action Committee was initiated at the LUMS in Lahore during
martial law. 78, 235
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol. The protocol to send emails. 194
282
